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Chapter 1  
 
Where Do We Go From Here? 
 
“As we talk about ‘Where do we go from here?’ we must honestly recognize where 
we are now…and face the fact that the movement must address itself to 
restructuring the whole of American society” (Martin Luther King, Jr., August 16, 
1967 SCLC Convention). 
 
We stand at a moment of uncertainty, having seemingly reached a 
number of dead ends while facing many crises in the emerging world order. Even 
if our old policy tools were up to the task of establishing stable economic growth, 
limited resources and environmental catastrophes seem to foreshadow inevitable 
and fundamental crises ahead. The sense of neoliberal inevitability that led 
Margaret Thatcher to claim that “there is no alternative” in the 1980s has 
foundered amidst mounting signs of economic and social meltdown, but it 
remains uncertain how resistance to this crumbling “Washington consensus” will 
develop or what will replace it. While this research project tackles only a small 
corner of this broader topic, it is connected via two linked assumptions. First, that 
working class movements remain central to determining the shape of the world 
economy, and second, that urban regions will continue to be important sites of 
economic accumulation and class struggle.  
This project compares emerging working class movements in three 
deindustrializing US cities—Pittsburgh, Milwaukee, and Chicago—with an eye 
toward these broader questions. Because organizers have met varying levels of 
success in each city over the past two decades, these cases help better 
understand why strong movements emerge in some places and not others. I was 
originally drawn to this set of questions by asking why recent economic justice 
struggles have been so weak and fragmented in Detroit (and Michigan as a 
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whole). As a native Michigander who has worked as both a community and labor 
organizer, this project is rooted in my search for strategies that might prove 
effective in my own patch of the Rust Belt. While efforts to build sustainable 
working-class movements in Pittsburgh, Chicago, and Milwaukee have not been 
completely effective, they offer many learning opportunities for organizers and 
researchers alike.  
This topic emerged from my involvement in a 2004 ballot initiative 
campaign to raise Michigan’s minimum wage. Many of the leaders of the 
campaign were interested in using it as an opportunity to build local progressive 
coalitions throughout the state and overcome the fragmentation dividing potential 
allies. The Republican legislature headed off the ballot initiative by passing an 
even larger increase (to avoid the presumed increase in Democratic voter turnout 
it would have produced). However, even before this deflated the campaign, I was 
struck by the immense challenge of bringing the many supportive groups 
together across cultural, organizational, and interpersonal barriers. Two years 
later, many of the same groups came together to oppose an anti-affirmative 
action ballot initiative, but often seemed to be starting from scratch. Scrambling 
to pull together a statewide electoral operation while fusing together a diverse 
coalition, the campaign never managed to gain momentum and lost by a sizable 
margin at the polls. 
Organizers in Milwaukee, Pittsburgh, and Chicago got tired of losing such 
defensive battles and began working together to develop proactive strategies in 
the 1990s. These three cities represent neither the “easiest” nor “hardest” places 
to build working-class movements in the US. While they have been hit hard by 
deindustrialization, pro-business regimes, and long histories of racial conflict, 
labor retains a significant political foothold and the general climate is not as anti-
worker as in some other regions of the country.  
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Coalitions in all three cities campaigned successfully for living wage 
ordinances1 in the late-1990s, but have followed different paths since. Chicago’s 
organizing efforts, which looked highly fragmented and less promising than the 
other two cities during the 1990s, built slowly and steadily and have since 
coalesced into the most vibrant and effective local movement in the region, 
largely because of the way organizers laid an early groundwork for success. After 
considerable early success, efforts in Pittsburgh and Milwaukee—mapping out 
ambitious structures to bring all potential allies into a single coalition—turned out 
to be unsustainable and failed catastrophically. While collaboration reemerged in 
Milwaukee relatively quickly, Pittsburgh activists continue to struggle. 
Why Do Movements Emerge Where and When They Do? 
The literature offers far more explanations for cases where movements fail 
to emerge, as in Detroit, than for the varying levels of success found in these 
three cities. One school of thought explores how broader political-economic 
context and “external” factors present barriers to movements. Another 
perspective focuses on a range of “internal” factors like fragmentation, divisions, 
and strategic shortcomings to explain the relative weakness of US working class 
movements. In an effort to better understand why some movements do emerge 
in the face of all these challenges, this project traces the evolution of local 
organizing strategies as they confront internal and external barriers in their efforts 
to unify local working class movements across difference and match their 
organizational forms and political strategies to the context, a process Edwin 
Amenta (2006) suggests is the most important variable explaining different 
movement outcomes. 
Because these perspectives are often applied somewhat erratically, 
observers of cities and working class organizing in the US seem subject to 
dramatic mood swings, resulting in parallel pessimistic and optimistic narratives 
within the urban and labor studies literatures. Cities are presented as either 
                                            
1 Arguably the defining local economic justice policy idea of the last decade, the first living wage 
ordinance was passed in 1994—not in Berkeley or Los Angeles, but Baltimore. Well over 100 
municipalities followed suit during the ensuing decade. 
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anachronistic remnants of an earlier age or our rediscovered future. Such 
dissonance is echoed in accounts of labor, which alternate between obituaries for 
a once-proud movement rendered toothless by increased capital mobility, racial 
divides, globalization, and self-destructive tendencies, and hopeful accounts of 
unions waking up from their lethargy, uniting with communities of color and 
churches, and embracing a broadly progressive agenda.  
This divergence stems in part from authors looking for different things; 
however, it also reflects the fact that both narratives capture a piece of the truth. 
Neoliberal capitalism2 is dominant in many ways—the legal and organizational 
basis of working class power has been eroded over time, urban policy is largely 
determined by business elites to protect real estate values rather than stimulate 
job growth or provide affordable housing, local governments are pitted against 
each other by corporations, and our communities remain dramatically segregated 
by race and class. Such fragmentation is a central problem for activists in cities 
and unions, as potential progressive allies are splintered by a multitude of 
parochial turf wars reinforced by pressures from above. However, one can also 
find hopeful signs that, backs pressed against the wall, unions and community 
groups are developing new organizing strategies to overcome the barriers 
separating them and promote a vision of more equitable urban regions that work 
for all their residents. 
While scholars explain the existence of such beacons of hope through 
both external and internal causes, the broader patterns of the social science 
literature tend toward structural explanations. For example, hopeful and 
pessimistic accounts of the labor movement often reflect a geographic split, with 
innovation and positive change on the coasts and Sun Belt (most often in 
California), while the Midwest rusts quietly. Of course, it was not always this 
way—a generation ago, the region now known as the Rust Belt was the heart of 
working class organizing in the US, while most of the West Coast seemed to 
                                            
2 Brenner and Theodore (2002:vi) describe neoliberalism as a “loosening or dismantling of the 
various institutional constraints upon marketization, commodification, the hyperexploitation of 
workers, and the discretionary power of private capital that had been established through popular 
struggles prior to and during the postwar period.” 
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embrace a sort of individualistic, uber-capitalist sprawl. How did these two 
regions come to switch places in our minds, and what does that transition imply 
for our investigations into urban working class organizing? 
As archetypal representatives of these two regions and their divergent 
trajectories, consider Detroit and Los Angeles, and particularly two well-known 
strikes of the 1990s. A longtime hub of left-wing organizing, Detroit was the 
symbolic center of America’s industrial union and Black Power movements, and 
elected a Black socialist mayor in 19733. While deindustrialization and job losses 
hit the region hard, Detroit remains a strong union town, and when workers at the 
two daily newspapers struck to protest blatant contract violations in 1995, it 
seemed reasonable to expect their eventual victory. However, even after building 
community support and coordinating boycotts, direct actions, and political 
interventions over the course of the five-year strike, the unions were forced to 
accept crushing concessions (Mirola, 2003). The loss set the tone for further 
contract take-backs and the erosion of public benefits. As of 2008, the state 
faces the worst foreclosure crisis in the nation, a wave of union-busting, and an 
effort to make Michigan a “right to work” state, but relatively little organizing or 
vocal opposition has emerged in opposition to this right wing assault. 
On the other hand, Los Angeles appears to have risen from the ashes in 
the 1990s, when a rejuvenated labor movement, in coalition with community 
organizations, is credited with transforming an “open shop” town into a bastion of 
working class power. The first widely noted sign of this trend came in the early 
1990s, when a Service Employees International Union (SEIU) local made up of 
largely undocumented immigrant janitors pulled off a historic victory by utilizing 
community networks and creative tactics to put direct pressure on building 
owners. Over the next decade, this emerging movement demonstrated a new 
willingness to treat members of the working class as “whole people” with multiple, 
interlocking interests. Churches became more willing to take a stand on behalf of 
                                            
3 Interestingly, 1973 is the same year many scholars use to mark the transition to a post-industrial 
economy and the rise of neoliberalism, suggesting what a difficult context Coleman Young and 
other African-American mayors of the era faced upon taking office (Sugrue, 1996). 
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their members’ work conditions; unions used their political clout to address 
members’ interests in clean air, affordable housing, and public transportation, etc. 
(Waldinger et al, 1996). This transformation emerged over time and through the 
conscious interventions of bridge-building leaders and a new intermediate layer 
of movement “halfway houses” like the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy 
(LAANE), which integrates policy, research, and organizing in their efforts to build 
a “city of justice” (Milkman, 2006). This transformation of Los Angeles has been 
reflected electorally in a wave of union-backed candidates, highlighted by former 
union organizer Antonio Villaraigosa becoming mayor in 2005. 
This reversal of roles between Los Angeles and Detroit is both hopeful 
and sobering. On one hand, such rapid transformations counter the fatalistic 
sense that change is impossible. On the other, it still remains unclear how much 
such transformation is caused by movement strategy and how much is due to 
external factors such as tight job markets and intense development pressures. 
The dominant narratives about the trajectories of such cities in both the social 
sciences and the popular press often reflect subtle shifts in analysis to claim 
movement success while explaining away failures. In a quintessentially American 
way, Detroit has been labeled a 20th century city, to be left behind as we head 
west and follow LA into the 21st. Perhaps due to some reluctance to place blame 
on activists to whom they are sympathetic, scholars who write about places like 
Detroit often present unions, community organizations, and even local 
governments as relatively powerless in the face of capitalists able to fly around 
the world playing workers off each other. Those who study places like Los 
Angeles, while no less critical of capitalism, often frame examples of resistance 
more optimistically, and celebrate actual victories like the Justice for Janitors 
campaigns perhaps beyond what their concrete impacts warrant.  
As with most such generalizations, the tendency toward structural 
explanations is based on a core of facts. It is indeed easier for organizers to win 
concessions where tight labor markets and increasing levels of capital 
investment exist, making the coasts and southwest more favorable terrain for 
workers than the deindustrializing Rust Belt. Numerically (and even qualitatively) 
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speaking, there is probably more innovation going on in these areas. However, 
many cities in the Sun Belt have not followed L.A.’s successful path, while strong 
movements have emerged in some Rust Belt cities, suggesting that strategy 
does matter. On the other hand, it is also problematic to draw general “best 
practices” from such regions rather than understanding them as attempts to 
match a set of strategies to a particular context. Given that a favorable economic 
context has played some role in its revitalization, the lessons of the L.A. 
movement might not have as much to offer Detroit as the dogged and piecemeal 
coalition-building efforts in other Rust Belt cities that are the focus of this study.  
In addition to these theoretical concerns, there are normative and practical 
reasons to pay attention to Rust Belt movements. Ethically, it is problematic to 
write off any region and its residents. Practically, while a working class 
movement can (and I would argue, should) be regionally-based, it cannot remain 
limited to certain regions and hope to achieve its larger goals. How the Rust Belt 
weathers deindustrialization will shape American politics for decades. The U.S. 
labor movement is still haunted by its post-WW II abandonment of the South after 
the failure of Operation Dixie led generations of leaders to write off the region as 
unorganizable. To build a more powerful movement, attention must be paid to 
these challenging contexts. As Steve Lopez (2004) argued in Reorganizing the 
Rust Belt, it is in cities like Pittsburgh, Chicago, and Milwaukee that we are able 
to observe the labor movement in transition, and thus better understand possible 
future directions for the movement as a whole.  
This project thus explores a surprising phenomenon—successful working 
class movements in the Rust Belt—by comparing the trajectories of labor-
community coalitions and working class movement-building in Chicago, 
Milwaukee, and Pittsburgh since the early 1990s. Before presenting an overview 
of each case and my findings, I will lay out the many reasons they should not 
exist through a brief review of the literatures on contemporary cities, 
neoliberalism, and urban working class movements. While these theorists largely 
explain movement failures, they can be read from another perspective to provide 
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clues for why strong working class movements emerge in some U.S. cities but 
not others. 
a. The Political Economy of Urban America 
Observers of urban politics generally agree that working class activists 
face a challenging political economic context. Regions have developed along 
fragmented geographies that separate people from each other, jobs, and 
decision-makers. Power relationships and decision-making are often obscured, 
either intentionally or through “common sense” assumptions that preclude certain 
ideas from public discourse. Pittsburgh, Milwaukee, and Chicago exemplify the 
sort of upper-Midwest industrial city that defined the 20th century. Over the first 
half of the past century, they were each sites of explosive growth, speculation, 
and class conflict, eventually producing a compromise between unions, 
businesses, and the state that created what we now think of as the American 
middle class.  
Two major schools of thought posit answers to the question of “who rules” 
US cities. Pluralists (e.g. Dahl, 1961) argue that local political systems are 
relatively open, requiring compromise and coalition-building among a variety of 
interest groups on major decisions. Regime theorists (e.g. Stone, 1989) criticize 
the pluralists inattention to behind-the-scenes negotiations and consensus-
building, suggesting that the power to set the policy agenda is held by a much 
smaller group of elites.  
The preponderance of evidence supports regime theory. Economic policy 
in these three cities, like most in the U.S., has long been dominated by a “growth 
coalition” of local capitalists, real estate interests, and politicians (Logan & 
Molotch, 1987). Local union leaders were incorporated into such “governing 
regimes” as second tier players, but politicians and wealthy elites remained the 
ultimate shapers of local discussions. Such regimes are sometimes formally 
organized into bodies such as Pittsburgh’s Allegheny Conference on Community 
Development, which was formed in 1943 and continues to play a central role 
linking the region’s economic and political elites. In other cases, the networks are 
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more informal, relying on overlapping board memberships, social connections, 
and a few key think tanks to forge consensus (Carroll & Shaw, 2001). Due to the 
durability of the Chicago Democratic machine, politicians have played a more 
central role in the city’s regime than most, and Milwaukee’s regime was not 
consolidated until the 1960s (Ferman, 1996; Rast, 2006). Still, classic growth 
machines have been established for several decades in each city. 
All three cities developed patterns of intense and durable racial 
segregation, particularly in housing but also employment, recreation, and politics 
(social scientists have called each the most segregated city in the US). Ira 
Katznelson (1981) has described the unique development of American urban 
politics as the furrowing of “city trenches,” with early political developments 
leading to a working class fragmented along lines of race, neighborhood, and 
occupation. The development of institutions (particularly urban political machines) 
from this foundation deepened and solidified the “trenches” separating the worlds 
of the workplace and the community. As manufacturing moved into suburbs and 
rural areas in the post-war era, recently arrived Southern workers (particularly 
African-Americans) were trapped in central city neighborhoods with little access 
to jobs (Sugrue, 1996). Beyond the ever-present black/white divides, each city 
has been marked by deep parochialism and rigid boundaries of religion, ethnicity, 
neighborhood, organization. Many in each city maintain a proud sense of 
uniqueness and resistance to outside ideas and people. Each is described as a 
“city of neighborhoods,” with city councils elected by districts.  
This “horizontal fragmentation” of urban communities has profound 
impacts on the shape and content of urban politics (Sites, 2007). The second half 
of the 20th century can be divided into two distinct phases. Key components of 
our present urban system emerged in the post-war decades—unified business 
elites promoting downtown development partnered with compliant politicians, 
labor unions focused narrowly on workplace concerns, and geographic 
fragmentation particularly marked by the flow of jobs, wealth, and white people to 
outlying suburbs. While in retrospect, this post-war social contract appears 
inherently weak, it took a fundamental transition in the world economy beginning 
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in the early 1970s to strip away the illusion that it was permanent and inevitable. 
Whereas the captains of industry had been leaving cities for suburbs, they now 
began abandoning whole regions, sometimes driven by industry-wide crises, with 
predictable multiplicative negative effects on local economies. Corporations went 
on the offensive against their workers, and right-wing activists increased their 
efforts to apply “free market” principles to all corners of life.  
The Right was far more prepared than the Left to take advantage of the 
uncertainty generated by the moment of crisis to promote a nascent neoliberal 
ideology. Looking back, it may be difficult to place in perspective, but they 
undertook the audacious task of shifting the core assumptions of ordinary people, 
as Business Week editorialized in 1974: 
“It will be a hard pill for many Americans to swallow—the idea of doing with less so 
that big business can have more. Nothing that this nation, or any other nation, has 
done in modern economic history compares with the selling job that must be done 
to make people accept this reality.” (Business Week, October 12, 1974, cited in 
Dreier, 2007). 
Political historians continue to document how the shaky foundations of the 
New Deal coalition crumbled under this assault, but it is safe to say a dramatic 
change had occurred in the US by Reagan’s election in 1980. Deindustrialization 
and the resulting social dislocations shook up local elites and governing regimes 
a bit more than their “big brothers” in New York, London, and Tokyo, but by the 
mid-1980s local regimes regrouped around a neoliberal agenda that jettisoned 
any remnants of a commitment to shared prosperity in favor of a business-
focused “trickle down” development strategy. The fragmenting “city trenches” of 
race and neighborhood were dug even deeper as general scarcity at the 
metropolitan level increased feelings of competition between groups.  
b. Working Class Organizing and Urban Social Movements 
In recent years, many writers have looked back at this story to better 
understand the role of urban social movements within polities dominated by 
neoliberal capitalism (e.g. Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Harvey, 2000; Sites, 2003). 
Following Castells (1983), they tend to find quite limited opportunities for social 
movements to implement a more redistributive framework, but for different 
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reasons. Many early accounts of “globalization” highlight a scale imbalance—
claiming that capital has become increasingly fluid and beyond the reach of 
workers and communities (or even states). A partial corrective to this view has 
suggested that governments continue to play a central role in creating the 
conditions for capital accumulation (Sites, 2003), which remains rooted in specific 
urban areas (particularly the “global cities” identified by Saskia Sassen (1991)). 
Still, even in this more locally focused view, governing regimes and political 
institutions are seen as flexible and able to co-opt or demobilize most 
movements, which start off on an uneven playing field and with vastly fewer 
resources. In addition, the fragmentation of working class communities make 
conflict as likely as collaboration across racial and neighborhood lines.  
Challenges to urban growth coalitions have been periodically mounted by 
three main groups: African-Americans, labor, and middle class whites (usually 
either promoting “clean government” reforms or protecting their neighborhoods). 
At different points, these groups have been potent electoral forces in city politics, 
but their organizations and leaders have tended to recede or be pulled into the 
governing regime, as would be predicted by Katznelson’s argument about the 
demobilizing effects of “city trenches.” However, while such trenches divide 
people and can lead to such co-optation, the institutions built on them have 
produced successes and provide the basis for any potential movement.  
Working-class Americans belong to three main types of organizations that 
have historically formed the building blocks of movements for economic and 
social justice: unions, churches, and grassroots community organizations. The 
literatures on labor and community organizing declare each movement to be in 
crisis, separated from each other as well as internally divided, and struggling to 
adjust to the context of neoliberal capitalism. These struggles are reflected in 
these three cities, but such groups remain the most viable source of working 
class power. Local movement-building has taken different forms in Pittsburgh, 
Milwaukee, and Chicago, with varying levels of success in sustaining cooperation 
over time and achieving their goals; however, each case has involved bringing 
organizations from these three sectors together.  
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In the late 1930s, Chicago was the birthplace of neighborhood-based 
community organizing as we know it, when Saul Alinsky applied union organizing 
strategies from his work with the CIO to the Back of the Yards neighborhood. The 
post-WWII Black Freedom movement shaped the Alinskyite tradition and helped 
spread the popularity of community organizing to a new generation of organizers 
inspired by a vision of “beloved communities” and democratic revolution from 
below. Particularly in Chicago, but also Pittsburgh and Milwaukee, a multitude of 
“grassroots people’s organizations” sprouted in the 1960s and 70s. This new 
populist community movement was filled with contradictions of ideology and 
practice, often became trapped in a paralyzing localism, and community 
organizing has declined across the country in the face of neoliberalism (Fisher, 
1994). Perhaps most famously, several of Alinsky’s efforts in Chicago turned 
rightward, including the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council, which 
organized to keep blacks out of the neighborhood.  
Less dramatically, but more common, community groups in all three cities 
retreated into parochialism under a variety of funding and political pressures. The 
increasing professionalization of “community development” as a field pulled 
organizations away from conflict approaches (Stoecker, 2003). Many became 
dependent on government and foundation dollars and adjusted their missions to 
keep money coming, including cooperating in right-wing efforts such as welfare 
reform and the privatization of public services. Even when not directly co-opted, 
many organizations retreated into narrow definitions of issues or communities 
they worked with. One organizer recalled Chicago in the 1980s as a “wasteland 
in terms of organizing, with everyone trying to be the next Alinsky instead of 
actually putting in the work.” 
Two main wings of community organizing exist in the US today—a (mostly 
faith-based) institutional approach that pulls together existing groups in a 
geographic area, and a model based on direct individual membership. Several 
networks of faith-based organizing exist, including Alinsky’s Industrial Areas 
Foundation. The most prominent example in this study is the Gamaliel 
Foundation-affiliated Milwaukee Inner-city Congregations Allied for Hope 
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(MICAH), which was founded in 1998 and brings together 36 member 
congregations around its mission “to do what is just.” Direct membership 
organizing is epitomized by the Association of Community Organizations for 
Reform Now (ACORN), which look more like “community unions” made up of 
dues-paying resident members of neighborhood-based chapters. ACORN 
chapters have been active in all three cities, but Chicago’s is far and away the 
most prominent (although an organizational split in 2008 has created some 
uncertainty). Although very successful examples of each type exist, most 
reflective assessments conclude that the overall movement has fallen far short of 
the hopes of early leaders (Dreier, 2007). 
Similarly, the US labor movement has fallen a long way from its peaks of 
energy in the 1930s and membership density in the 1950s. The early organizing 
efforts of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (founded in Pittsburgh in 1935) 
combined workplace and community-based organizing from a class perspective 
to begin knitting together urban working class communities, but this approach 
was almost completely lost following WWII. Labor scholars agree that the decline 
of the movement is due to a combination of virulent business opposition, a legal 
framework tilting ever more anti-union, and self-defeating practices. High on the 
latter list are union complicity in reproducing racial disparities and the evolution of 
“business unionism,” in which unions accepted a transactional and limited role.  
In return for recognition and collective bargaining, unions agreed to limit 
their demands to strictly defined “workplace” issues. As part of this transition, 
most unions gave up trying to organize new workers and settled for whatever 
piece of the labor market they already represented. Following the failure of 
Operation Dixie, a post-war CIO effort to organize Southern industries, the labor 
movement implicitly withdrew from its role leading a broad working class 
movement with the goal of union representation for every worker to focus 
narrowly on winning better contracts for members, who began to see themselves 
as paying a fee for service rather than as members of a social movement.  
American unions coasted through the 1950s and 1960s, riding their 
residual strength and the long post-war boom to increased wages and benefits. 
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However, each decade diminished the bonds between members and deepened 
the “city trenches” dividing suburbanizing union workers from the 
disproportionately Black urban poor. When corporations began their attack in the 
1970s, most unions were unprepared to fight back (Tait, 2005). In hindsight, it 
becomes clear that working class movements have been steadily losing power in 
US cities for decades due to a combination of political-economic shifts, internal 
fragmentation, and self-defeating practices.  
When union leaders bought into the myth that they were just another 
“interest group” and adopted a transactional business union model, they 
inadvertently eliminated their own ability to generate power. Offe & Wiesenthal 
(1980) argue that working class organizations must not only aggregate the 
interests of members as the pluralist interest group model assumes, but also 
transform those interests through a dialogical process. By relying only on 
aggregation, business unionism (like narrowly parochial approaches to 
community organizing) makes it impossible to generate the solidaristic ties that 
make sustained collective action possible. I argue that this retreat from more 
transformative logics of collective action is closely related to the shrinking of 
intermediary spaces linking working class residents across organizational 
boundaries. Historical analyses of many movements have demonstrated the 
importance of such spaces in developing common frameworks, matching 
strategies to the context, and transforming groups into “more than the sum of 
their parts” (Andrews, 2001; Foerster, 2004; Morris, 1984; Warren, 2001).  
c. The Upsurge in Labor-Community Coalition-Building 
Some promising efforts at the intermediary level have emerged from this 
generally dismal scene of parochialism and demobilization, although it remains to 
be seen whether they represent a new upsurge in working class organizing or 
anomalous blips within a general pattern of decline. The desperation fostered by 
1980s plant closings sparked efforts to rebuild relationships with community 
groups. These defensive battles were mostly unsuccessful, but strengthened 
some revitalization efforts within the labor movement. Over the 1980s and 90s, 
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some unions dedicated themselves to organizing new members and strategically 
rebuilding power, sparking hopes of a general shift in strategy (cf. 
Bronfenbrenner, et al., 1998).  
While these efforts produced many positive results, overall union density 
continued to slide, as increased membership in the service and public sectors 
lagged behind dramatic manufacturing job losses. The erosion of union 
membership steadily weakened the place of labor leaders within local growth 
machines over the past several decades, and the cooperative business union 
approach yielded fewer and fewer results as corporate interests tightened their 
grip on local political processes. While some labor leaders cling to the 
comfortable model of back-room handshake deals, many others -- pushed along 
by pro-business politicians like Chicago’s Mayor Daley -- have become more 
open to alternative ways of building power.  
New leadership was elected at the AFL-CIO in 1996, resulting in renewed 
attention to organizing, efforts to strengthen local labor councils, and increased 
engagement with other social justice movements. Promising community 
organizing efforts have sprouted around the country, particularly among 
immigrants and low-wage workers (Tait, 2005). Also attracting significant 
attention has been the increase in coalition activity involving unions, churches, 
and community groups in metro areas around the country. Observers have 
suggested that this wave of coalition-building might breathe new life into unions 
and community organizations; force the Democratic Party to adequately 
represent the interests of working class Americans; and develop more effective 
means of bringing people together across race, gender, and other cultural 
differences—in short, revitalize the US left. 
The weakness of the left is often attributed in large part to its difficulties in 
bringing people together across differences, particularly race, gender, and class. 
As I found in our Michigan coalitions, such fragmentation is quite present in 
labor-community collaborations. Most unions and community groups are wary of 
working together because of perceptions of mismatched interests or 
organizational cultures. When they do work together, community organizations 
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often feel taken for granted while unions are frustrated by their lack of clear 
structure and authority (Krinsky & Reese, 2006). Studies of coalition-building 
efforts offer a window onto evolving strategies of negotiating difference and unity, 
especially efforts to cross racial boundaries and bring together unions with 
unorganized poor workers.  
Local resistance to neoliberalism has evolved over the past two decades. 
The 1980s saw a wave of mobilizations against plant closings and Reagan-era 
policies, with significant focus on key defensive strikes and employee ownership 
bids (Brecher & Costello, 1990). In the 1990s, activists developed more proactive 
political program in efforts to pass legislation like living wage ordinances, develop 
comprehensive regional development platforms, and develop alternative electoral 
resources for progressive candidates (Reynolds, 2004). Taken together with 
studies of more recent efforts (e.g. Krinsky & Reese, 2006; Luce, 2004; Tattersall 
& Reynolds, 2007), these accounts document an evolution of strategies as 
working class organizers continue adapting to the context of neoliberal capitalism.  
While such evolutionary learning processes are inevitably piecemeal and 
geographically differentiated, three main types of collaborative vehicle have 
emerged over the years. Ad hoc coalitions mobilizing defensively against plant 
closings and other crises were particularly prevalent in the 1980s. In the 1990s, 
activists in several cities tried to “get out in front” of issues by building over-
arching regional coalitions uniting the broadest possible set of groups on a 
permanent basis. In part because several of these ambitiously broad coalitions 
fell apart, more recent efforts have tried to find ways to continue proactive 
planning without bringing everyone under a single organizational roof. While still 
bringing together broad coalitions to work on specific issue campaigns, this 
model relies on more focused intermediary organizations playing a coordinating 
and consolidating role between campaigns (Tattersall & Reynolds, 2007).  
This study focuses on how activists in Pittsburgh, Milwaukee, and Chicago 
experimented with more structured coordinating bodies in the 1990s and looser 
overlapping networks in recent years. The histories of these efforts help distill the 
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key factors influencing the emergence and sustainability of local working class 
movements. 
Research Methods 
My work contributes to ongoing debates on movement strategy by 
systematically comparing three divergent cases of efforts to build local working 
class movements. While the unavoidable contingencies of the real world make it 
impossible to find perfectly matched cases, these three cities and their local 
movements shared many characteristics through the 1990s. The comparative 
case study method is most useful in efforts to reconstruct and extend theories, 
rather than systematically testing them (Burawoy, 1991). By exploring what is 
similar and different between efforts in Pittsburgh, Milwaukee, and Chicago we 
can suggest factors that play a role in causing their divergent outcomes.  
My data collection and analysis were based on a reflexive model of 
analytic induction (Burawoy, 1998) and involve two main bodies of data: 
• Semi-structured interviews with 53 experienced activists in the three cities 
covering the dilemmas and lessons of their work. 
• Archival documents pertaining to coalition-building efforts in Chicago, 
Milwaukee, and Pittsburgh from 1990 to the present, drawn from 
organizational archives and news sources, which provide evidence of how 
different strategies work in varying political-economic contexts. 
I spent several months in each city in 2006 gathering data. Where 
organizing was ongoing, I played an active participant-observer role as much as 
possible. For example, I helped out knocking on doors, attending meetings, and 
phone banking during the Big Box Living Wage campaign in Chicago over the 
summer of 2006. For the no longer active coalitions, I was forced to rely more on 
interviews and archival documents, which varied significantly in availability. For 
example, while the Alliance for Progressive Action papers fill many boxes at the 
University of Pittsburgh archives, most of the Campaign for Sustainable 
Milwaukee files (and those of several other activist groups collected over the 
years) were apparently tossed in a dumpster when they closed their last office.  
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While I entered the field with a set of theoretical interests and asked all 
interviewees a core set of standard questions, I also allowed themes to emerge 
from the cases and looked for evidence to challenge my preconceptions and 
early conclusions. Participants were generally quite willing to be interviewed and 
generous with their time, often sitting for repeat meetings and sharing their 
personal files with me. My experience working with both unions and community 
organizations gave me a measure of legitimacy with both groups. I was up front 
about my sympathetic orientation and background, and unsurprisingly found 
those I worked alongside in to be particularly candid, especially over time as I 
“proved myself.” Several paused in their interviews to mention that they “wouldn’t 
necessarily tell most academics this, but you’re an organizer, so you get it.”  
Since I was interviewing key members of coalition campaigns in each city, 
I ended up over-sampling the kind of “bridge building” leaders who seem to be 
inevitably involved in successful collaborative efforts (Delgado, 1998). As their 
importance emerged more clearly, I made an effort to interview all such bridge 
builders in each city. Not only had most been at the center of many different 
struggles over the years, they had often already thought about the broader 
issues of building solidarity across difference I was asking about. Because of 
their eloquence, I have often quoted from our discussions at some length, letting 
the participants provide context for their insight rather than always parsing each 
passage myself. This involves a tradeoff in writing style, as it requires the reader 
to do more analytical work at times, but as one of my respondents said: “It’s in 
the stories—let the stories come out.” To preserve continuity and readability, I 
reserve this “oral history” approach to a few key leaders, whose voices appear 
repeatedly over the course of the text, hopefully allowing readers to link 
narratives together and develop a more nuanced understanding of the 
individual’s perspective.  
Most interviewees requested to be identified by their real names, although 
other identities are disguised some or all of the time. I sent all of them the quotes 
I planned to use from our discussions to double-check for accuracy and 
permission, which proved to be a good decision for several reasons. Seeing their 
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words on the page with the chance to reflect on potential consequences, several 
respondents requested that I either remove small portions or not attribute certain 
quotes to them. However, most not only approved what I had written but offered 
further reflections that deepened my understanding of their comments and past 
events. Several of these local activists became more like collaborators than 
research subjects over the course of our discussions as we bounced ideas back 
and forth and debated points. Our dialogue has continued as they have 
graciously provided feedback on drafts of this project. 
During my entire time in the field, I was very aware of how my identity as a 
white professional-class man based in an elite university was shaping my 
interactions with people. My mannerisms and union background often made 
white male labor (and community) leaders comfortable with me, to the point 
where I sometimes felt I was being let in on “family secrets.” On the other hand, I 
found women and people of color were often hesitant to talk about racial or 
gender equity issues, or “controversial issues” in general, until I signaled my 
interest and support. In introducing myself to everyone, but especially to people 
of color, I included a broad range of past experiences and chose examples 
carefully, mentioning “When we were trying to save affirmative action in 
Michigan…” or “As we’ve been fighting the gay marriage ban…” to mark myself 
as active in a broad range of social justice struggles. The code words I dropped 
and ways I introduced myself and my interests undoubtedly shaped how 
interviewees responded to me. Being a doctoral student at the time of this 
research cut both ways. On one hand, many respondents seemed enthusiastic 
about “helping me get my degree,” but I had the nagging sense some didn’t quite 
think of my research as “real.” This was confirmed when I sent out quotes to be 
confirmed and several interviewees reacted with surprise that their words might 
actually end up in print someday. 
I told those involved that I was not interested in “airing dirty laundry” when 
I discussed the conflicts within each coalition, and I hope I have lived up to that 
promise. I was told many stories of racism, sexism, and homophobia from within 
each of the coalitions. For the most part, I do not explore specific incidents, but 
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discuss more general methods of dealing with conflict. As many others have 
documented, our movements are part of the larger culture and reflect all its 
negative traits. Interpersonal conflicts are endemic to movement organizations 
and can be considered relatively constant across groups. Specific stories are 
usually stripped of some details and context to emphasize the conflict, rather 
than the people involved. I hope I have been faithful in rendering and analyzing 
these stories, and am able to offer something useful to those who so generously 
shared them with me. 
Overview of Cases 
Although Chicago is much larger than the other two, these three cities are 
broadly similar in many ways. Both Chicago and Milwaukee are the dominant 
cities in primarily rural and suburban states, nestled in the corner of their states 
along the shores of Lake Michigan (and while Pittsburgh is the second largest 
city in the state, it is so far from Philadelphia that it plays a similar role as the de 
facto capital of Western Pennsylvania). All three continue to rely heavily on 
manufacturing to drive their regional economies, though the number of jobs in the 
sector has declined sharply.  
Figure 1.1: Demographics of Cities and Surrounding Counties, 20064 











Chicago 2,749,283 37 35 28 5 21 51 
Cook County 5,288,655 51 26 23 6 15 38 
Milwaukee 563,079 43 40 15 3 26 52 
Mil. County 915,097 61 27 11 3 19 45 
Pittsburgh 297,061 67 27 2 3 22 47 
Allegheny Cty 1,223,411 83 13 1 2 13 32 
US Overall -- 74 12 15 4 13 33 
 
As is evident from the relative size of the cities and their surrounding 
counties in Figure 1.1, Pittsburgh was the least successful in annexing 
surrounding land, with static borders since its contentious takeover of several 
neighbors in 1907. Pittsburgh is also significantly less racially diverse than the 
                                            
4 Source: American Communities Survey, retrieved from http://factfinder.census.gov on 3/4/2008. 
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other two cities, where White residents make up only a bare plurality. And while 
Milwaukee and Chicago have gained many Latino immigrants in recent decades, 
Pittsburgh has remained basically biracial. However, all three are very racially 
segregated and have similar proportions of residents living below the poverty line 
and renting their homes, leading to roughly similar economic geographies. 
Decades of local development policy focused on downtown have resulted in 
many underdeveloped neighborhoods surrounding shiny pockets of new 
buildings in downtowns that empty out at night. 
Similar opportunities for labor-community collaboration occurred in 
Pittsburgh, Chicago, and Milwaukee over the past couple decades. A number of 
large, publicly-supported construction projects were built; private sector workers 
faced aggressive employer campaigns and public sector workers tried to fend off 
privatization, outsourcing, and cutbacks; companies demanded concessions and 
public subsidies to create low-wage jobs or leave existing jobs in the area; and 
activists launched campaigns to pass living wage ordinances and other proactive 
economic justice initiatives. 
These episodes offered opportunities to affect the regional political 
economy and push for a “high road” approach to economic development5. Many 
of the key activists involved in the campaigns examined in this study rose to 
leadership positions in their organizations by the early 1990s and tried to 
transition into building proactive, rather than defensive, labor-community 
coalitions. These coalition efforts were often explicitly undertaken as efforts to 
rebuild a left that had become fragmented by sector and geography over the 
preceding decades as many activists retreated into single-issue movements or 
neighborhood-focused organizing.  
Coalition organizers sought out cross-cutting campaign issues that could 
pull in a variety of organizations and deepen relationships between them. Living 
wage ordinances requiring municipalities and their contractors to pay a higher 
                                            
5 There are two basic paths to profitability for capitalist firms: a “low road” of cost-cutting and 
competition on price, with many social and environmental costs, or a “high road” involving niche 
development and high value-added processes, coupled with socializing, rather than externalizing 
costs (Luria & Rogers, 1999). 
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minimum wage emerged as a movement-building tool after Baltimore’s well-
publicized victory in 1994. Activists in Pittsburgh, Milwaukee, and Chicago were 
excited about the issue’s appeal to traditional labor, poor people’s organizations, 
and racial and gender justice advocates, and tried to use living wage campaigns 
to spark strong and sustainable working-class movements. Their effectiveness in 
doing so rested on the relative balance of power, what strategies they were able 
to bring to bear, and how they built relationships between constituencies.  
Figure 1.2 presents an overview of the major collaborative efforts 
examined in this study. Almost all the campaigns included unions, churches, 
membership-based community groups, and advocacy and/or research 
organizations. However, the trajectory of labor-community collaboration has been 
different in each city. While it would be difficult to find a moment when there were 
not unions and community groups working together in recent history, more 
permanent, proactive, and multi-issue coalitions have come and gone.  
In both Pittsburgh and Milwaukee, broad multi-issue coalitions were 
founded in the early 1990s, achieved success in several campaigns, but 
dissolved soon after 2000 amidst considerable infighting. Activists in Milwaukee 
re-formed a similar, though narrower, coalition two years later, while cross-sector 
collaboration reemerged in Pittsburgh within a much looser and informal structure 
at the Thomas Merton Center. No comparable long-term coalition existed in 
Chicago until a group of organizations, inspired by their cooperative experience 
in the living wage campaign, formed the Grassroots Collaborative in 1998. While 
this coalition hasn’t been growing in organizational members, it has formed the 
core of consistently more ambitious campaigns and increased the organizing 
capacity of its members and the local movement as a whole. This study seeks to 
understand how Chicago’s movement has been built steadily over the years, as 




Milwaukee’s recent history exemplifies the three phases of labor-
community collaboration almost perfectly. Following a series of ad hoc defensive 
coalitions in the 1980s, two types of coalitions emerged to coordinate economic 
justice campaigns over the past two decades. The Campaign for a Sustainable 
Milwaukee (CSM) was formed in the early 1990s and became a nationally known 
model before a sudden demise in 2000. The CSM’s role has since been partly 
filled by the more modest Good Jobs and Livable Neighborhoods coalition, which 
formed in 2003 and continues today. 
A string of plant closings in the 1980s shook local unions out of their 
complacency and they mobilized with community groups to fight back, but with 
relatively little success. An informal group of activists formed bonds during those 
struggles and started thinking about how to go on the offensive over regular 
lunches at the China House restaurant. Around 1993, a core group including 
Bruce Colburn from the Milwaukee Central Labor Council and Joel Rogers, a 
professor at the University of Wisconsin, decided to create a structure within 
which to push for sustainable economic development in the region, first by 
expanding the monthly lunch meetings to include a broader group of invitees, 
and then forming the Campaign for Sustainable Milwaukee.  
Over the next year, the CSM brought together a broad group of 
stakeholders for a series of conversations culminating in a report called 
Rebuilding Milwaukee from the Ground Up, presented at a Community Congress 
in 1994. The report looked at what was happening in Milwaukee and around the 
country to develop a progressive regional agenda and suggested forming four 
committees focusing on good jobs, credit and redlining, transportation and the 
environment, and schools. Hearing about Baltimore’s living wage success later 
that year, CSM leaders thought such a campaign held great promise as a 
coalition-building tool and defining issue for their fledgling effort, although most 
area Democratic politicians were still reeling from the 1994 “Republican 
revolution” and thought they were crazy to launch such a campaign. 
Nevertheless, the CSM got strong support from the American Federation of State, 
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County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) public employees’ union, hired an 
organizer to focus specifically on involving young black men (the group most 
affected by underemployment) and passed ordinances at the city level in 1995, 
school board in 1996, and county in 1997. 
The CSM found even more success in 1997. The Casey Foundation 
recruited the group to coordinate an ambitious job training effort, while a big fight 
over the construction of a new convention center led to a groundbreaking 
community benefits agreement bringing together the historically antagonistic 
building trades unions and Black and Latino communities. After demolition work 
for the Convention Center started with a non-union company, the CSM managed 
to bring together the Building Trades Council with key community groups like 
Milwaukee Inner-city Congregations Allied for Hope (MICAH) and Esperanza 
Unida to coordinate a huge demonstration and a shared platform. This resulted in 
a project labor agreement that required both union labor and affirmative action, 
as well as promises to bring more black and Latino workers into union 
apprenticeship programs.  
The next year they opened the Central City Workers’ Center to implement 
the Casey-funded Milwaukee Jobs Initiative, which was relatively successful and 
involved doubling in size again, to more than 20 employees by the end of 1998. 
The CSM appeared to be on a path of sustainable growth—having developed a 
funding model that tapped state and federal job training funds to support the 
infrastructure for organizing and advocacy and a membership of more than 200 
organizations either paying dues or contributing in-kind labor—and they were 
seen by observers (e.g. Reynolds, 2002) as one of the most promising efforts in 
the country; however, the end was surprisingly near.  
While the CSM was riding high, they lost a key founder when Bruce 
Colburn, head of the central labor council and the relational center of gravity of 
the coalition, left Milwaukee to take a position with the AFL-CIO. Management 
practices had not kept up with the explosive growth of the organization, and the 
CSM dissolved in 2000 amidst interpersonal conflicts, competition for funds, and 
a very shaky financial situation that has left some former board members still 
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upset with each other. Many Milwaukee activists seem to avoid the memory of 
the CSM. The accepted wisdom regarding the demise of the CSM is that its 
leaders were overly ambitious in expanding their reach—growing from 1 to 30 
employees over a few years, but those more closely involved attribute more of 
the problems to internal conflict.  
A similar body facilitating labor-community collaboration arose relatively 
quickly. In 2003, John Goldstein, then president of the central labor council and 
former CSM board chair, convened the Good Jobs and Livable Neighborhoods 
(GJLN) coalition to advocate for a community benefits agreement (CBA) for the 
Park East redevelopment project, a huge swath of prime downtown real estate 
opened up by the demolition of the Park East freeway. GJLN has a handful of 
core organizational members, but involves other more groups at varying levels. 
GJLN won a CBA at the county level in 2005 and is now working to transition 
beyond the Park East campaign and push for sustainable development policies 
throughout the city, currently focusing on redeveloping the former Tower 
Automotive site in the predominantly African-American north side neighborhood. 
GJLN has joined the Partnership for Working Families network of similar 
coalitions around the country (where Goldstein is now Field Director), 
incorporated as a 501(c)(3), hired staff, and laid out a plan to “change the 
conversation around development in Milwaukee.” 
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Three different intermediary organizations have played a role as 
movement “hubs” in Pittsburgh over the last two decades. The Alliance for 
Progressive Action (APA) was formed in 1991 by several longtime Pittsburgh 
activists and coordinated a number of campaigns through the 1990s. Following 
the demise of the APA, the Thomas Merton Center served as the main center of 
labor-community collaboration for the past decade. Most recently, Pittsburgh-
UNITED, an intermediary based on models like LAANE in Los Angeles and 
GJLN in Milwaukee, emerged in 2007 to coordinate community benefits struggles 
around large development projects. 
Many of the APA’s founders worked together through the 1980s fighting 
mill closings, the Bork Supreme Court nomination, and supporting strikes and the 
Rainbow Coalition campaigns in 1984 and 1988. After working together so long, 
many were anxious to avoid “reinventing the wheel” for each campaign and 
hoped the APA would help them go on the offensive. SEIU and the United 
Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers (which moved its international 
headquarters to Pittsburgh in the late 1980s) provided crucial early funding, and 
by the mid-1990s, the coalition had around 50 dues-paying organizational 
members, an office, and staff. Early campaigns included organizing against 
police brutality, the sale of a local public TV station, and the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  
The leaders of the APA had been looking for a galvanizing issue and, like 
their contemporaries in Milwaukee, were excited about the potential of a living 
wage campaign to bring together unions, churches, and community groups 
around shared economic justice concerns. The Western Pennsylvania Living 
Wage Campaign kicked off in 1997, got an ordinance through the City Council in 
2001, lost a County Council vote a few months later, and then saw the City 
ordinance repealed within the year. This setback was a shocking defeat, given 
the Democratic majorities on both bodies and Pittsburgh’s reputation as a “labor 
town.” This disappointment exacerbated internal dissension, leading to the 
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departure of key players. The APA dissolved in 2002 and there have been no 
efforts to revive a living wage campaign in the region. 
As in the other two cities, Pittsburgh politics often pivot around racial 
divisions, and efforts to bring together the African-American community with 
unions were never completely successful in the living wage campaign. Just 
before the living wage came up for a vote in 2000, the building trades unions 
engineered a ‘backroom” defeat of a bill that would have required construction 
projects receiving tax breaks to employ 35% city residents, which was seen by 
some black leaders as a betrayal by the entire labor movement. The living wage 
campaign subsequently became coded as a “white union proposal” and the key 
vote against the ordinance was cast by an African-American County Councilor 
representing one of the poorest areas of the city who had originally co-sponsored 
the bill. Ironically, the subsequent repeal of the City ordinance is widely attributed 
to the unions pulling support for the ordinance. Thus, because of their difficulty 
working together, neither of the campaign’s presumed core constituencies (labor 
and the black community) ended up putting their full support behind the living 
wage.  
The APA became so subsumed in the Living Wage Campaign during the 
long fight that the campaign setback became a mortal blow to the coalition itself. 
Perhaps even more important in the long run, it had not succeeded in its goal to 
foster more grassroots community organizing—particularly in the black 
community—through the campaign. This task has been increasingly taken on by 
the Thomas Merton Center (TMC). The TMC has existed as a local peace and 
justice center since the 1970s, but assumed a more central role in local 
movement-building as the APA became exclusively focused on the living wage 
campaign and then dissolved. The TMC is quite decentralized and flexible, 
primarily providing space and support to local peace and justice groups who 
apply to be sponsored projects. While its board members represent a wide range 
of organizations, it is not a formal coalition. Many of the TMC’s projects involve 
relatively small groups of activists working mostly in coalitions with other groups. 
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The TMC also publishes a newspaper and website that circulate information to a 
broad community of local activists across sectors. 
Recent examples of labor-community collaboration in Pittsburgh, such as 
a Justice for Janitors campaign, have largely been housed at the TMC and 
involved the Mon Valley Unemployed Committee (MVUC), another holdover from 
an earlier era and one of the founders of the APA. The efforts of SEIU Local 3 to 
improve the wages and benefits of Pittsburgh janitors have been threatened by 
an intransigent building owner who pulled out of the downtown collective 
bargaining agreement and fired their janitors at the end of 2003. A group of TMC 
and MVUC activists took on organizing community support for the janitors and 
pressuring tenants and other stakeholders (which would have been illegal for the 
union). Although they were quite successful in drawing press coverage and 
isolating the building owners, they were not able to force a resolution, and 
tensions developed between mostly young and radical community organizers 
and union staff over decision-making and the overall dynamics of the campaign.  
In an effort to become more proactive, over the summer of 2007 a group 
of local activists worked with the Partnership for Working Families to form 
Pittsburgh UNITED. Their first two campaigns are trying to tie community benefits 
to plans to build a new downtown casino and hockey arena. People and 
organizations involved in the living wage campaign are active in the current 
campaigns, but the 2001 defeat also serves as a sort of generational dividing line, 
with many of the living wage leaders no longer much involved in local politics. 
Like in Milwaukee, the efforts of the APA are not widely discussed, or even 
known, among most of those now active in Pittsburgh. 
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Figure 1.3: Map of Pittsburgh City Council Districts 
 
c. Chicago 
Chicago differs from Milwaukee and Pittsburgh in that no broad, multi-
issue labor-community coalition like the APA or CSM emerged in the early 1990s. 
The closest analogue would be the Industrial Area Foundation’s (IAF) effort to 
build a Chicagoland-wide coalition called United Power, which still exists, but has 
been unable to build deep relationships between members or launch substantial 
campaigns (Moberg, 2006). Though all three cities have reputations for 
parochialism, the conflicts between groups in Chicago are legendary, and many 
local activists claim that broad, sustainable coalitions are impossible in the city.  
However, collaborating in the Jobs and Living Wage Campaign in the late-
1990s was a transformative positive experience for a group of members of the 
steering committee, who decided to form the Grassroots Collaborative after the 
City living wage ordinance was passed in 1998. John Donahue, of the Chicago 
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Coalition of the Homeless, was particularly central in these early stages as a 
person who had relationships with many other organizers across town. Members 
of the Collaborative thought they had developed some useful best practices 
through trial and error during the living wage campaign, including a two-tiered 
membership structure. Any organization was allowed to join the coalition and 
attend periodic meetings, but to be part of the decision-making steering 
committee, they needed to contribute money or staff time and be able to “fill a 
bus” with supporters (Meyer, 2008). This policy is credited for making campaigns 
run smoother and providing a clear and above-board way of determining who 
gets a voice in decisions.  
The Collaborative, made up of about ten grassroots community 
organizations and one union, has gone on to build coalitions to tie the living wage 
to inflation, expand Illinois KidCare, raise the state minimum wage, increase 
affordable housing, and win driver’s licenses for undocumented immigrants. The 
union, SEIU Local 880, is unique in that it began life as part of Chicago ACORN, 
to which it remains closely linked even as it has grown into the largest union local 
in the state by organizing tens of thousands of home health and childcare 
workers. 
Another key center of cooperation was Chicago’s Jobs with Justice (JwJ) 
chapter, which is widely credited with opening up local unions to the benefits of 
working with community groups and laying the groundwork for tighter 
collaboration in the 1990s. The local labor movement’s political perspective was 
further shifted in the early 2000s, when Mayor Daley tried to extract big 
concessions from city workers in contract negotiations, spurring their unions to 
coordinate bargaining and threaten to strike for the first time in recent memory. 
This crystallized the growing estrangement between the mainstream labor 
movement and the Democratic Party machine after a decade of increasingly 
more business-friendly policies at City Hall. The Chicago Federation of Labor 
(CFL) and several large unions began speaking publicly against Daley and 
building up their political capacity after years of disuse. In addition, the Daley 
 32
machine came under attack in the courts, as judges issued a series of rulings 
gutting its patronage system. 
This relationship-building and series of political shifts created the 
possibility for significant labor-community mobilization when Wal-Mart announced 
plans to build as many as 10 stores in Chicago in 2003. An anti-Wal-Mart 
coalition was convened at JwJ by the United Food and Commercial Workers 
(UFCW), with the goal of persuading City Council to reject Wal-Mart’s plan to 
build stores on the South and West sides unless the company agreed to a 
community benefits agreement requiring living wages and family health care for 
their workers. Following a split vote on the first two stores, the Collaborative 
formed a new coalition to pursue a new strategy of a citywide ordinance targeting 
all large retailers.  
The resulting “Big Box Living Wage” ordinance sparked one of the most 
high profile campaigns in recent Chicago politics and ultimately passed City 
Council in July 2006 over the fervent lobbying of Mayor Daley and millions spent 
on advertising by Wal-Mart, Target, and the Chamber of Commerce. The mayor 
decided to draw a line in the sand, issuing the first veto of this career and pulling 
three aldermen to his side to avoid an override. His victory proved somewhat 
hollow however, as the Big Box ordinance provided a “litmus test” issue in the 
2007 aldermanic elections. Members of the coalition targeted aldermen who 
voted against the ordinance, forcing eleven runoffs that resulted in nine new 
members of Council. While not all nine are strong economic justice supporters 
and Daley retains a working majority, many of the coalition partners are excited 
about shifting the balance of power in Chicago in a worker-friendly direction. 
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Figure 1.5: Major Collaborative Efforts in Each City 
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Conclusion: Strategic Evolution through Praxis 
While strategic debates within social movements often inspire strong 
feelings on each side, most remain debates because they have no clear right or 
wrong answer. By surfacing such recurring dilemmas, we can uncover useful 
research questions and internal processes of learning. I set off to study the 
experiences of coalition-builders in Pittsburgh, Milwaukee, and Chicago with a 
number of assumptions about what I would find. My beliefs that I would observe 
key dynamics at the intermediary level and that organizers on the ground would 
have many stories to share about the complexities of coalition-building were 
amply confirmed, but several of my own preconceptions about strategy ended up 
being exposed and challenged.  
For example, I began this project asking, “What factors facilitate the 
emergence of sustainable labor-community coalitions?” but was pushed by the 
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case examples and opinions of respondents to think more carefully about 
equating success with enduring coalitions. As one activist told me, “Just keeping 
an organization alive isn’t necessarily success.” I realized that I was really 
interested in strategies for building working class power, and was studying labor-
community collaboration because it seemed likely to be a key mechanism for 
doing so—enduring coalitions might or might not end up being important. Given 
that many activists are involved in, and frustrated by, such coalitions, it also 
seemed more practically useful to begin asking: “How can labor-community 
collaboration help build working class power?”   
Although “working class power” is perhaps even more difficult than a 
“sustainable coalition” to operationalize as a dependent variable, taking this step 
back helped me regain a view of the “forest,” not just the “trees” of individual 
coalitions and campaigns. My analysis places labor-community collaboration 
within the broader contexts of urban political economies, social movements, and 
communities. Social movements are larger and more amorphous than any 
specific organization or coalition, with ebbs and flows over extended periods of 
time. The idea of community also inherently references the flow of time, in 
addition to an understanding of members as heterogeneous and linked together 
in overlapping relationships of conflict and cooperation6. Social movements and 
communities are inevitably unfinished projects, making movement-building and 
community-building their central activity. 
Strong working class communities are directly related to strong 
movements. This project focuses on specifying what such strong communities 
look like and what can be done to build them, including how social movement 
activity itself is a strong source of community-building. In analyzing each case, 
three linked spheres of practice emerged. Organizational structures and 
networks form an infrastructure for community and movement-building. Cultural 
norms and relationships link members together in certain ways. Finally, 
                                            
6 This conceptualization is similar to how Crossley (2003) suggests using Bourdieu’s theory of 
fields in social movement studies, but I prefer the more intuitive “community.” 
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movements utilize a repertoire of political strategies to build and wield power. 
These three spheres are depicted in Figure 1.6. 
Figure 1.6: Spheres of Practice and Intervention 
 
The ultimate goal of these activists is to intervene in this complex system 
in ways that strengthen the local working class community’s ability to wield power 
in the broader society. Because these spheres are so interrelated, effective 
change efforts must target each of them simultaneously. Bate, Khan & Pye (2000) 
frame organizational change efforts as processes of structuring—deliberately 
breaking and refashioning the prevailing cycle. They suggest that the fatal flaw of 
most change efforts is an exclusive focus on either structure (resulting in new 
organizational charts that don’t end up reflecting reality) or culture (endless team-
building and processing). More successful approaches foster the development of 
a learning community that integrates the co-evolution of structures and cultures. 
This process has the added benefit of developing consensus and fostering the 
emergence of a core leadership group through a cycle of action and dialogue—
what Paulo Freire (1970) called praxis.  
In the following chapters, I analyze the ways activists in each of these 
three cities have tried to learn through their experiences and balance the 











choices regarding the organizational structures used to coordinate movement 
activity. Flexible and overlapping networks of membership-based organizations 
linked together by intermediaries appear to provide a more sustainable basis for 
movement activity than a more parsimonious single structure. Chapter 3 looks 
inside these structures to examine the internal cultures and relationships within 
coalitions. Rather than downplaying differences between partners and focusing 
only on points of commonality, these efforts have been more successful when 
they pay overt attention to difference in their efforts to build bridges and construct 
new ways of relating to each other. Chapter 4 addresses the strategic political 
questions faced by coalitions as they try to shift the balance of power and create 
change, finding that they are more successful when they combine a broad range 
of strategies, prioritize long-term goals and avoid potential “catastrophic losses.” 
Finally, Chapter 5 returns to the over-arching dilemmas faced by movements, 
including how to coordinate change efforts in all three areas at once, and 
summarizes a set of recommendations and conclusions.  
Overall, such collaborative work often seems to be swimming upstream 
against strong tendencies toward entropy. Patterns of fragmentation within local 
working class communities are particularly difficult to overcome because 
structural forces and elite actors reinforce the divisions of internal “trenches.” 
This point is sometimes missed by those who attribute the recent dominance of 
the US right to more effective organizing and infrastructure-building. While a 
useful corrective to past ignorance of the topic, such critiques sometimes fail to 
recognize the greater barriers faced by the Left. More effective coordination and 
allocation of resources is important and would likely lead to greater success, but 
working harder at the same game won’t lead to fundamental social change. 
By overlooking the need for a transformative dialogical process, 
electorally-oriented populists sometimes fall into the individualist trap of thinking 
of working class organizations as merely “interest groups,” when they also face 
the challenge of pushing members to think outside the box of interests accepted 
by the dominant framework. Often focusing on persuading white working class 
men to “vote their economic interests,” this narrative assumes the existence of 
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already formed interests and collective identities in a historically untenable way 
that leaves organizers waiting for the long-promised working class majority rather 
than actively creating it through struggle.  
Rather than just adding together all these potential members, processes 
of individual and collective transformation within movements are necessary to 
forge the sort of culture of solidarity that could lead to deeper political 
transformation. Running a slew of TV ads every four years (or any kind of 
electoral organizing) is simply not going to have much of an impact on creating a 
politically active working class. The process of strategic evolution documented in 
this study shows the necessity of multi-faceted interventions aimed at long-range 
development in order to build sustainable movements. It also demonstrates the 
importance of creating spaces to discuss past campaigns, which are too often 
pushed under the rug rather than learned from. 
This is a particularly interesting time to consider such questions. Recent 
years have seen a surge of interest in expanding the capacity and infrastructure 
of the progressive movement with an eye toward blending short and long-term 
goals. Many of those involved see labor-community collaboration as a central 
component of any emerging Left movement, and several national nonprofits and 
networks are focusing specifically on supporting such coalitions. The models 
promoted by such networks will potentially set the framework for movement-
building across the country, making it critically important that they not only build 
on the best practices of successful efforts, but also foster the learning capacity of 
local movements, helping local leaders assess the relative weight of internal and 
external factors, and innovate and adjust to new situations.
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Chapter 2  
 
Organizational Structures for Building Local Power 
  
Building working class power is an inescapably complex process. As 
Chapter 1 began to lay out, organizers must pursue change efforts in at least 
three inter-connected spheres: organizational structures, creating local cultures 
of solidarity, and expanding the repertoire of political strategies. This chapter 
addresses the first of these spheres. Working class residents of these regions 
work for change through their neighborhood associations, churches, and 
unions—as well as through coalitions that pull these organizations together. 
What organizational structures best facilitate the emergence of powerful social 
movements to improve the lives of working class residents of a region?  
Any such discussion raises longstanding questions surrounding the costs 
and benefits of formal organizations. Representing the positive view, Saul Alinsky 
(1972) claimed that “organized people” were the only potential counterbalance to 
the “organized money” of the rich. Efforts to build unions and community 
organizations have been founded on this belief and achieved significant 
successes, but a persistent strain of criticism follows Michels (1949) in warning 
against the dangers of oligarchy. Pessimistic libertarians like Piven and Cloward 
(1977) claim that efforts to formally organize the protests of challenging groups 
perversely serve to demobilize and channel their energy into “safe” avenues. 
While fears of oligarchy are sometimes more ideologically than empirically 
grounded, organizers do face a dilemma of how to build power while avoiding the 
stagnation of over-bureaucratization. More concretely, it is often unclear what 
type of organizational structure is best suited to carry out the tasks needed at any 
given time. 
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Introduction: Networks, Social Capital and Movement Infrastructure 
My exploration of this dilemma relies on several terms that are often used 
haphazardly or interchangeably. I use organization to refer to relatively 
independent and formally structured groups, including membership-based and 
advocacy groups. Coalitions are organizations of organizations working toward a 
common goal. Coalitions and organizations wage campaigns as political 
interventions into struggles to realize their goals. While organizations and 
coalitions are relatively formally defined, movements are larger and more 
ephemeral than any formal structure. Richard Rorty (1995) captured this 
distinction when he claimed that movements, in contrast to campaigns, are too 
big and amorphous to do anything as simple as succeed or fail.  
This complexity poses challenges to those attempting to explain social 
movements, and organizationally-focused analyses seem particularly susceptible 
to draining away the emotions and alchemy that distinguish the movements they 
examine. This contributes to the unfortunate inaccessibility of much social 
movement theory and has limited the exploration of overlapping areas of interest 
with activists. In a similar vein, community is used by scholars to describe a 
complex system of relationships and meanings, including shared geographies, 
identities, subjective feelings, and patterns of communication (Bellah, et al, 1995). 
Based on the assumption that well-organized communities will be more able to 
form strong movements, one long-term goal of many activists involved in these 
coalitions is the development of politically active and aware working class 
communities.  
While the literatures on community-building and social movements have 
mostly remained distinct from each other, the place and class-based local 
movements explored in this book highlight how much their subjects overlap. 
In fact, both literatures share a common “black box” that demands further 
specification. A conceptual gap exists between more concrete local structures 
like organizations and more amorphous phenomena like movements and 
communities. Considerable attention has been devoted to social movement 
organizations, but much less has been focused on intermediaries. Collective 
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action is clearly dependent on coalitions, training centers, and technical 
assistance providers—“movement halfway houses” that link together individual 
people and the larger collectivity (Morris, 1984). To bridge this gap and better 
understand how individuals are brought together in movements, recent analyses 
of the organizational underpinnings of movements have developed a meso-level 
focus on networks (della Porta & Mosca, 2007), social capital (McAdam & 
Paulsen, 1993), and infrastructure (Andrews, 2001).  
The above discussion implies at least four potential levels of 
organizational analysis: individual, organizational, intermediary, and 
movement/community. This chapter focuses on how membership organizations 
and intermediary structures link individuals to movement communities, in the 
process suggesting how certain patterns of organizational structure foster or 
constrain the emergence of local movements. Following Offe and Wiesenthal 
(1980), I distinguish between two logics of collective action taking place within 
this intermediary level: additive strategies that seek to aggregate the existing 
power of partner organizations, and transformative strategies that seek to change 
the organizations and their relationships to create new sources of power.  
Efforts to apply network analysis to social movements have demonstrated 
that the optimal conditions for movement emergence involve nodes of strong ties 
(bonding social capital) extensively linked by weak ties (bridging social capital), a 
distinction that corresponds neatly with my distinction between membership and 
intermediary organizations (McAdam & Paulsen, 1993). Particularly in the down 
times between waves of movement energy, membership organizations like 
churches, unions, and community groups are an indispensable source of strong 
ties between people (Rupp & Taylor, 1987). Intermediary organizations, on the 
other hand, help bring people together across differences and foster the bridging 
social capital essential to the ability of movements to spread.  
Figure 2.1 pulls together these two frameworks for thinking about the 
organizational preconditions for movement emergence. Bonding social capital is 
most commonly produced between individuals within organizations, while 
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intermediaries like coalitions are hothouses for bridging social capital, providing a 
potential empirical and theoretical ladder between organizations and movements. 
Figure 2.1: Levels of Organizational Analysis and Social Capital 
 
People and organizations have different interests, ways of doing things, 
cultures, and levels of power. A crucial goal of labor-community coalitions is 
bringing together constituencies (e.g. unions, churches, and neighborhood-based 
groups) that do not normally cooperate closely. Differences have to be 
negotiated while forging collective identities in any movement or community, but 
how are they most successfully bridged? By specifying the organizational 
strategies of activists in each region through the lens of social capital and 
networks, this chapter develops a set of provisional theories regarding predictors 
of movement sustainability and suggested applications for activists. 
The experiences of these groups suggest that throwing everyone together 
in a room and hoping they coalesce seldom works, and that organizers should 
instead start off carefully, set up structures that encourage working together 
toward shared goals, and incorporate transformative strategies alongside the 
more common additive approaches. Specifically, strong movements appear more 
likely to emerge when activists build a strong organizational infrastructure, form 












broadest and most ambitious coalitions for specific issue campaigns and 
moments of expanding political opportunity. 
Strategy 1: Developing Local Movement Infrastructures of Strong 
Organizations Linked by Flexible Intermediaries 
Activists sometimes debate whether energy and resources are best 
devoted to building “organizations” or “movements.” Although most would prefer 
not to make a choice at all, the amorphous nature of movements means that 
when the debate is framed this way, people focus on organizations almost by 
default. Particularly in the U.S. today, most do not feel a direct tie or sense of 
responsibility to a “movement.” Organizational affiliations, on the other hand, are 
real and present, and most activists feel a sense of responsibility to act in their 
organization’s best interest, prompting others to call for deemphasizing 
organizational interests in favor of broader movement issues. Ella Baker 
recognized this dilemma and emphasized that while her basic loyalties lay with 
the Black Freedom Movement, building strong organizations was necessary to 
grow and sustain it, as a Chicago union leader reflected: 
Mike:  “What I've always liked about the Grassroots Collaborative—especially in 
the early days—is there’s a lot of people involved who want to build their 
organization, and they want to build a movement, but not at the expense of the 
organization. 
 
Dobbie: Ella Baker always said her loyalty was to the movement, more than to any 
organization… 
 
Mike: “I think I know what she meant by that, but at the same time you need to 
build strong organizations to be able to support strong movements. It's an 
interesting question as to whether you can do both—and balance that—it's tricky.”  
This debate is hamstrung by a limited vocabulary, particularly the absence 
of intermediary organizations from the discussion. A combination of direct 
membership organizations and intermediaries is necessary to bring together 
large numbers of people in social movements. Those arguing for a broader 
“movement” orientation and against parochialism might practically suggest 
devoting more resources to building networks and “halfway houses.” The limited 
resources of the left are very concentrated at the organizational level, especially 
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in non-profits, but also in other sectors (Incite, 2007). For example, the U.S. labor 
movement overwhelmingly concentrates money and power in local and 
international unions rather than intermediary bodies like central labor councils 
and the AFL-CIO. Even fewer resources are devoted to cross-sector 
intermediaries. 
Organizers in each of these three cities have followed Baker’s example 
and looked for ways to simultaneously build movements and their organizations. 
A more precise typology of movement organizational structures and strategic 
discussions about what roles they can best serve can help local activists choose 
“the right tool for the job” and build a strong local infrastructure. Differentiating 
between organizational forms is useful both analytically and practically. As 
longtime Pittsburgh activist Joni Rabinowitz warns, “Organizations are different 
from campaigns, and it's easy to just start one without asking, ‘What are we 
trying to get done and how can we best do it?’” The evolution of organizational 
strategies in each city over time points to some broader themes about how 
activists can build sustainable local movement infrastructures. 
a. Broad vs. Focused Coalitions in Milwaukee 
Like other Rust Belt regions, Milwaukee, and especially its central city, has 
faced an exodus of manufacturing jobs in recent decades. Several efforts, 
including a local chapter of Jobs with Peace, brought together labor and 
community activists in the 1980s to fight plant closings and influence national and 
state policy. After a progressive slate headed by Bruce Colburn was elected to 
lead the Milwaukee Central Labor Council in the late 1980s, the Council began to 
take more active stances on local issues and reach out to a broader array of 
partners. This laid the groundwork for the creation of the Campaign for 
Sustainable Milwaukee (CSM), which emerged in 1994 alongside a bitter 
struggle to save more than 2,000 jobs at Briggs & Stratton’s longtime central 
manufacturing facility. 
CSM was broadly focused in every way, bringing together hundreds of 
organizations to develop a comprehensive platform for regional public policy, 
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coordinating political efforts with a third party called Progressive Milwaukee, and 
trying to secure a stable stream of funding by taking on a job training role that 
could tap federal and state funding. Ideally, this function was intended to mesh 
with organizing like a hiring hall—job seekers would come to the CSM Workers’ 
Center for training and placement and would also get trained on their rights and 
how to take collective action. Knowing the local labor market well would then help 
CSM go after the bad employers and help workers develop skills and work within 
the good ones. As Bruce Colburn, who was leading the Central Labor Council at 
the time, explains:  
“One of the questions that always comes up is how you take something to scale. 
We made a decision at some point to become the lead in the Milwaukee Jobs 
Initiative. The idea of it was that you could combine services and advocacy. The 
service side was connecting people with jobs, addressing the mismatch of skills, 
etc. So we ended up getting a grant from Casey that was collaboration between 
CSM and the business community and labor. That was about 7 or 8 million dollars, 
so it put a lot of pressure on the organization to focus on that level of service and 
then tie that into advocacy. It did focus on system changes—whether it was the 
lack of driver’s licenses and what that meant for people or setting a standard for 
wages in jobs that were subsidized, but it was so focused on this process of 
getting people jobs that we struggled to maintain focus on the original advocacy.” 
The Jobs Initiative was set up to funnel money to CSM community 
partners to train residents of their neighborhoods, but this new relationship put 
these organizations into competition with each other and frayed bonds with those 
leaders responsible for overseeing the program. Although several of the key 
players are not convinced that the model of combining service delivery and 
advocacy was inherently flawed, there is a general consensus that growing so 
fast stretched the CSM beyond what it could handle. Bill Dempsey, the main 
CSM staff member, came to Milwaukee from Gary, Indiana, where he had been 
organizing to save steel mills: 
“Looking back, running a lean organization might have been a better idea. The 
synergy between the job training and organizing elements was really productive, 
but we needed way more management expertise than we had…I found out later 
that Ernie Cortes [lead organizer of a well-established IAF affiliate in Texas] turned 
down the Casey money, which we probably should have too.”  
A more focused intermediary, the Good Jobs and Livable Neighborhoods 
coalition, rose from the figurative ashes of the CSM in 2002, although only a few 
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of the same individuals are actively involved. Despite including several common 
partners and being separated by only a few years, the CSM and GJLN coalitions 
took quite different organizational forms. The key transitional figure was John 
Goldstein, who followed Colburn as president of the local transit union, head of 
the labor council, and as the last board chair of the CSM. He then founded the 
GJLN coalition and now works for the Partnership for Working Families 
supporting similar efforts around the country.  
In 2006, following a partial victory in their campaign to win a community 
benefits agreement for the Park East re-development, GJLN faced a number of 
decisions. Should it stay in existence? If so, what should it look like? What kinds 
of capacity should it provide, and what would be its focus? The coalition brought 
in an outside facilitator to help them discuss next steps. While several people 
were wary of moving beyond Park East and incorporating GJLN as a 501(c)(3), a 
consensus emerged that they wanted more organizational capacity. As Craig, 
who had served as GJLN chair, reflected: 
“Even though we did get some victories, we were kinda flying by the seat of our 
pants and we weren't strategic enough because of not having a central staff. Like 
when we used the SEIU phone-banking system, we had to tally up with people to 
throw in 20 bucks or whatever, or somebody had to cover it themselves and then 
go around and collect.” 
Pam Fendt, a University of Wisconsin faculty member who has since 
become director of GJLN, remembered a discussion from the same retreat where 
it became clear that they didn’t feel ready to take on another campaign yet 
because the coalition wasn’t “scary enough to really have the kind of impact we’d 
want.” Stemming from this environmental scan and their desire to play an active 
role in regional development decisions, GJLN’s short-term goal became building 
up the coalition, particularly adding members from poor neighborhoods where 
they would like to encourage development projects. This approach to formalizing 
the organization differs from CSM, which existed on paper and then brought 
people into the structure. Like Chicago’s Grassroots Collaborative, GJLN 
emerged through a campaign, which fused together a core group of leaders and 
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shaped their ideas about what sort of intermediary organization would be most 
useful in Milwaukee. 
Although the example of the Campaign for Sustainable Milwaukee is not 
much discussed within GJLN, some of the stories about its demise seem to affect 
how the participants think about setting up their coalition, particularly in terms of 
avoiding competition for funding between partners and limiting bureaucracy. The 
GJLN coalition was set up as a “coalition of the willing” and limited its targets to 
publicly supported development projects. A key issue limiting their effectiveness 
is the lack of strong organizations in Milwaukee to build on. While they haven’t 
yet attracted a lot of labor involvement, one local union president expressed 
concerns that GJLN has “siphoned off some of what little energy existed in the 
labor movement” by drawing some of the more active locals away from the labor 
council, thus limiting their attention to reforming local unions. Similar to the 
situation faced by Pittsburgh activists, GJLN leaders are asking: “If a strong 
activist labor movement is key to progressive change in Milwaukee, but the vast 
majority of locals are operating reactively, where does that change come from?” 
Perhaps made a bit warier by the way CSM vanished without leaving 
much infrastructure or capacity behind, John Goldstein insists that, “We have to 
very consciously build the capacity of our partners. We don't have enough 
organizing capacity in Milwaukee, and if we think that hiring three organizers at 
GJLN is going to change that, then we're nuts.” As Craig lays out, they hope to 
seed more lasting change by funneling money to coalition partners to increase 
organizing capacity:  
“Part of [MICAH’s] Jewish Fund for Justice grant came out of the Good Jobs 
coalition. Some of the initial funds of the coalition will be re-granted to the partner 
organizations. So that's the way that we can build up organizing among the 
organizations most likely to be doing it, and really get at the grassroots that's 
gonna be the key to really doing this.” 
While this does create a “funder-fundee” relationship like the CSM, 
partners are getting money to organize, not to provide services, which will 
hopefully head off any tendencies to drift into competition with each other. While 
some activists see such financial entanglements as positive linkages, others 
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think they are always a bad idea, so the power relationship between GJLN and 
its partner organizations will be interesting to watch evolve over time. In addition 
to competition for resources, a major concern of some members was that 
building up the GJLN infrastructure and hiring staff would lead to less 
engagement by partner organizations as they sat back and watched.  
Addressing the larger concerns that strengthening a coalition as an 
independent organization might take something away from the member 
organizations, Annette, a longtime union organizer now working for 9 to 5, the 
National Association of Working Women, made a case for why organizations and 
larger efforts don’t have to be seen in conflict with each other:  
“When you say some people are worried about coalitions taking on a life of its 
own—you kinda want it to. It doesn't diminish 9 to 5 to be part of Good Jobs, and I 
don't think it diminishes our efforts as a coalition to hire staff either. If you don't 
have that structure, you never get ahead of what's happening. And if you don't get 
ahead of it, your ability to impact decisions is very limited. I hate getting involved 
after the fact, and you're stomping your foot and demanding something, and that's 
all you're gonna get, is some little thing.” 
Another former union organizer now working for a statewide political 
organization made the argument that staff don’t necessarily “take over, as long 
as the coalition partners don't abdicate their roles...I think it's kind of a cop-out to 
say staff takes over—only if you let ‘em.” Ultimately, GJLN reached a consensus 
that the dangers of bureaucratization were manageable and worth the risk. 
Through discussion, it became clear to all that several individual members had 
been carrying many of the day-to-day responsibilities in a way that wasn’t 
sustainable, making the decision to hire staff easier. In addition, to this point, they 
have been able to attract all “new money” from foundations outside Milwaukee 
that hadn’t funded any of the partners previously. 
The most recent capacity-building step in Milwaukee has involved creating 
a Civic Leadership Institute bringing together emerging local leaders to develop a 
collective vision for “high road” regional development. The Institute, based on a 
successful model from San Jose, CA that Building Partnerships is promoting, will 
bring together cohorts of strategically chosen participants for a series of sessions 
presenting research and alternative perspectives for thinking about the local 
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economy, the role of government, and how coalitions like GJLN can make an 
impact. 
b. Strong vs. Loose Intermediaries in Pittsburgh 
While the Thomas Merton Center was founded in 1972, only in the past 
decade has it played a central role in bringing together labor-community 
coalitions. More prominent in the 1990s was the Pittsburgh Alliance for 
Progressive Action (APA), which made a large impact and marked out new 
intermediary roles during its brief career. While the APA arose at a similar period 
and from similar motivations as the CSM—following the catastrophic collapse of 
the Western Pennsylvania steel industry and broad mobilizations to support a 
number of local strikes—it evolved quite differently, never developing the same 
kind of institutional base and funding as its Milwaukee counterpart. Most 
strikingly, while the CSM was rooted in the Milwaukee Central Labor Council, the 
APA never forged a close connection with the Allegheny County Labor Council. 
In many ways, the APA never settled into an organizational identity, variously 
striving to create and incubate new organizing, consolidate existing efforts in 
focused campaigns, and catalyze change within local organizations. While all 
three of these were needed in Pittsburgh, the APA struggled to balance such a 
broad set of missions. 
A core group of activists spent significant time and energy working through 
the idea and potential structure before bringing it to a broader audience, but it 
was still met with some skepticism. While supporters found it obvious that such a 
permanent coalition was better than “reinventing the wheel” each time a new 
campaign emerged, others pointed to the Thomas Merton Center and other 
existing structures to argue against starting a new coalition. Joni Rabinowitz, an 
anti-poverty activist, makes clear the need for more specific terminologies and 
discussion of distinctions when strategically thinking about structures:  
“I went to a couple meetings, but I frankly found them to be like nothing was 
happening there. If you're going to start an organization, you have to make there 
be a reason to be there. Sometimes people think we need an organization to do 
something, but I’m very hesitant, because often they'd be better off with a 
campaign. It's easy to just start an organization without thinking, ‘What are we 
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trying to get done and how can we best do it?’ It wasn't clear what it was doing in 
between campaigns...there's a lot of ways to do the relationship-building and 
information sharing without having meetings every month with a chair and people 
raising their hands and all that.” 
The APA formed a board made up of representatives of the dues-paying 
coalition members, but without much of a budget, their capacity was limited 
basically to the core group of organizers who were willing to volunteer time. Their 
limited capacity meant that their goals of coordinating proactive campaigns and 
incubating new organizing projects ended up being somewhat in conflict with 
each other. When some funding was secured from unions and foundations in the 
mid-90s for the Living Wage Campaign, the APA was able to hire a full-time staff 
organizer. This allowed a much more ambitious campaign, but resulted in a shift 
away from the incubation and mutual support goals, later lamented by Judy 
Ruszkowski, long-time treasurer of the APA: 
“I don't think we ever really fulfilled the vision. I wanted to see the APA be more of 
an "advocacy incubator." And through all of this, we had a lot of trouble bringing 
the organizations and the individuals involved in these campaigns into the APA 
organizational structure. Tremendous amounts of resources would be mobilized to 
deal with these issues, but in the end, they didn't end up strengthening the APA 
and its infrastructure. If we had concentrated more on providing services to 
member organizations to support their ongoing work, rather than just trying to sell 
this concept that ‘in numbers we have strength,’ I think we might have succeeded 
more in keeping the APA around longer.” 
As the APA grew more and more consumed by the Living Wage 
Campaign in the late-90s, the Thomas Merton Center (TMC) took on a role as 
the kind of incubator the APA had set out to be, carrying on a piece of 
Ruszkowski’s vision as a result:  
“There were always some tensions between the Merton Center and the APA, 
because I think they saw themselves as fulfilling some of those roles that the APA 
had carved out for itself. They always had a much looser form of governance that 
allowed people to come in and out without having to check their politics at the door. 
That has really helped them, I think, develop into this project incubator.”  
The TMC had historically been seen mostly as a center of Catholic peace 
activism. At least partly in response to the APA’s example, they deliberately 
broadened their focus to become a more general peace and justice hub in 
Pittsburgh. Many projects are affiliated with the TMC and use the meeting space 
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and resources like computers and copier, but are not linked together in any 
formal way. As with the CSM, the incubator and campaign roles of the APA 
would ideally have been mutually reinforcing—organizations would have 
deepened their bases through joint campaigns, which in turn would have been 
more successful because of the broad constituencies involved. In a low-capacity 
environment however, their interaction meant the failure to develop strong 
grassroots organizations also limited the effectiveness of the living wage 
campaign, the failure of which is commonly attributed to a lack of grassroots 
support among those most affected, particularly in the African-American 
community. 
The basic questions about the APA’s role and relationship to other groups 
raised in early debates were never fully resolved. Was it to be a network of 
members, a campaign vehicle, marshal support for other campaigns or lead its 
own? The lack of a clearly defined identity and purpose created tensions 
between leaders of the APA and affiliated campaigns. For example, after the 
APA helped develop the Coalition for Police Accountability and secured a grant 
to hire an organizer, the Coalition began applying for separate funding from the 
same foundation, creating conflict between leaders of the two groups.  
All coalitions struggle to decide how visible to make the coalition as an 
independent organization versus putting member organizations out front. Very 
different views of how to balance this tension created much of the stress between 
key APA activists. In one interpretation, the APA was not independent enough 
from its members to be effective, as its coalition roots slowed it down and made it 
less flexible as a campaign vehicle. From another view, the APA took so much 
ownership of the Living Wage Campaign that member organizations did not 
really buy in and, when the campaign failed, it brought down the APA because it 
had become so identified with that one campaign. Barney Oursler, a longtime 
Pittsburgh economic justice activist, staffed the campaign and reflected on how 
the coalition’s energy slipped away over time, in part because the APA claimed 
ownership over the Living Wage Campaign in a way that felt oppositional to 
partner organizations:  
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“A lot of groups that thought of the APA as theirs stopped thinking of it that way. 
‘Oh well, that's the APA—we may pay dues, we may do a few things that we're 
asked to do, but it's not really my organization anymore.’ And none of us really 
noticed this! Even the board that ran the living wage campaign—which was 
carefully defined to be reps of orgs that made substantial contributions to the 
campaign—it became clear towards the end of the campaign, that they weren't 
even making the real decisions. That happened several times, and people quit 
participating, like ‘Why the fuck do I come to this?’ And the board of the APA just 
kept withering and withering.”  
After the living wage loss, the APA limped along for a year or so without 
recapturing a vision of what to do next. When asked whether the coalition could 
have returned to its early days as a no-staff, shared space, low resource 
existence, Matt Richards, a union organizer who served as the final board chair 
said:  
“Not a chance…people on the board had gotten used to the idea of having a staff 
and having an office. In the end, it became like, ‘We gotta hold onto the office, so 
we gotta hold onto the organization and our c3 status.’ Nobody wanted to make 
the hard choice of shutting down. Finally we just ran out of money.” 
On the surface, this tale seems to exemplify Piven & Cloward’s fear of 
organizations becoming ends in themselves and demobilizing movements. 
However, even those activists most critical of the APA asked, “What kind of 
organization could help us be most effective?” rather than “Why have any 
organization at all?” The APA set out to perform at least three roles: to seed and 
incubate new organizing in the area; to pull together the often-disconnected local 
progressive movement into a structure that enabled joint decision-making; and to 
coordinate proactive campaigns. With limited resources available to it, the APA 
was never able to fulfill all three roles simultaneously, but did each well in spurts. 
The larger strategic question is whether any one organization should try to fulfill 
all these roles simultaneously? 
The Thomas Merton Center has undergone an interesting evolution over 
recent years under the prodding of staff organizers who actively reached out to 
people of color and younger activists, broadening the affiliated campaigns 
beyond their traditional faith-based pacifist base. The TMC does not try to fill all 
the roles envisioned by the APA, but has taken on an incubation role and 
provides spaces that bring together the local progressive movement. The TMC 
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publishes The New People, a wide-ranging monthly paper covering local activism, 
maintains an online calendar of upcoming events, and hosts many meetings and 
events. Because so many people come through the doors for various occasions 
and the staff is connected with activists from across the region, the TMC 
informally connects local activists together, though they are interested in 
encouraging more active cross-fertilization.  
Most recently, a new intermediary named Pittsburgh-UNITED (modeled 
after GJLN) has helped pull together coalitions around development projects in 
the city’s North Side and Hill District neighborhoods. In late 2007, the Pittsburgh-
UNITED affiliated One Hill coalition launched a high profile campaign to force the 
Pittsburgh Penguins hockey team to agree to a community benefits agreement 
on their new arena. 
c. Overlapping networks combining strong and weak ties in Chicago 
No central coalition like the CSM or APA ever emerged in Chicago. The 
IAF-affiliated United Power has worked to pull together a Chicagoland-wide 
coalition, but has never built up the density or capacity necessary to tackle 
ambitious campaigns (Moberg, 2006). Many faith-based coalitions have united 
congregations around peace and justice issues, both within denominations like 
Protestants for the Common Good, or across, like the Chicago Interfaith 
Committee on Worker Issues. Beginning in the 1990s, Jobs with Justice has 
been at the center of many labor-community coalitions, helping forge connections 
and open up union leaders to the idea of working with other groups. Research 
and policy capacity to support these campaigns has come from groups like the 
Midwest Center for Labor Research and the University of Illinois-Chicago’s 
Center for Urban Economic Development. 
Currently, a key intermediary role in Chicago is filled by the Grassroots 
Collaborative (GC), which has evolved a unique organizational model that links 
together a handful of like-minded organizations committed to direct action, 
grassroots mobilization, and progressive political activity. Its independent 
capacity is limited to one staff member working from a cubicle in the American 
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Friends Service Committee office just south of downtown. The Collaborative 
seldom operates independently, but is almost always engaged in a campaign as 
part of a broader coalition. Their capacity to act remains rooted in the 
membership of each organization and their willingness to act. In the opinion of 
Ken Snyder, former GC organizer, the Collaborative takes enough of the 
coordination work off campaign coalition partners that they can focus on 
organizing: 
“We take some of the work off, but not so much that you actually dilute the 
strength of the organization, and move the power from them—there's a balance. 
There's 800 coalitions out there that have 65 members and can turn out 65 people 
to an event because they each send one person. That's deadly, and it doesn't win 
you campaigns like this. So there's a real balancing act, and I don't think a 
concrete set of rules is gonna solve it—you really have to be cognizant of how to 
keep the work in the organizations, but at the same time coordinate and 
communicate.”  
The Collaborative tries to stay in the background of campaigns, both to 
enhance member ownership and to diminish fears of losing organizational 
autonomy with coalition efforts, a particular issue in Chicago’s parochial 
environment. When discussing a possible campaign to pass a “balanced 
development” affordable housing ordinance, Kate, chair of the GC and director of 
an anti-hunger group, explains:  
“We don't want people to feel like we're doing a takeover…I don't lose my identity 
being part of the Grassroots Collaborative, and I think people need to feel that and 
trust that. So the groups that have been at the forefront of Balanced Development, 
they don't have to feel like they're going to be in the backseat. They were the 
groups that really birthed this movement and this campaign, and we're there to 
support it and not to take over. That doesn't happen overnight—it's about building 
relationships and building trust, and realizing that nobody's self-interest is going to 
be stomped out, but whenever we can come together and have a collective 
interest, that's when we all gain.” 
As well as being a coalition of organizations, the Collaborative functions 
as a network of individual organizers. It began through informal breakfast 
meetings of like-minded leaders from the Chicago Jobs and Living Wages 
Coalition getting together to talk politics, and they continue to support each 
other’s efforts to move their organizations toward a more organizing-focused 
model. Kate grew up in Chicago, but had been gone for years when she returned 
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to a job with an organization that had no real history of building a grassroots base, 
and was sustained in the early years through her contacts in the Collaborative. “It 
was a way to connect with organizers, rather than people who were just doing 
advocacy. So for me, coming into a place where my organizational home didn't 
really do organizing, it was a wonderful thing.” One result is that her organization 
is now a very active community group with a large and growing grassroots 
membership, enhancing the broader movement possibilities in the region. 
By intention and of necessity, the Collaborative is not the only active 
organizing network in town. One organizer who has worked closely with the GC 
on many campaigns but is not a member talked about “not getting stuck in the 
Collaborative.” There are organizations that will likely never join the Collaborative, 
which has chosen to be a relatively small, tight-knit group of organizations who 
believe in similar principles. Organizations need to make a significant 
commitment to join, and some will be hesitant to make that jump. In addition, 
there are some groups that refuse to join because of organizational conflicts with 
ACORN and SEIU, who are widely seen as the key drivers. There thus remains 
an important role for other Chicago networks like Jobs with Justice (JwJ) to reach 
out to other groups who might be active in labor-community solidarity work, as 
Carlos Fernandez from JwJ envisions: 
“I think that Jobs with Justice needs to be not only a neutral space, but an 
expansive space—continually bringing new folks in. Like NOW [National 
Organization of Women] hadn't been involved before, but we did an action 
highlighting the experience of women workers at Wal-Mart, and it just took a call 
over to NOW and they were like, ‘Of course we’ll support it.’ So we want to be 
involved in what the Collaborative does, and any other campaigns in the city, but 
just always keep expanding those boundaries—bringing in new organizations, 
maybe on a marginal, very limited basis, but keep bringing them into the fold.”  
Members of the Grassroots Collaborative certainly agree with the 
importance of bringing new groups into labor-community solidarity work, but don’t 
think of it as a role the Collaborative necessarily needs to play. They think 
expansively about building power to move a broad agenda, but have a keen 
sense of the limits of their capacity, combined with an acceptance of a mid-level 
role in local change efforts. Campaigns that overlap with other networks provide 
the chance to work with other groups who might eventually join the Collaborative. 
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This limited ambition appears to be a large part of what has helped them create a 
sustainable and increasingly powerful network. 
d. Discussion 
A variety of approaches to organizationally structuring movements emerge 
from these cities. The increased capacity provided by coalitions has been 
essential to their successes, but organizational structures have provided difficult 
challenges as well. The APA and CSM tried to create broad formal coalitions that 
pulled together as much of the local left as possible, but failed to last out the 
decade. The Thomas Merton Center has existed much longer as an organization, 
resource center, and meeting space without the same kind of ambitions, though 
they would like to bring groups into closer contact. Similarly, the Grassroots 
Collaborative and Good Jobs and Livable Neighborhoods coalition have fewer 
members and more tightly defined missions. 
Each of these efforts show the varying ways organizations relate to each 
other within coalitions according to formal and informal rules. How do you build 
strong, but not top-heavy, intermediary organizations? How can organizations 
relate to each other cooperatively when there many forces pushing them into 
conflict outside it? As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, questions of 
organizational culture are inseparable from structural issues. While on paper, the 
Alliance for Progressive Action looked very similar to the Grassroots 
Collaborative while fighting for a living wage ordinance, Barney Oursler describes 
the erosion of the culture of solidarity among its leaders over the course of 
Pittsburgh’s Living Wage Campaign: 
 “We didn't function as an organization of organizations anymore. We functioned 
as a staff-driven campaign organization, and it's kinda weird, cuz we had 72 
groups join the living wage coalition, which meant some shit. When you signed the 
paper, you committed to educating your membership, to leadership getting trained, 
plus resources—money, people, turnout. And we did sustain activity for 4 years… 
 
But we didn't spend any time, like we used to do, when a bunch of us would say, 
‘Hey, we're all gonna go to each other's meetings—we're gonna have some 
presence of this larger organization by at least seeing the face of some other 
leaders at your meetings.’ All those little things that just build those connections 
beyond the leadership level. It takes organizational work to do that. With no one in 
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charge, some of us who were really excited would periodically get together and do 
something. When you've got staff, it's certainly easier for folks to step back. Its like, 
"Hey, you want it, you got it..."  
Chicago hasn’t lost this culture of solidarity because of a unique blend of 
new structures and norms that have developed over a series of campaigns. Just 
as in thinking about the interconnected need for structural and cultural changes, 
there is often no need to force a choice on such questions—both/and is a better 
solution than either/or. People can be interested both in growing their 
organization as well as the long-term health of a movement. Campaign coalitions 
and networks can provide a bridge between organizations and movements, 
creating the space for the cross-fertilization, relationship-building and 
transformation of identities and interests that are central to the process of 
movement emergence.  
Strategy 2: Building Intermediaries in Layers and Over Time 
How a coalition or other intermediary begins has important effects. 
Counter-intuitively to some organizers, paying attention to differences between 
potential partners and treating them differently within intermediary structures 
helps meet three linked goals of effectiveness, inclusiveness, and sustainability. 
As Joel Rogers, one of the founders of the Campaign for Sustainable Milwaukee, 
describes, there is no substitute for slow and careful trust-building: 
“We met informally for years in something called the China House group, named 
after a restaurant. One thing about building movements is you need some trust 
among the people who are leaders, and there's no way to build trust like just sitting 
around and talking with no particular agenda—just talking about how to improve 
the place that you're in.”  
a. Targeted outreach rather than “open calls” to the coalition table 
Many activists try to start a coalition by issuing a general announcement 
with a meeting time, to which anyone who’s interested is welcome to show up. 
The broadest possible participation is desired for both pragmatic and ideological 
reasons. Pragmatically, organizers are used to looking for power in numbers and 
count a high turnout as indication of a “hot” issue. In addition, many activists on 
the left are committed to ideals of inclusiveness and resist the idea of excluding 
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anyone who wants to participate. However, experienced organizers agree that it 
is important to start a coalition with a core group of solid people and then 
carefully build around it, rather than throwing open the doors and seeing who 
shows up. Members of Chicago’s Grassroots Collaborative are most emphatic 
about this rule, as Madeline Talbott, longtime head organizer of Illinois ACORN, 
founding member of the Collaborative, and current lead organizer of a new 
grassroots organization called Action Now makes clear: 
"We learned through trial and error [to be careful how you start building a coalition], 
and then it's become something that a lot of us know now...so it's developed a bit 
of history and tradition in the culture of organizing here. Some people still do a 
general call, like "Everybody who wants to work on this, come." But that's always a 
disaster and if it's on an important issue, we have to dismantle that group and 
rebuild. And that's a troublesome task, because it upsets people, because there 
you really are kind of directly insulting them. But if you build it right, you build a 
table that has folks that can move people and will move people on the campaign, 
and then you have an outer table that is people who are supportive in various 
ways." 
This approach (and the Grassroots Collaborative itself) grew out of the 
first Chicago Jobs and Living Wages Campaign in the mid-90s. The campaign 
brought together many organizers who were interested in building power at a 
broader level, but wary of “poisonous” coalitions. A longtime local organizer 
named John Donahue, of the Chicago Coalition of the Homeless, started bringing 
together an informal network of leaders involved in the Living Wage Campaign 
for breakfast once a month at Manny’s Deli, a long-time Chicago political venue, 
to talk about what was going on in the city and possibilities for working together.  
Eventually this group became the Grassroots Collaborative and has 
evolved a distinct method of running coalitional campaigns. Even as coalitions 
expand, those organizations contributing more resources are accorded privileged 
access to information and decision-making as part of the core group, which has 
resulted in them playing more active roles and sending key organizational 
decision-makers to coalition meetings. This principle is clearly stated up front, so 
that organizations have the choice to join as either core members or as part of 
the supporting circle. In contrast, some organizers in Milwaukee and Pittsburgh 
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expressed frustration with not having control over who was at the table and no 
way of ensuring accountability among those who were not “bought-in.” 
While an invitation-only process poses challenges to being inclusive, the 
ideal of building a diverse coalition can also be better served through slow and 
careful growth than an open call. Because of our segregated reality, it is difficult 
to reconcile the goals of beginning with a diverse membership with that of 
starting from a group of like-minded people with existing relationships. However, 
it is quite important to do so, as early interactions establish norms for how 
members approach the differences between them (Ely & Thomas, 2001). 
Research shows that while many groups struggle to manage diversity, those 
based in settings such as workplaces that produce common experiences tend to 
produce more meaningful interaction (Estlund, 2005). Studies also show that 
people are better able to build relationships across differences when members 
dialogically develop congruent views of each other early on, something more 
possible in smaller and more stable groups (Polzer, Milton, & Swann, 2002). 
Among my interviewees, several women and people of color reported feeling less 
“tokenized” within smaller groups where the members developed personal 
relationships and an organizational history together.  
In addition to greater effectiveness and inclusiveness, the intermediary 
organizations that have resisted pressures to add as many members as possible 
and focused on strengthening a network of like-minded organizations have 
sustained themselves over time most effectively. The Grassroots Collaborative 
has come under pressure from foundations to grow at a certain rate each year as 
a condition of funding, but members think that they are more effective because 
they insist on similarly high levels of commitment to organizing among all 
members. Ken Snyder, who was the Collaborative’s lead organizer and now 
works as the political director of UNITE-HERE Local 1, laid out:  
“I don't know that there's a large permanent membership for the Collaborative, and 
I wish the foundations would get off our backs about it, because I think they 
misunderstand the Collaborative. They think that the ideal form of the collaborative 
is like 40 members…but having 10 permanent members is not necessarily a bad 
structure if we're continuing to successfully run these broad coalitional campaigns. 
Our permanent members are around the table because they have some power 
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and because the people who lead them are very smart and are willing to look at 
the world through this context.” 
Bringing in organizations not quite on the same page might provide a 
short-term power boost, but make it harder for the Collaborative to sustain itself 
in the long term. In contrast, the Campaign for Sustainable Milwaukee was made 
up of more than 275 organizational members, but of course most commitments 
were quite shallow, contributing to the inability of the CSM to sustain itself 
through tough times. 
b. Internal structures that reflect contributions and differences between partners 
Contrary to how many progressive activists think movements should work, 
these coalitions have been more successful when they acknowledge the different 
levels of power between partner organizations and set up their structures 
accordingly. A key principle in setting up effective coalitions is making sure that 
the people making decisions represent a real power base (usually in terms of 
either people or money), which holds them accountable and encourages 
pragmatism and compromise. Coalitions often focus on bringing people together 
as equals, a goal many respondents think of as mythical at best and poisonous 
at worst—creating opportunities for individuals to exploit the goodwill of others. A 
parallel can be drawn with “color-blind” approaches, which limit efforts to set up 
“fair” structures by refusing to pay attention to difference (Taylor, 1994). 
The past negative effects of overly “open” leadership structures often 
came up in conversations. Several respondents, including Mike, a Chicago union 
leader and member of the Grassroots Collaborative, distinguished between 
“stealing” and “building” power within coalitions: 
"The whole is greater than the sum of its parts. We get a lot of strength out of what 
you call coalition, and we call collaborative—cuz coalition is a loaded term with 
some people, especially field organizers, they're like 'Ugghhh...another coalition, 
that's all we need.' In the worst case, you get the professional activist who doesn't 
have a base but just goes from group to group and tries to form these paper tigers. 
So that's why we called it the Grassroots Collaborative, rather than a 
coalition...because it's such a loaded term for community organizations, and for 
unions. Because there’s so many unions that have been burned in coalitions, or 
who, for good reason, have a bad reputation in coalitions. Because in the worst 
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case, they're just using community groups to turn people out and get them a 
contract and then just turn their back on them. 
 
A lot of these letterhead coalitions—especially through the 70s, 80s, and into the 
90s—where somebody'd get a few people together and then they're a group, and 
then 20 other individuals sign on. That's the worst case—you're borrowing other 
people's power rather than building your own power…The way we're able to keep 
the Collaborative collaborative is something that was true in the first Jobs and 
Living Wages Campaign. To be on the steering committee, you had to produce 
money, at least a busload of people, and staff—preferably all three. And if you 
couldn't produce that, you might be a very nice person, but sorry. But you could be 
on a separate endorsers’ committee—we had regular meetings of them, and they 
could have input on things, so it wasn't just all rammed through, but it meant that 
that steering committee was really effective. And it was nice to be there with a 
group of like-minded people who not only wanted to build their organizations, but 
also wanted to build a movement and not just be organizations—really build both.”  
Formal structures can help create this more positive dynamic, but the 
distinction between borrowing and building power also reflects whether the 
coalition just pulls together organizations as static lumps of influence (an 
aggregative approach), or facilitates a creative process where the partners grow 
their bases and create stronger alliances (transformation). Although Pittsburgh’s 
APA and Living Wage Campaign used a very similar set of rules that tied 
decision-making power to resource contributions and membership mobilization, it 
did not build a sustainable set of relationships between the partner organizations. 
Chapter 3 will explore how the Grassroots Collaborative has been able to 
transform the interests of participants to create a new culture of solidarity in 
Chicago. 
Maintaining a strong core, being up front about power differentials 
between members, and growing thoughtfully helps coalitions stand up to the 
inevitable pressures from outside and build unity across traditional boundaries. 
The Good Jobs and Livable Neighborhoods (GJLN) coalition is far smaller than 
its predecessor, the Campaign for Sustainable Milwaukee (CSM), and members 
talk about how important it has been to build strong relationships over time. Craig, 
a pastor of a church and also works as an organizer for Milwaukee Inner-city 
Congregations Allied for Hope (MICAH), a coalition of churches affiliated with the 
Gamaliel Foundation, remembered that:  
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“They tried to split us up all kinda ways...they'd say, ‘John and labor, they only care 
about themselves, they've never cared about black folks, why would you work with 
them?’ Some people felt like we were getting into bed with the unions and doing 
their work. Some of our pastors and leaders felt like we needed to be the ones at 
the helm of the coalition.”  
In part because it was the same people at the table week after week, 
personal relationships helped bridge the history of mistrust black church leaders 
felt toward union leaders. However, this experience also demonstrates an 
inherent tension in models of allocating formal coalitional power based on 
organizational resources. Less powerful groups have a long history of being 
ignored or double-crossed by more powerful groups, leaving a durable residue of 
mistrust between, for example, unions and African Americans. Guarantees of 
formal equality within coalitions are an understandable desire of these groups 
and can help persuade them to come to the table. However, many of those 
interviewed thought it was impossible to create an effective structure in which 
each group actually had equal voice, making formal and visible inequality 
preferable to formal equality and informal backroom deals.  
c. Moving beyond “laundry lists” and “single issue” campaigns 
In a coalition context, choosing the right issues for campaigns shapes 
opportunities for existing partners to reach out to a new base, bring new 
organizations to the table, and opportunities for leaders to interact and educate 
each other. Because working class movements face the dual challenge of not 
only aggregating the interests of members, but also defining and transforming 
these interests through a dialogical process, they face a more difficult collective 
action dilemma than elites.  
The most common approach of broad-based coalitions has been 
exclusively additive—pooling together many issues in a “laundry list” platform. 
This practice is often rooted in a desire for openness and the belief that 
organizations are likely to work together based only on their immediate self-
interest. However, coming together while remaining in separate “issue silos” does 
not build new power—it only rearranges existing players. Such coalitions tend to 
launch a series of disconnected “single issue” campaigns, in which one or two 
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organizations lead “their” campaign and ask others for support. Taking the first 
step to develop consensus around a common “additive” vision is often a relatively 
easy process. The right-wing attack on working people and communities of color 
has been so vicious that most activists can identify how their issues are linked 
together. In the early stages of the CSM’s development, Joel Rogers 
remembered that:  
"It was very easy to get it together. We said, ‘We’re getting absolutely wiped out. 
The city's going down the tubes, we're riven by this race stuff, we're not getting 
help from the state, we've gotta have a plan, and here's our proposal.’ Let's lay out 
a five year plan...and make a commitment that we'll try to do this thing over several 
years."  
Following these initial meetings, the CSM produced a comprehensive 
report documenting their vision for “Rebuilding Milwaukee from the Ground Up” 
and formed four task groups focusing on Jobs and Training, Environment and 
Transportation, Capital and Credit, and Education. In practice however, the CSM 
only really developed substantial campaigns focused on jobs and training, with 
some efforts around transit. To move beyond a "laundry list" situation where 
every group hopes to use the power of the others to achieve their own goals, it is 
necessary to develop a shared vision and choose cross-cutting issues to focus 
on together. These cases show that transforming various issues and concerns 
into a cohesive vision is an important step in helping coalitions become “more 
than the sum of their parts.”  
Like many other coalitions, Pittsburgh’s Alliance for Progressive Action 
(APA) early on tried to support the campaigns of all member organizations (a 
laundry list approach), but found it overwhelming and developed a set of criteria 
for choosing which campaigns to support, and what level. Somewhat by default, 
the APA ended up narrowing even further and became focused exclusively on 
the Living Wage Campaign (single issue) by the mid-1990s, leaving no natural 
next step following its failure. The broad original platform was a distant memory 
and, without the living wage campaign to fight, there seemed no clear reason for 
the APA’s existence.  
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Instead of developing a comprehensive platform like the CSM and APA, 
the Chicago’s Grassroots Collaborative pauses between campaigns to survey 
the landscape and assess what issues have the most potential to pull together a 
powerful bloc of forces. More informally, they continue the tradition of the 
Manny’s Deli breakfast group through continuing conversations about what’s 
going on in the city and how they might fit in. The APA and CSM used their 
platforms to convince a wide variety of groups that their interests were a coalition 
priority while trying to fuse them together into a more cohesive whole. This sort of 
common vision can be more easily forged within the Collaborative because it is 
much smaller and the participants have developed a good sense of the kinds of 
campaigns that will draw the interest of many members.  
Long-time Milwaukee labor leader Bruce Colburn described how a 
“community benefits” frame has helped GJLN attract broad coalitions to work on 
development issues by bringing people together around their “mutual interest, 
because you can get a lot of different forces all together, whether it’s 
environmental, housing, access to jobs.” Exemplifying this wide appeal, the Park 
East community benefits agreement (CBA) in Milwaukee aimed to transform the 
site of a former freeway into an environmentally friendly neighborhood built by 
union labor that increased access to jobs for women and people of color, and 
provided affordable housing. As Colburn describes, the CBA form pushes 
coalitions toward a common vision. By synthesizing diverse interests into a single 
campaign, this represents a step beyond a laundry list approach where each 
group is promised that “their” campaign will come up eventually. In framing each 
CBA as only one intervention into the ongoing process of economic development, 
they avoid the single issue trap that limits the potential of long-term 
transformation. 
d. Discussion 
While activists in all three cities ran living wage campaigns with the hope 
of catalyzing transformation within local organizations and strengthening the 
central coalition, only Chicago seems to have realized this potential. This result is 
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somewhat surprising, given that the other two campaigns were coordinated by 
already existing coalitions with resources and infrastructure. Perhaps in some 
way, the maintenance of separate “silos” within CSM in the form of task groups 
meant partners were less likely to fully invest in the living wage campaign 
because “their” campaigns remained on the horizon. 
The strategic balance between openness and a small tight-knit group is 
variable based on the situation. To a certain extent, efforts to increase breadth 
and depth are always in tension within these coalitions—growing very big very 
fast makes it difficult to also maintain strong relationships between members. 
However, these cases suggest that it is not a zero sum game—some of the 
coalitions have added members and built power while also maintaining strong 
ties between members by paying attention to how they grow and balancing 
attention to breadth and depth. The patient movement-building approach of 
Chicago activists over the last decade has enabled them to build progressively 
more power while also striving for inclusiveness. Like the Park East CBA, the 
most successful campaigns have garnered the full buy-in of a wide range of local 
groups, pulling them into a dialogical structure in which the begin to 
reconceptualize their interests and articulate a common vision. 
Strategy 3: Using Campaigns to Catalyze Relationships and Strengthen 
Infrastructure 
Coalitions come together around various types of campaigns—supporting 
issues like a living wage ordinance, a union’s fight for a fair contract, ballot 
initiatives, or candidates in the electoral arena. Ideally, each campaign not only 
achieves its immediate goals, but also builds power that can be tapped in the 
future. How does this happen? Some approach this question by using campaigns 
as springboards into ongoing networks, while others let the coalitions dissolve, 
but hope each experience transforms member organizations. This relates closely 
to questions of formal organization and the combination of additive and 
transformative strategies, and this section overlaps with Chapter 3 in exploring 
how organizational structures and cultures are interrelated. 
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In Warren’s (2001) conceptualization of relational organizing, power is 
built by increasing either the breadth or depth of ties between partners. Bringing 
together a broad range of organizations offers the potential to wield more 
influence over decision-makers and relies on bridging social capital, while deep 
relationships, or bonding social capital, between leaders and members within 
organizations make it easier to weather setbacks, find common ground, and deal 
with conflict. Maximizing both dimensions is a key organizational challenge faced 
by activists.  
a. Targeted recruiting to set the stage for deeper relationships 
One of the most often-repeated themes in interviews was the desire to 
push a progressive agenda forward instead of always responding defensively to 
attacks. As discussed above, the most effective campaign issues attract a 
powerful constellation of organizations, mobilize (and expand) the bases of these 
partners, and take advantage of political opportunities. A clear goal of issue 
campaigns is pulling in powerful players, often with the idea of working together 
to test the waters for more long-term partnerships. MICAH, a Gamaliel affiliated 
faith-based coalition in Milwaukee, and member of both the CSM and GJLN, 
explicitly uses such an approach to develop relationships with potential member 
churches. Craig says, “We like to work with churches that don't want to be 
members. We just ask for the opportunity to build some relationships with the 
leaders, and then after we win, they say, ‘Hey, this is a pretty good organization, 
why don't we belong?’”   
Building power to substantially reshape regional economies will clearly 
take more power than these local movements have yet managed to build. While 
bringing existing organizations together is a crucial step, new organizing is also 
essential. In some cases this means seeding new efforts, while other 
organizations can transform themselves into powerful and active membership-
based organizations. GJLN has used potential development sites to reach out to 
community groups as part of a longer-term project to develop progressive 
organizing capacity—particularly within Milwaukee’s Black and Latino 
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communities. Over the past year, GJLN leaders have cultivated relationships with 
people they see as the best organizers within these communities by exploring 
mutual self-interest and offering funding support, even funneling money for 
organizing to groups before they formally joined the coalition. 
While this outreach process works smoothly with some organizations, it is 
often a struggle to convince groups that their self-interest will be served by 
joining the coalition. Various GJLN representatives tried to get SEIU Local 1 
involved in the Park East campaign, with the idea that part of the community 
benefits agreement could include union representation of janitors in the 
development, but were unable to attract a significant commitment. Particularly 
within the property services division, SEIU is almost exclusively focused on an 
industrial, rather than geographic, organizing model. As John Goldstein 
explained, they’re interested in getting leverage on large companies that will 
allow them to organize “25,000 in one shot, not the 1200 we could have helped 
with.” 
This example shows how limited resources (even among some of the 
wealthiest potential partners) create a need to prioritize. Since the presence of at 
least one active organizing union local seems important to the success of these 
labor-community coalitions, understanding the strategic priorities of union 
partners is critical to campaign planning. The APA and the Grassroots 
Collaborative were both built largely on SEIU locals that represented large 
numbers of working class people of color and provided a key link between other 
unions and community organizations. Just as with individuals, the “availability” of 
key organizations is a complex and important component of movement 
emergence. In the long term, the GJLN coalition will need the active involvement 
of more politically powerful union locals to have the impact it is looking for. 
Of course, even when they lay out such a plan and find a cross-cutting 
issue, organizers have to respond to changing circumstances on the ground. 
From their beginnings, leaders of the APA and CSM saw healing the relationship 
between the construction trade unions and the black community as key to 
progressive movement-building in their regions; however, as is discussed in 
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Chapter 3, campaigns focused on minority representation on public construction 
projects turned out quite differently in each city. In Milwaukee, the CSM was able 
to advantage of the opportunity offered by a huge Convention Center project and 
new leadership of the Building Trades Council to broker a deal guaranteeing 
union labor and also targets for people of color and women on the project.  
On the other hand, efforts to broker similar deals between the trades and 
the black community in Pittsburgh failed badly. In the late-1990s, a city ordinance 
called “Pittsburgh Works!” was proposed to guarantee that all city-funded 
construction projects were built union and included a certain percentage of 
Pittsburgh residents, with the goals of ensuring good jobs and diversifying the 
local trades. Although it spoke to deeply felt grievances in the African-American 
community, the ordinance was not connected to a specific grassroots struggle or 
proposed project like the Convention Center, played out mostly in the formal 
political sphere, and was killed in a backroom deal.  
b. Cross-fertilization of shared interests 
A key factor in how campaigns potentially create transformation is the 
process of organic cross-fertilization of issues, tactics, and “movement” identities 
between partners (della Porta & Mosca, 2007). While the Grassroots 
Collaborative periodically looks for cross-cutting issues, other campaigns have 
emerged organically because members look at the world differently as a result of 
working together, as Kate, the director of an anti-hunger group describes: 
“I was working on getting a mandate passed that if schools had 40% or more of 
their kids low-income, that they have to provide school breakfast. I went to the 
then-president of the Chicago Teachers Union, and went to the other unions and 
got them to support the legislation. I wouldn't say that they were the ones who got 
it passed, because it was really our leaders, but for the first time, our leaders were 
sitting down and meeting with representatives from labor. And starting to realize 
from listening to them—though they'd heard me saying it all the time—that wages, 
working conditions, and benefits are at the root of hunger. Because our mission is 
to eliminate hunger by getting at the root causes, so that's how I’ve kinda been 
able to get away with this [push into organizing around broader issues].  
 
So now we’re always inviting our partners from labor to be part of the process. 
We're working on getting a breakfast for all 400,000 kids to have breakfast in the 
classroom, and key to that is my relationship with [the SEIU local representing 
service employees in the schools]. There's also a summer food program (and this 
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is where it gets real interesting, which is what I love). I found out that this summer 
food program is greatly underused and that in Chicago, the Park Districts are not 
using this program.  
 
When I pushed the Park District to find out why, I found out that they will only feed 
kids that are enrolled in programs, and they charge per kid to get into these 
programs. So we're sort of uncovering this—and when I told [the local’s director of 
community outreach] about this, she got real excited, because they've been 
fighting privatization and closing down programs, and charging families for 
services because it's precluding the people in the neighborhood who need it the 
most. I think our work together is going to build both of our bases of support as we 
fight this privatization of the park district.” 
Because of open lines of communication and knowledge of each other’s 
approach and interests, these issues turned into coalition campaigns. The 
potential for cross-fertilization is multiplied when rank-and-file members, and not 
just leaders, come together within coalition campaigns. The Big Box Living Wage 
campaign and the 2007 aldermanic elections provided many opportunities for 
people from the various partner organizations to work together, as Kate 
describes: 
“Some of our leaders, that was the first time they had done the political stuff, the 
phone-banking and whatnot—and they really liked it, they were really jazzed, 
especially about doing it with the unions. Cuz a lot of these guys are day laborers 
or they pick up trash in alleys. They don't work at the Wal-Marts of the world—
they're not even there yet—so it was a bit of a stretch or a leap for them, but they 
really liked it, and they felt like they learned a lot, and they liked developing 
relationships with some of the union guys that they met.” 
These sorts of mediated “weak ties” are the types of connections that 
seem particularly effective at spreading movement identities and building a sense 
of community (Diani, 2003). At marches, prayer vigils, and City Hall rallies, 
members of various organizations had the informal chance to socialize. While 
more formal programs to bring together rank and file supporters would make 
sense from a movement-building perspective, such efforts are outside the 
comfort zone of many leaders and make them nervous.  
Two recent campaigns involving Pittsburgh unions and the Thomas 
Merton Center (TMC) speak to the benefits and challenges of bringing together 
rank-and-file memberships. Save Our Transit (SOT) was founded by bus riders 
to fight for adequate state funding for transit and maintenance of services. Tim 
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Vining, who came to Pittsburgh from Louisiana a few years ago to become 
director of the TMC, describes the emotional energy during a lunchtime 
downtown rally called by SOT to support the drivers’ union during negotiations: 
“That rally really worked against what the Transit Authority had been trying to do—
drive a wedge between the drivers and these poor riders. To have the only 
organized group of riders out there supporting the union really made a difference. 
We had so much authenticity, cuz we had people out there in their McDonald's 
uniforms—she almost lost her job for that—we had people in wheelchairs, and the 
media loves Save Our Transit. Even Channel 11 and the Trib couldn't pursue their 
anti-union agenda, and the unions saw that. Barney helped educate the unions, 
and union members started coming to the press conferences. Pat (the local’s 
president) was almost teary-eyed at one of them. One of the cool things was the 
board was going to sponsor one of our events, and they took that to the members, 
and the members were like, ‘double it!’ 
 
It means so much when a driver acknowledges a rider that's got nothin’ but is 
wearing an SOT button...so now the union and the community group are 
intertwined. So much so that at the last SOT meeting, the question of privatization 
came up, and it was a unanimous decision against it. Two years ago it woulda 
been a battle. It puts us at odds with the Port Authority leadership, who likes us 
too...but it didn't happen because the union gave us money or the leaders pushed 
it down their throat...it was very organic on both sides...I think the key was the 
relationships. These people don't get much affirmation. They talk about Save Our 
Transit being a place where their voices are finally heard. At the Labor Day parade, 
the ATU invited Save Our Transit to march with them. Save Our Transit was 
excited to hand out a few thousand fliers to people, we made it a diverse 
contingent, and we got to know each other marching together. And to be offered 
coffee and donuts, and Pat would grab some of the SOT members and bring ‘em 
around to introduce em to other union members.” 
This connection is not natural to most leaders, who are wary of providing 
access to “outsiders,” and only developed after months of relationship-building 
and consistent support of the union by SOT. In general, most U.S. public 
employee unions do not have close relationships with the constituents who 
access their services. For example, teachers’ unions have often had wary or 
contentious relationships with parents and students. This cuts each group off 
from the potential allies who could be most central to creating positive change, 
and makes standing up to privatizations and other right-wing assaults on the 
public sector much more difficult.  
The TMC Healthcare Campaign was formed to support the struggle of 
downtown janitors for a fair contract and to increase progressive action around 
healthcare more generally. After a quite different experience as one of the central 
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community organizers involved in the campaign, Alex Bradley ended up 
frustrated that:  
“Unions have this huge reluctance to open up their members…I think ultimately the 
big thing was the cultural barrier. We wanted to bring together the community with 
labor, not necessarily just with their handlers. We were never really able to do that, 
and that was mostly because of the union. They really kept a tight leash on us. 
They wanted us to help, but not too much. And they wanted us to be involved, but 
not in certain ways. I think it's a shame, cuz that was one of our…primary 
motivations. If you're going to build a longer-term movement, it's not just about the 
rhetoric, but people in the community are going to have to feel some real bonds of 
solidarity with individual workers, and not just with some representative telling 
them why it's important for workers.”  
Symbolic of this cultural barrier, union staff involved with the campaign 
found it incredible that the community-based activists would have tried to talk 
directly with their members, because it broke with normal protocols and seemed 
to open the union up to a dangerous breach of discipline. To them, the conflict 
seemed due to activists “not understanding how the real world works.”  
The relationship between SOT and the transit union was brokered by 
several skilful activists with experience in both union and community struggles, 
who carefully built trust during the beginning stages. It also may have made a 
difference that the bus riders of SOT were mobilizing around their own self 
interests, rather than just as supporters. The active process of defining how the 
riders and drivers shared interests and framing the issue in ways that supported 
each other provided opportunities to deepen the relationship between the two 
groups. The Healthcare Campaign, on the other hand, began with the goal of 
supporting the janitors against a particularly nasty building owner, offering less 
chance to focus on how the destinies of these workers and their community 
supporters were entangled. 
c. Building sustainable infrastructure 
The best example of an intermediary organization emerging out of a 
campaign in these cases is the Grassroots Collaborative, which grew out of the 
original Chicago Jobs and Living Wages Campaign. The Good Jobs and Livable 
Neighborhoods coalition presents a similar story—formed to fight for a 
community benefits agreement for one specific project, the members decided to 
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carry on following the campaign with the goal of intervening in all important 
development decisions in the region. More recently, GJLN developed a Civic 
Leadership Institute focused on their efforts to spur sustainable development on 
abandoned industrial sites. Participants were more likely to attend because of the 
preceding example of successful collective action, and hopefully the Institute will 
become an ongoing institution. 
The energy of a “hot” campaign issue can pull people together, help them 
work across differences, and demonstrate the possibilities of cooperation, in the 
process expanding participants’ sense of possibility and justifying a commitment 
to the “costs” of future cooperation (Gould, 2003). Overall, campaigns are key 
strategic opportunities for movement-building. The right issues bring in new 
members, encourage a strategic focus on organizing capacity and base-building, 
and provide opportunities to build relationships and work through conflicts 
between potential allies. Coalition campaigns offer the potential for 
transformation as leaders actually get to talk to each other across differences, 
stretch their ideas of self-interest, and take their organizations in new directions.  
Conclusion: Building a Flexible Infrastructure and Seizing Opportunities 
By comparing efforts to mobilize around economic justice issues in these 
three deindustrializing Rust Belt cities over the past two decades, we can explore 
what strategies are most effective in sustaining mobilization and increasing 
working class power. When do these coalition-building efforts actually become 
“more than the sum of their parts” and yield an energy that disrupts politics as 
usual and shifts the balance of power toward the have-nots? What approaches 
are most successful in overcoming fragmentation and riding out the ebbs and 
flows of changing political contexts? How people are brought together clearly 
matters, and these cases show that more focused strategies increase 
sustainability in a number of ways. When linked together by effective 
intermediary organizations, a local movement can realize the potential of broad 
strength implicit in the memberships of area working class organizations like 
churches, neighborhood groups, and unions. 
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a. Building working class movements in a society that doesn’t talk about class 
At the core of many organizing dilemmas lie questions of who to work with. 
While a class-based politics makes intuitive sense for efforts that define 
themselves around a common concern with economic justice, none of these 
coalitions explicitly defined themselves along class lines. Many commentators 
have noted how class discourse is policed and discouraged on the American 
political scene, making it less surprising that these groups mostly use terms like 
“progressive change” or “working families” when describing their goals (Zweig, 
2004). While the symbolic borders are thus fuzzy, imputed class interests often 
come up in conversations about people on the edges of the movement who don’t 
fit in, like one Milwaukee church leader described by Craig:  
“Your mission does shift once you take that money. We see it all the time, like with 
one of our leaders who works at a PR firm that works for Wal-Mart and spends a 
lot of his time trying to tell us that Wal-Mart isn't bad people. And we say, ‘Look it's 
not about bad people, it's about bad practices, bad policies.’ But he feels 
compelled to keep sayin’ it cuz Wal-Mart is paying his salary. And Wal-Mart’s been 
strategic about doing that...like they hired Andrew Young...You see that and it's 
just weird, y'know?”  
In fact, Young, one of Martin Luther King’s former top lieutenants, was 
campaigning against Chicago’s big box living wage campaign on behalf of Wal-
Mart before being forced to resign in disgrace in the summer of 2006. The money 
chase is often dangerous for movements on the Left, with the scarcity of 
resources steering organizations down more conservative paths (Incite, 2007). 
Non-profits reliant on foundation and government funding provide the clearest 
examples of this phenomenon, but member-funded unions and churches are also 
often pulled toward a “safer” and less active role as the easiest route to 
maintaining member support. However, while most working class members of 
these groups may ask for an individually-focused “service model,” this preference 
is potentially transformable through the processes of collective action and 
dialogue. It is far less likely that charitable foundations built on the logic of 
capitalism will ever support basic challenges to the system (Rodriguez, 2007). 
The above example from Milwaukee speaks directly to the tangled knot of 
race and class in the US, and the struggles of activists to deal with their 
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interrelation coherently, a central activity within each of these cases. The 
“potential movement” in each of these regions is highly fragmented, with divisions 
between activists on the basis of demographics, areas of focus, and strategy. 
Symptomatic of how separated various justice issues have become from each 
other, Jeremy Shenk, the former communications director of the Merton Center, 
describes a well-publicized and funded group of mainly white, upper and middle-
class liberals who “like to see themselves as a new progressive movement, but 
support privatization and busting unions by talking about ‘old Pittsburgh…artsy, 
young, definitely pro-choice and gay marriage...but when it comes to race and 
class, you get some interesting things.”  As a result, the label “progressive” has 
become a flashpoint in Pittsburgh, with many in the labor movement reacting 
negatively to its mention. Ironically, less than a decade earlier, the term 
progressive as used by the APA was criticized by some for being too labor-
focused.  
To restate the dilemma as it often applies to these coalitions, to what 
extent should unions and working-class community organizations try to work with 
“middle-class” groups? While pragmatism and the desire to build power seems to 
dictate alliance-building, results in Chicago suggest that a majority political bloc 
may be achievable without the cultural complications of working with groups 
dominated by white professionals (e.g. many environmental, peace, or women’s 
groups), which, as the growing body of work on labor-environmental coalitions 
shows, can present considerable hurdles (Rose, 2000; Dreiling, 2001).  
In his analysis of the mayoral campaigns of Harold Washington, Gary 
Rivlin (1992) suggests that the promise of attracting “lakefront liberals” to 
progressive coalitions that take race and class seriously is often overrated. Even 
though he was arguably the most reform-oriented “good government” mayor in 
the city’s history, Washington was never able to win more than a handful of votes 
from the north side wards. The Grassroots Collaborative’s campaigns have been 
almost exclusively based in organizations representing poor and working-class 
residents. Liberal suburban churches and similar groups have played an 
important supportive role, but the core has been inner-city community 
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organizations and unions, suggesting that, at least at some levels, it is possible 
to make change even in the face of a Daley administration that is far more 
interested in appealing to its wealthy constituents.  
There are always challenges in bringing people together across 
differences within movements. To some extent, organizers can control who 
comes to the table and when, and thus impact the effectiveness and 
sustainability of coalitions. While it can be tempting to operate on utopian 
assumptions of equality and treat all partner organizations the same, these cases 
demonstrate that paying attention to differences between groups when 
developing organizational structures provides a basis for more long-term stability. 
Open calls to join campaigns, 50-member steering committees, trying to include 
every possible potential ally, and page-long laundry lists of shared issues often 
limit meaningful involvement as the greater breadth turns into greater frustration 
of nothing getting done.  
While I argue that additive and transformative strategies can often be used 
side by side, in certain cases they do not fit together. For example, although the 
Big Box Living Wage campaign could have increased the breadth of its coalition 
by trying to pull in local retailers or small business associations, the strategic 
choice to limit who was at the table allowed them to frame the ordinance as a 
class issue and provided greater opportunities for the transformation of identities 
and interests among participants. 
b. Linking key organizations within focused intermediaries 
The key building blocks and constituencies of working class movements in 
each city are membership organizations based in the workplace, neighborhoods, 
or communities of faith. These cases suggest that these membership 
organizations are linked together within and across sectors by three main types 
of movement intermediaries: “permanent” coalitions, campaign coalitions, and 
capacity-builders. 
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Figure 2.2: Three Types of Movement Intermediaries 
Intermediary Type Characteristics Example 
Ad Hoc/Campaign 
Coalition 
Ad hoc network of organizations pulled 
together to work on a specific campaign. 
Living Wage Campaigns, 





Network of organizations formed with the 
intent of facilitating cooperation over an 




Alliance for Progressive 






Broad category of organizations that 
provide spaces for groups and individuals 
to come together, specific “expert” 
capacities like policy analysis or electoral 
organizing, or otherwise serve as “hubs” 
of local movements. Often include 
representatives of a broad set of 






These intermediaries can be distinguished based on the kinds of 
organizations they bring together and how many issues they focus on. Figure 2.3 
represents a typology of organizations based on the breadth of their ambition on 
two dimensions. Some intermediaries work only with labor, faith-based, or 
community organizations, while others bring groups together across several 
sectors. Second, some focus on a single relatively narrowly defined topic, while 
others tackle a broad range of issues. 
Figure 2.3: Variations in Focus Among Movement Intermediaries 
 Range of Issues Addressed 
 Narrow Broad 
Narrow 
US Labor Against the War 
Chicago Rehab Network 
(neighborhood housing 
associations) 
Interfaith Justice Coalitions 
Grassroots Collaborative 
Central Labor Councils 




















Justice for Janitors 
Good Jobs & Livable 
Neighborhoods  
Jobs with Justice 
Alliance for Progressive Action  




None of the examples from the lower-right “most ambitious” category in 
this study have been successful over a sustained amount of time, suggesting that 
they represent a less realistic goal for activists outside moments of opening 
political opportunities. A more fluid strategy of pushing out in one direction from 
“narrow/narrow” collaborations to form “permanent” coalitions in the less 
ambitious boxes, pulling together broader campaign coalitions, then retreating 
back into more sustainable formations, may be a more effective way to build 
power for the long haul. For example, the Grassroots Collaborative formed the 
much larger Big Box Living Wage coalition to press the ordinance. 
Beyond networking, movement intermediaries house a number of specific 
capacities to support local power-building. Coalition-building, research and policy 
analysis, leadership development and training, and political action all require 
specific skill sets and are often housed in specialized independent capacity 
providers like “think-and-do tanks” or “civic leadership institutes.” None of these 
three cities have uniformly strong capacity in these areas, but structurally, the 
more dispersed location of capacity seems to hold advantages over the “under 
one roof” strategy of the CSM, whose downfall took much of Milwaukee’s local 
capacity with it. In sum, these intermediaries play at least five potential roles in 
strengthening local working class communities: 
• Consolidating the power of existing organizations in campaigns 
• Creating new organizations to fill gaps 
• Catalyzing change within existing organizations 
• Coordinating proactive strategic planning 
• Community-building and informal connections 
The APA and the CSM both proved unsustainable, arguably in large part 
because they were too ambitious. Both tried to build the broadest coalition 
possible, provide services, and unify the local left into a formal decision-making 
structure to coordinate campaigns, but they were not able to do it all. Activists 
involved in both describe a loss of “coalition culture” during their decline. 
However, this decline was due to different forces. The APA’s cooperative culture 
atrophied during the years when attention was focused on the living wage 
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campaign, while the CSM was swallowed up by the service provision 
bureaucracy it built. 
Of course, while less ambitious coalitions may be more sustainable, they 
make it harder to “get out in front of issues,” a continuing frustration of organizers. 
Defensive campaigns are naturally easier to build broad coalitions around 
because the issue, and people’s stake in it, has usually been made clear. 
Relationships are more easily built within strategic campaigns that draw in 
multiple partners through their self-interest, but there is no guarantee that these 
campaigns will emerge or that groups will come to the table in response.  
A partial answer may be found in more focused types of intermediary 
organizations. For movements to emerge, local activists need a place to build 
relationships, develop a common vision, and set long-term strategy, but they 
don’t need to do these things all in the same place, and certainly not in a formal 
coalition setting. For example, the Grassroots Collaborative serves several 
important movement-building functions in Chicago, but is intentionally less 
ambitious than some other efforts. Ken Snyder calls the Collaborative “an 
interesting hybrid” of organizing-focused membership-based organizations that 
provides a supportive space for their staff and leadership as well as the core of 
broader coalition campaigns tackling “big issues that aren’t necessarily in their 
immediate self interest.”  
Some Collaborative leaders “map” the field of local social justice 
organizations in multiple tiers, paralleling the way they structure campaign 
coalitions. The Collaborative is part of a central core group that is committed to a 
common vision and making significant sacrifices toward common goals. This 
core provides a center of gravity within larger coalitions. A second tier includes 
organizations that are regular partners in campaigns and are becoming more 
connected. A third tier is made up of groups that are peripherally active or logical 
partners who haven’t been connected with yet.  
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Figure 2.4: Conceptual Map of Local Movements 
 
 
Although the Collaborative has not formally added many new members 
over the past decade, their campaigns have brought many organizations into the 
second and third tiers, multiplying “weak ties” and warming relations between 
community groups and unions in Chicago overall, increasing the potential for new 
campaigns with new partners. 
c. Evolving strategies and the craft of movement-building 
Overall, there’s no one answer to the question of what organizing 
strategies are most useful. At their most successful, these campaigns blend 
together mass grassroots memberships, strong organizations linked in networks 
and campaign coalitions, and a tightly linked leadership core. The presence of 
each of these elements makes it more likely that a strong movement will emerge 
from the continuing series of struggles in each city. Nothing as clear as right or 
wrong approaches emerge, but it is clear that there are better and worse ways to 






Local power-building strategies appear to be evolving, with at least three 
roughly distinct modes of local movement-building emerging from U.S. cities over 
the past several decades. The first, most prevalent in the 1980s, is exemplified 
by defensive mobilizations against plant closings; a second by proactive efforts to 
build over-arching regional coalitions uniting the broadest possible set of groups, 
and the third by a more flexible model of overlapping networks and institutions. 
As I have described above, this third generation still thinks big, but with more 
focused ambition—bringing together broad coalitions to work on specific issue 
campaigns while relying on more focused intermediary organizations to play a 
coordinating and consolidating role between campaigns. 
Figure 2.5: Types of Cross-Sector Working Class Organizing 
Mode of 




Clear distinctions between workplace and community 
issues; often union-directed; ad hoc coalitions; often 
aggregate impressive amounts of energy and power 
but dissolve quickly after campaign without leaving 






“Popular front” strategy of unifying a potential 
“governing bloc” in a formal structure, developing a 
common agenda, and pressing a broad platform of 
change; tend toward “laundry lists”; often bring all 
functions under one roof 




Building movement infrastructure and creating a local 
culture of solidarity by strengthening networks and 
capacity through fitting defensive and proactive 
campaigns into a larger vision; Forward-looking but 
reflexive and organically evolving; Multi-level systems 
change; Uses all three intermediary types 
Chicago in the 
2000s 
 
An open-minded pragmatism and willingness to alter approaches based 
on shifting political opportunities and local conditions seems to produce more 
success than a set model. Perhaps most challenging for organizers, building 
strong movements is not a linear process. Ideally, cooperation and involvement 
continue growing steadily among partners over the course of each campaign, but 
history has shown that movements grow and make gains in relatively 
unpredictable big leaps (Clawson, 2003). These coalitions are unlikely to grow 
steadily until one day becoming ready to take power. Since the political context is 
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constantly shifting, organizers should continually revisit strategic questions in an 
effort to better balance these dilemmas. Whatever organizational and political 
approaches are chosen should reflect a clear understanding of these tensions 
and be optimized to fit the local situation.  
When a political opportunity opens up, organizers want to be able to 
quickly pull together a powerful bloc to capitalize on it and win as much as 
possible. To meet this goal, these cases suggest a measured and long-term 
strategy based on creating denser local movement networks. Under normal 
conditions, organizations would always be looking to move one or two links 
beyond their normal sphere of influence by reaching out across differences to 
organizations of different types or constituencies. Coalitions then constantly 
reach out to new partners who “fit” with the group, but bring something new in 
terms of constituencies or connections. 
Each campaign provides a testing ground for groups to assess each other 
and see if they’re ready for a long-term relationship. For a group like the 
Grassroots Collaborative, each campaign might bring one or two new permanent 
members, as well as several new “second tier” relationships. The ambitious 
visions of the founders of the APA and CSM are not impossible, but require a 
more patient approach to expanding coalitions through the ebbs and flows of 
political struggle over the years. In general, activists will be more able to take 
advantage of political opportunities if a solid foundation of coalitions within each 
sector has been established, so building interfaith social justice networks and 
rejuvenating central labor councils is very important ongoing work. In addition, 
cultivating the growth of issue-based coalitions that bring various organizations 
together around a common cause strengthens cross-sector relationships and can 
help develop movement identities among activists. 
If such broad and ambitious coalitions appear less likely to sustain 
themselves over time, it raises questions about where, and with whom, certain 
movement-building tasks should take place. Groups like the CSM and APA tried 
to provide a democratic setting for activists to come together and develop a 
broader vision of how the problems they faced (and their solutions) were linked 
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together. The Grassroots Collaborative and GJLN are made up of smart and 
creative people, but represent nothing like the diversity of these broader 
coalitions. Should some other structure exist to periodically pull people in these 
cities together to build bridges and a common vision, even if it does not continue 
as a formal body? 
The CSM and APA also set out to build professional and personal 
relationships between activists to facilitate more spontaneous collaboration. What 
kind of local movement infrastructure is necessary to allow people to stay in 
contact, build relationships, and mobilize quickly? Who should be funding the 
media, networks, and “halfway houses” that help facilitate movement-building? 
The Thomas Merton Center plays a role unlike anything in Chicago or Milwaukee, 
and represents a model of what a loose, but physically rooted, movement-
support space can look like. Many local activists across sectors read the TMC’s 
monthly newspaper and attend the annual social justice awards ceremony, which 
presents a chance for informal linkages. What parts of this model might be 
replicable in other regions? 
Activists in all three cities are developing pieces of organizational 
infrastructure and establishing a basis for strong working class movements. 
Pittsburgh UNITED has joined Good Jobs and Livable Neighborhoods and the 
Grassroots Collaborative as a focused permanent coalition; Milwaukee has 
developed a Civic Leadership Institute, an idea now under consideration in the 
other two cities; and a core of leaders interested in tackling big issues has 
emerged in each city. Whether they are able to spark the emergence of strong 
local movements will depend not just on creating logical organizational structures, 
but on their efforts to use transformative strategies to forge new cultures of 
solidarity linking together local working class communities, the focus of Chapter 3.
 
 83
Chapter 3  
 
Creating Cultures of Solidarity Across Racial 
Boundaries 
 
Introduction: Organizational Culture and Prefigurative Politics 
“We're a microcosm of the larger society, so we'll always have homophobia, we'll 
always have racism. But if you don't struggle with those things, then that's what 
we'll always be, and that's not right. We should aspire to something better.” 
(Annette, Milwaukee community organizer) 
 
U.S. social justice movements have made great strides in securing rights 
for women, people of color, and workers, but have often been hamstrung by their 
inability to unite potential constituencies across differences such as race, gender, 
and class. As the preceding quote suggests, these internal boundaries often 
replicate fault lines from the broader society. Unsurprisingly, the politics of race 
relations are never far beneath the surface of efforts to build local working class 
movements. As a researcher, when I introduced my interest in “labor-community 
coalitions,” I found that most people the prefix implicitly (or explicitly) attached 
“white” to the term “labor,” while “community” implied Black or Latino. Virtually 
everyone I interviewed assumed I was focused on efforts to bring together unions 
with communities of color. While I was initially uncomfortable with this and 
insisted that I didn’t intend such a distinction, I realized over time that it usefully 
pointed out the centrality of racial boundaries in their organizing frameworks. 
With this in mind, I reworked my interview introduction to center on questions of 
how coalitions work across race, gender, and other differences in pursuit of 
economic justice.  
How these coalitions deal with cultural differences plays a significant role 
in the success and sustainability of their efforts. The starting point for coalition-
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building in most regions is one of mistrust and fragmentation, with activists 
assuming that others are willing to “steal their power” and jump ship at any time. 
Based on past experiences, participants usually assume that differences of 
opinion, culture, politics, or strategy will lead to unpleasant conflicts and 
breakdowns of cooperation. Approaching multiracial coalitions as ticking time 
bombs produces a predictable vicious cycle in which wary activists assume the 
worst of each other and fulfill each other’s fears by acting in narrowly self-
preserving ways. Although lip service is often paid to diversity, far fewer activists 
make an active commitment to inclusion. Sheila Cochran, who leads Milwaukee’s 
Central Labor Council, described how seldom differences of ideas and identity 
have been welcome during her years of experience as a black woman in the 
labor movement: 
We have leaders that feel like as long as you hire or elect someone who is African-
American or Latino, you’ve satisfied what it means to be a diverse organization. 
Instead of saying, ‘I'm gonna bring this person to the table because they have 
ideas, not just because they happen to be brown or black,’ it’s been my experience 
that once you open up your mouth and actually begin to express those opinions, 
all of a sudden, diversity's not such a good thing and now we're just gonna tolerate 
you. And so I started hearing my favorite phrases: "She's very candid...and 
outspoken." The struggle is that you want these diverse communities to work 
together, but when they get together, you don't really want to hear what they have 
to say.  
Not only do such groups miss out on the potential benefits of bringing 
together diverse constituencies, this sort of tokenism exacerbates existing 
divides. The status quo remains in place – women and people of color are 
excluded and often less willing to try playing such a role again.  
The barriers standing in the way of a strong working class movement are 
easy to spot. Most people in the U.S. do not think of themselves as members of a 
working class in any political sense. If they think of themselves as part of a 
systematically disadvantaged group, it is much more likely to be on the basis of 
race or gender than class. Americans live very segregated lives, particularly 
along racial lines, reinforcing this sense of difference and producing a variety of 
dispositions and ways of life. As Ira Katznelson (1981) has shown, the US 
working class developed along a bifurcated path – workers on the job, but 
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members of racial and ethnic groups at home. Our political system enhances this 
fragmentation, as geographic racial segregation is translated into a pluralist 
interest group politics that creates a sense of conflict between subgroups. In 
addition, various segments of the working class (especially white men) have also 
used their racial and gender privilege to exclude and maintain relative 
advantages over African-Americans, immigrants, women, “unskilled workers,” 
and other groups (Roediger, 1991).  
In the face of all these challenges, uniting the diverse body of social 
justice struggles within a transformative movement often appears little more than 
a pipe dream. With this crisis, however, comes opportunity. I found a general 
recognition that “politics as usual” has failed to produce results, and a resulting 
openness to new approaches. Many of the activists involved in these coalitions 
want to fundamentally shift the distribution of power and resources in the United 
States, are well aware that the history of US social movements is littered with the 
carcasses of groups unable to work together across differences, so are 
searching for new strategies to achieve their goals. This chapter focuses on the 
intersection of race and class because it was the most frequent topic within these 
coalitions, but much of the analysis could be applied to similar dynamics 
involving gender, sexuality, and other dimensions of difference. 
Efforts to bridge these boundaries require more than just working harder 
on the same strategies, since they have included a hesitation to talk about issues 
of race and class directly, firm distinctions between workplace and community 
issues, and a narrow focus on organizational interests over broader movement 
goals. As Chapter 2 described, one piece of moving beyond the status quo 
involves creating new organizational structures to coordinate action. In addition, it 
is also necessary to create alternative cultures based on new norms and 
relationships between movement partners. The more successful coalitions in my 
sample are characterized by strong, trusting relationships between members 
(who even report having fun together!) and an acceptance of conflict and 
differences as constitutive elements of the group.  
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A wide-ranging literature on cultural change in social movements 
addresses the need to create spaces to develop the critical consciousness of 
members and demonstrate alternative ways of organizing social relationships in 
order to build solidarity across differences (cf. Guinier & Torres, 2002). This 
general process has been explored under a number of labels, including 
organizational culture, group formation, consciousness, collective identity, 
imagined communities, and public spheres.  
While informed by all these literatures, this chapter is framed around the 
concept of prefigurative politics, an approach to movement strategy that attempts 
to align movement cultures, practices and consciousness with long-term goals – 
forging new relationships and developing ideology through struggle, guided by 
the dictum that “the way is the goal” (Crass, 2007). Prefigurative approaches 
emphasize the importance of “how” movements function as well as “what” their 
goals are. In their efforts to develop more effective organizing models, the 
coalitions examined in this study have utilized two interrelated strands of 
prefigurative politics (which I label using names developed within earlier 
movements). First, they incorporate a group focus on creating “beloved 
communities” as building blocks of a new world within the shell of existing 
structures. Second, they create new leadership norms through an individual 
focus on “being the change you wish to see.”  
The most effective approaches to creating change within complex systems 
seek to coordinate reinforcing structural and cultural changes, rather than 
focusing on one or the other (Bate, Khan & Pye, 2000). These coalition-builders 
are trying to coordinate change within these two spheres while wrestling with an 
ongoing question: how best to bring diverse groups together without replicating 
systemic inequalities between them from the broader world? This chapter will 
briefly describe the status quo of racial division in these three regions before 
presenting two prefigurative strategies for building cultures of solidarity used 
within these coalitions. Finally, I provide several case examples of these 
strategies in action before concluding with a summary of cultural change 
strategies within multiracial organizing. 
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a. Status Quo: Underlying Conflicts between Unions and African-Americans 
Activists in all three cities face longstanding tensions between local unions 
and black communities. Factors both internal and external to the movement 
maintain a cycle of mistrust and defensiveness. First, the two sides often seem 
trapped in patterns of relating to each other that increase emotion and distance 
between them rather than sparking change. Second, elites skillfully exacerbate 
these conflicts within broader cultural narratives, fanning the flames and making 
it harder to have constructive dialogues. Leaders’ ability to bridge this divide 
explains much of their success in building powerful and sustainable coalitions 
and is central to long-term movement-building possibilities. This requires change 
in the labor movement—the less local unions are seen as only representing white 
workers, the more legitimacy they have as leaders of a multiracial working class 
movement. While there is still much to be done in each city, Chicago has been 
most successful moving in this direction, Milwaukee has seen some successes 
and some setbacks, while Pittsburgh has mostly struggled to bring together local 
unions and black communities. 
The relationship between building trades unions and communities of color, 
particularly African-Americans, is a primary flashpoint in regions across the 
country. In all three cities, activists point to this historically-rooted conflict as the 
key barrier to building a stronger working-class movement. Black and Latino 
activists are upset about the slow pace of progress while leaders of the building 
trades feel their efforts to change deep-seated traditions in the face of resistance 
go unappreciated. The unresolved conflict spreads outward and infects the 
relationship between communities of color and labor in general. Biko Baker, a 
young African-American community organizer in Milwaukee who has also worked 
for unions, described how his father has sued the Electrical Workers for 
discrimination five times and now hasn’t been sent to a job in years: 
Labor people often seem to say, ‘Well, the trades are the trades…What can we do 
about them? It’s not our fault.’ But it may really be poisoning relationships with 
black activists, because those look like the only good jobs out there. It doesn’t 
matter that SEIU’s open—nobody wants one of those jobs anyway. 
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As Baker’s comments reflect, even when unionized, service sector jobs 
usually don’t pay much, so the greater racial and ethnic diversity of unions like 
SEIU and UNITE-HERE fails to register as much impact on public perception. 
Such unions are thus forced to care about the conflict because many people 
generalize from the trades and portray all unions as racist, creating a huge 
barrier for those interested in bringing together a multiracial working-class 
movement. A Chicago labor leader told me:  
The problem is really the trades—that’s where all the problems between African 
Americans and the labor movement are coming from. Reverend Meeks was on the 
radio in his church last week saying “All unions are racist.” So we have to just get 
out there and show them that isn’t us. It amazes me how much is ignored. Like at 
the last Collaborative meeting, [a woman] from MetroSeniors was saying, “Don’t 
they know that there wouldn’t have been a civil rights movement without a labor 
movement? Did they forget that King was in Memphis helping the sanitation 
workers?” 
Martin Luther King’s work in Memphis was often cited as an example of 
how race and class struggles could be fused together. Particularly in Chicago, 
many white activists expressed strong convictions that change is necessary, but 
weren’t sure exactly how it could be accomplished. A local labor leader told me 
he though there were some union leaders who would like to see more done, and 
some “people in the trades who think they're doin’ everything they can—and they 
are. They go out and recruit. And then there are people in the trades who could 
do a lot more. And we all get painted with that brush.” 
The conflict flows in part from the model of unionism used by the trades, in 
which you need to go through an apprenticeship and become a member of the 
union before being eligible to work for “union contractors.” The union thus takes 
on the role of regulating the labor supply and allocating limited slots. Historically, 
these positions have often been filled based on ethnic and family connections, 
leading to the replication of homogenous workforces. Suggesting that such 
conflicts were almost intrinsic to the model, one African-American union leader 
told me, “I don’t care where you are—I was in Zimbabwe and the trades was a 
problem!” On top of this however, US trade unions have at times explicitly tried to 
prevent people of color and women from joining (Swanstrom, 2007). 
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While federal and state intervention since the 1970s has made overt 
discrimination rarer, union members have still often made it very unpleasant and 
difficult for those trying to get through apprentice programs. Apprenticeship 
program sites are now often located in outlying suburbs and assume that workers 
have dependable cars and money to buy their own tools. In addition, while they 
have maintained relatively high wage standards, the building trades have lost 
market share along with the rest of the US labor movement, and more and more 
construction is being done non-union (often by Latinos and Black workers, 
including virtually the entire residential industry). With fewer union jobs available, 
those with less seniority (disproportionately women and people of color) spend 
more time “on the bench” and find it difficult to make a living. 
All these factors combine to keep the construction workforce on big visible 
commercial and public works projects largely white and male. For example, only 
4% of construction workers in Pittsburgh, and 7% in Chicago, are African-
American (2% of each city’s construction workers are women) (Swanstrom, 
2007). Steve Donahue, a Pittsburgh activist, describes walking by several big 
sites “and the parking lot’s full of SUV's from Butler and all these outlying 
counties...Almost all white guys...” The high visibility of construction work and the 
perception that the trades provide one of the last ways to make a decent living 
without a college degree combine to make access to construction jobs a key 
issue to many African-Americans, whose communities have been particularly 
hard hit by deindustrialization. From the 1960s on, demands for affirmative action 
and local hiring have galvanized many struggles in Black communities. In most 
places, the building trades unions have grudgingly committed to ideals and goals 
of diversifying themselves, but half-hearted efforts and a lack of new slots have 
resulted in little visible change in most cities. 
Jen Kottler, from Protestants for the Common Good, echoed others in 
Chicago by emphasizing the need for concrete restorative action directly 
confronting the relationship between the trades and the black community:  
“Until this issue’s addressed, it's gonna continue to rear its ugly head, even in 
campaigns like this where the union involvement is from unions that primarily 
represent black and brown people—like UFCW and SEIU. I think it's gonna take 
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somebody like the AFL to step in and say, "Y'know what? IBEW, Steelworkers, 
Plumbers and Pipefitters...you're gonna have to make amends. You're gonna have 
to actually do something in the black community that's gonna help us build 
bridges.”  
 
Whether it's putting together a high school—a charter school that focuses on 
apprenticeships in the trades, maybe taking over the Washburn building. Do 
something! It can't be about sayin, "Oh, we don't do that anymore." No. Y'know 
what? You're gonna have to buck up or shut up, and do something that overtly 
says to the community, "Yeah, we screwed up. We can't afford to be at odds with 
the black community."  
One reason that people are able to generalize from the trades to the 
broader labor movement is that the leadership of most unions—even those 
whose membership is largely women of color—remains white men. Until that 
changes, says Kottler, “It's going to perpetuate the myth that that's the only 
people that's in the unions and that the unions are just there to protect white 
folks.” It seems likely that the more unions like SEIU, UFCW, and AFSCME are 
publicly represented by people who look more like their members and are able to 
push the building trades to make concrete changes, the more they will be able to 
build strong relationships with communities of color.  
Leaders of these unions are also well-positioned to serve as 
intermediaries between the two sides in potential efforts to broker deals. There 
are real limits to the number of unionized construction jobs available, but the 
symbolic impact of efforts to bring more people of color into the trades could 
potentially radiate outwards in the same way negative perceptions have. While 
leaders in the trades may feel the focus on them is unfair, the centrality of this 
issue in shaping perceptions of the labor movement in black communities 
suggests that directly addressing the relationship is crucial to the entire labor 
movement. 
Although action is imperative, it would be naïve to assume that organizers 
only have to address the historical legacies of racism and continued segregation 
in order to be successful. Powerful actors try to keep unions and communities of 
color at odds, often in ways that directly impact coalition-building. Mayor Daley, 
who had previously claimed that Chicago was a “post-racial city” when 
confronted with racial justice claims, campaigned against the Big Box Living 
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Wage by equating union support for the ordinance with “redlining” black 
neighborhoods and preventing black workers from getting jobs. In addition to 
such overt intervention, the American political system encourages people to draw 
group boundaries along racial and geographic lines in ways that challenge the 
formation of working class movements. 
While the racist history of US unions is undeniable, this narrative has been 
amplified as part of a broader anti-union assault and emerges in sometimes 
unlikely guises. Strains of Black nationalism emphasize racial solidarity as the 
key to advancement in each of these cities. Blue-collar white men (and the 
unions that still represent a few of them) are sometimes seen symbolically as the 
main enemies of working class communities of color. In such segregated settings, 
it is possible for such stereotypes to take on considerable resonance and be 
shaped by dominant discourses of capitalism. Tim Vining, former director of the 
Thomas Merton Center, describes:  
“Black leftists in Pittsburgh who know they should be wanting to work with labor, 
but they think it's easier to work with corporations! I try to encourage them to think 
about the unions, but they just have these bad experiences with the building trades 
and think that all of labor is worthless.”  
In the long struggle to bring a grocery store to the Hill District, the historic 
center of Pittsburgh’s black community, residents are most often framed as 
potential consumers with disposable income a store could capture, assuming that 
capitalism should render the race of residents meaningless. Entrepreneurship is 
often promoted as the key missing ingredient in the black community, and the 
years of segregated black-owned businesses are fondly remembered and 
promoted as a possible future. Of course, the idea that capitalism will eventually 
eliminate differences based on race or gender is as utopian as the hope that 
socialism would do so (Bourdieu, 1998). It is symptomatic of the contemporary 
strength of neoliberalism that so many racial justice claims are framed within its 
individualistic logic. Such framings, like the promotion of black entrepreneurs as 
natural community leaders, limit the potential for collective struggle and deeper 
analysis (Robbins, 2004). 
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While it is easy to understand protests of the racially exclusive practices of 
unions, these cities also contain conflicts between unions and ministers or 
political leaders that are more rooted in political machinations and divisions within 
the Black community. The “right to leadership” claimed by some (mostly 
professional class men like clergy) has long provoked conflict within the Black 
Freedom Movement (Kelley, 2002). White elites have often encouraged this 
centralization of leadership by rewarding compliant leaders and giving them 
some limited access to information and patronage (Rivlin, 1992).  
Stereotypes of blue-collar bogeymen also provide cover for white liberals 
to be anti-union under the cover of advocating anti-racism and “progressivism.” 
Joni Rabinowitz, director of Just Harvest, a Pittsburgh anti-poverty organization, 
described how “a lot of progressive people in the welfare rights movement want 
the best for the clients and see the unions as an impediment to that. For example, 
when one former Just Harvest organizer went to work for a local union, a welfare 
rights advocate said to her, “Oh, you're going over to the other side...”  
In these cities, the remnants of the labor movement are often portrayed as 
members of the “old boys club.” It is debatable to what extent unions were ever 
full members of local governing regimes, but their influence is certainly limited in 
the present era—maybe a seat at the table, but nothing like the agenda-setting 
influence of local business leaders. While they should certainly be pushed to 
become more inclusive, treating unions as parallel “interest groups” with 
business owners masks a fundamental power imbalance and thus effectively 
sides with capital (Offe, 1985). Alternatively, Steve Donahue, a Pittsburgh 
community organizer, suggests approaching potential allies with “a favorable 
bias…or at least withhold judgment.” 
Breaking the Cycle: Building Working Class Solidarity Across Differences 
This tangle of issues exemplifies the extra hurdles faced by the Left in a 
context where neoliberalism is dominant. The historical experiences of union 
exclusion faced by Black communities dovetail with broader anti-union narratives 
and are amplified by local elites, who seize the opportunity to emphasize the 
supposedly different goals of unions and communities of color at every 
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opportunity. In this atmosphere of mistrust, it takes a significant amount of work, 
as well as some luck, to incubate stronger relationships between these potential 
allies in ambitious coalitions. While recent successes provide hope for change, 
this work is unending, as demonstrated in the Chicago big box living wage 
campaign, because elites are able to use the mass media to hammer wedges 
into emerging coalitions. 
Building on the work of Gramsci, Offe and Wiesenthal (1980) specify the 
challenges faced by working class movements in such contexts, which must try 
to achieve a dialogical synthesis between channeling the interests of constituents 
into collective struggle while also transforming these interests. Practically, this 
suggests that counter-hegemonic movements face more complex tasks than 
defenders of the status quo since they not only have to effectively wield power 
within the existing system, they also need to create spaces in which members 
develop new norms and understandings that contradict those of the dominant 
system (Steinberg, 1999). If working class leaders want to mobilize a base for 
change, they have no choice but to engage dialogically with their constituents—
both aggregating and transforming power. 
Within the literature on working class formation, the school of thought that 
most closely parallels the processes observed in these coalitions is represented 
by Rick Fantasia’s (1988) identification of the development of cultures of 
solidarity as the key process of working class formation. Fantasia argues that the 
concept of class consciousness is overly focused on abstract ideas and often 
obscures the actual processes by which groups become collective actors. 
Following Katznelson (1986), he suggests that class consciousness often 
develops through collective action and conflict, rather than being a necessary 
precondition for it. 
This process of building such cultures of solidarity is inevitably contingent 
and historically bound, and activists try to marshal narratives of the past to help 
people imagine future possibilities. The local histories of each city are 
complicated and contradictory, holding both hope and warning for these coalition-
builders. On one hand, each city has a progressive past that can be mobilized to 
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inspire present efforts. The mines and mills around Pittsburgh gave birth to both 
the AFL and CIO, and a strong abolitionist presence and early Black migration 
made Pittsburgh one of the early cultural centers of Black America. Milwaukee 
boasts of electing the last socialist mayor in the US, Frank Zeidler, who served 
until 1960. Chicago has long been an organizing hub, from the Haymarket affair 
to Alinsky, the Black Panthers, and the breakthrough election of Mayor Harold 
Washington, who combined bare-knuckled Chicago politics with the idealism of 
the Rainbow Coalition.  
On the other hand however, each city’s history contains many depressing 
stories as well, as working class groups have fought with and double-crossed 
each other, been co-opted or crushed by elites and politicians, and generally 
struggled to overcome the dominance of a corporate right wing in local politics. 
Activists in each city struggle are challenged to piece together a narrative that 
combines these positive and negative elements in a way that inspires hope and 
brings people together to take action while acknowledging shortcomings and 
learning from the mistakes of the past. 
Further complicating this process, each city has been thrown into a 
broader crisis of self-definition by the political-economic shifts of the last few 
decades. Throughout their modern histories, waves of working class migrants 
(from within and outside the US) arrived and put down roots. While local elites 
have always been uneasy with this population, the demographic realities were 
undeniable and the public image of each city was as a blue-collar, industrial, 
immigrant town (sometimes even proudly embraced). Deindustrialization has 
created another opportunity for elites to intervene and “rebrand” their cities as 
enclaves of the white professional class. For example, Chicago activists are 
confronted by a powerful “growth coalition” led by Mayor Daley and real estate 
interests working to transform the city into a whiter, richer, amenity-rich, and 
service economy-driven “Global City” (Koval, 2006). While this push for 
gentrification does not benefit the majority of Chicagoans, who are working class 
people of color and largely unable to enjoy the new amenities, the Daley machine 
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is sometimes able to keep them split apart by playing groups against each other 
and exacerbating existing divisions (Garner, 2006). 
Most critics remain largely pessimistic toward the possibilities of strong 
working class movements emerging in the U.S. Even the most optimistic work of 
recent years, Dan Clawson’s The Next Upsurge (2003), calls for hope based on 
the historical pattern that American workers have made great leaps forward when 
conditions are worst and struggle seems least likely to social scientists. The most 
cited challenges faced by the U.S. labor movement include increased capital 
mobility, tendencies toward bureaucratic “business unionism,” and detachment 
from communities of color and their struggles. These coalitions all set out to 
address the third challenge by bringing together unions and community groups 
and incubating nascent cultures of solidarity. 
Part of the problem they face lies with our theoretical frameworks for 
thinking about difference and unity, particularly the pluralist tradition that 
dominates mainstream American thought. Solidarity has most often been treated 
as a latent quality, implicit in shared interests or cultural backgrounds, waiting to 
be uncovered by an organizer who shows people how their self-interests are 
connected and how those interests can be achieved through collective action. In 
this traditional organizing model, difference signals a lack of unity and solidarity 
and the most common approach has been to ignore in-group differences 
whenever possible. Most organizers systematically call attention to the 
differences between “us” and “them,” constructing solidarity on the basis of 
commonalities within the group opposed to an “enemy.”  
 
 96
Figure 3.1: Pluralist Approaches to Cultural Difference 
 
The collective identities created through such processes are relatively 
impermeable, which provides strength but also makes it difficult to imagine 
overlaps where people belong to multiple groups. Differences within movements, 
whether of opinion, background, or identity, are minimized out of fear that they 
will distract the group from its common purpose and lead to fragmentation and 
divisiveness. A current of pragmatism among organizers eschews discussions 
that focus on dealing with differences in favor of “getting things done.” However, 
pragmatic organizers also care about building power, and most recognize that 
bringing people together across differences is essential to accomplishing their 
goals. If they had confidence that a discussion would yield the desired results 
rather than their fears of emotional blow-ups, most would be receptive. 
Most organizing efforts still employ either “color blind” or “separatist” 
varieties of pluralism—either downplaying identity-based differences while 
emphasizing ideological common ground or invoking a shared identity to paper 
over ideological differences. These pluralist models assume a natural state of 
unity unfortunately marred by differences. Critical theorists have proposed 

















quandary, but they have failed to gain much traction within movements, perhaps 
because collective mobilization seems to thrive on stark dichotomies.  
There are not many practical examples of how organizers could build 
solidarity in ways that take differences between members as starting points for 
establishing common ground rather than ignoring, reifying, or minimizing them 
(Guinier & Torres, 2002). Even though it is virtually a given that coalition-builders 
pay lip service to the importance of diversity and not replicating racial and gender 
disparities within a coalition, such a “process” goal is often seen as conflicting 
with “effectiveness” and “getting things done.” While none of my respondents 
would ever downplay the historical significance of racism and sexism in the US, 
some grumbled off the record about people of color and women “beating a dead 
horse” and “not moving on.” More commonly however, they expressed sincere 
but frustrated desires to build new relationships between constituencies, 
particularly the black community and unions. If they had a model for effective 
organizing across differences, they would be likely to implement it. 
These regional coalitions provide a particularly rich site to explore how an 
effective praxis of prefigurative politics can develop new strategies for multiracial 
organizing. The basic structure of a coalition primes those involved to be thinking 
about consciously negotiating differences. As they work to forge new collective 
identities, they inevitably grapple with the realities of past and present inequities 
as they try to create new relationships between people and groups. Chapter 2 
showed that paying attention to differences in constructing organizational 
structures increased success and sustainability. The following sections examine 
prefigurative strategies pursued by these coalitions, focusing on how formal 
structures shape conflict and cooperation between members, how new cultures 
of solidarity can be created through collective action, and the role of leaders in 
bringing people together across differences.  
The inevitable jumble of ideas, conflicts, and political pressures present 
activists with a tangle of dilemmas as they try to build cultures of solidarity, but 
some patterns emerge. Chicago has been most successful in creating new 
norms for groups and leaders (and relatedly, building a sustainable movement), 
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Pittsburgh least successful, with Milwaukee falling somewhere in between. 
Perhaps more important, common areas of success and failure across cities 
show how much more would be possible with more thoroughgoing change. 
Strategy 1: Changing Group Norms to Create Beloved Communities 
“While abhorring segregation, we shall love the segregationist. This is the only way 
to create the beloved community.” (Martin Luther King, Jr., 1957 Christmas 
sermon) 
Civil rights leaders of the 1950s and 60s tapped into the shared Christian 
faith of most African-Americans in the South to construct an ideal of the beloved 
community that shaped the organizational cultures and structures of the 
movement. In order to generate the necessary solidarity in the face of repression, 
they needed to transform local black communities—tightening bonds between 
people and developing a sense of possibility rooted in faith and experience. 
Powerful speeches were not enough to motivate people to take the risk of 
stepping forward; the new bonds tying them together with others across the 
country and a shared vision were rooted in emerging interactions, rituals, and 
structures (Payne, 1995). Such transformation took place within an 
organizational context that helped participants act out new roles as individuals 
and communities. In a similar vein, Marshall Ganz’s (2000) account of the rise of 
the United Farm Workers shows how organizers tapped into shared cultural 
meanings to transform the fragmented migrant worker community into a potent 
collective actor.  
Efforts to bring people together across differences within labor-community 
coalitions don’t have the head start of broadly shared cultural experiences to 
build on. However, this makes constructing such “beloved communities” by 
consciously constructing common ground and establishing shared norms even 
more important (Grimes, 2002). Reflecting on the challenges differences present 
social justice activists, bell hooks (1994, p. x) asks, “Do you give up on making 
the beloved community…or do you realize you must make it a different way?”  
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a. Using formal structures to manage conflict and encourage cooperation 
As discussed in Chapter 2, a clearly laid out coalition structure helps 
partners work together more smoothly. Developing structures that take 
differences between organizations into account while remaining open and 
welcoming is a constant challenge and occurs most effectively when organizers 
simultaneously work to change both organizational cultures and structures. For 
example, to establish a baseline of common perspective, Chicago’s Grassroots 
Collaborative was formed through ongoing conversations to develop the principle 
that members need to be able to deliver a busload of people in order to sit at the 
central decision-making table, speak at rallies, or receive public credit. “Huge 
tensions remain,” as Madeline Talbott explains, “But you can manage them 
because it's a group of peers.” 
The Collaborative helps alleviate the persistent difficulty of bringing 
together lots of relatively small community organizations with much larger unions 
by providing an umbrella group through which Ken Snyder could provide a 
central voice as lead organizer: 
It's not just that a union was dealing with the Chicago Coalition of the Homeless, 
they were working with CCH and Brighton Park, and 20 other organizations that 
were working on this. That helped to balance some of the power dynamics. There 
really weren't a lot of these tension points, but you could see a union saying ‘Well, 
it's OK to piss off that community group because what they bring to the table isn't 
that significant,’ but they wouldn't walk away from the whole community side. 
This has helped develop stable relationships between unions and 
community organizations over a series of campaigns in Chicago. In contrast, 
several of the Pittsburgh community activists who have worked with unions in 
loose partnerships facilitated by the Thomas Merton Center described feeling 
confused, alienated, and discriminated against, particularly on the basis of age 
and gender. Rachel Canning, a union staffer and current organizer at Pittsburgh-
UNITED who observed several of the disputed occasions and heard these 
complaints through the grapevine, agrees that cultural change is certainly 
necessary in the labor movement, but attributes much of the conflict to different 
behavioral norms across organizations. While grassroots community groups hold 
the ideal of treating everyone involved the same way close to their hearts, “in the 
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labor movement you get burned if you don't talk to leaders in the right way.” 
Therefore, in meetings with community groups, unionists are likely to try to find 
the “leaders” in the room and speak directly to them. This may work fine while 
working with other centralized organizations, such as black churches, but create 
conflict when dealing with groups that place a premium on flat structures. 
Coalitions create internal incentives for members to act in certain ways. 
Members of the Grassroots Collaborative make a case for healthy effects of 
competition within the coalition if it is focused on the proper goals. According to 
Madeline Talbott, since credit and publicity is divvied up according to turnout, all 
member organizations have an interest in organizing, which strengthens the 
campaign and movement as a whole: 
“It builds the coalition events bigger if we're all competing with each other. We're 
helping organizations to build the kind of organization where their members know 
they're members and associate with it, which I think is tremendously important to 
be able to do. If you can't put your shirt on somebody, then you oughta improve 
your organizing. I think other people can learn—if we come up with a flag, you can 
do a flag; if we do bright-colored t-shirts, others can buy bright t-shirts. We do that, 
and we get a big kick out of it. At first, it was just like, ‘Oh there goes ACORN 
taking over again,’ but once people got the hang of it, its fun.  
 
And if you say you're going to have 20 people and you don't, we try to make 
coalition events where your seats—whether 200 or 20—are kind of blocked off, so 
if you don't fill ‘em, it's kinda embarrassing. Those kinds of accountability things 
can be very trying—how do you enforce enough that it's worth coming for the 
groups that are disciplined? That it's not so loosey-goosey? You do it by setting up 
coalitions with only people who can move turnout and then rewarding them by 
making their turnout visible.” 
On the other hand, the Campaign for Sustainable Milwaukee foundered in 
part because of a loss of cooperation between partner organizations. In the 
opinion of Tony, head of the Building Trades Council, one cause of their demise 
was the coalition’s efforts to funnel job-training money to partner organizations, 
which turned them into competitors for contracts mediated by CSM: 
“You had Esperanza Unida, which is a job training and case management 
operation, competing against the Urban League for the same dollars. And these 
are businesses, even though they're nonprofit businesses, these guys are tryna 
make a buck, and when you have them competing; now you have a problem. Now 
you have two entities that are going to be proprietary in terms of sharing 
information, they're going to be predatory in terms of going after each other, and 
the coalition's over.” 
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Similar tensions exist in Chicago, where claiming credit and numbers can 
be important for impressing foundations, but cooperative norms keep the 
competition within accepted bounds and focused on actions that benefit the 
whole. Tony ended up overseeing the job-training program at a stage when 
things came to a boil with the CSM under a cloud of financial impropriety, leaving 
him still bitter today:  
“It was a very tough initiation for me. This finally boiled down to more of a business 
relationship than any sort of collaboration, because I was responsible, and nobody 
gave a damn what happened to me, and I had to protect myself at all times. And I 
fired a couple of the original collaborators who didn't deliver...So that was a really 
strange, strange experience of working with people in collaboration that finally just 
evolved into a business relationship, where I became a primary employer, and 
they became my subcontractors…That’s the problem I had with Sustainable 
Milwaukee—it literally destroyed the collaboration.” 
Especially striking in this quote is the assumption that collaboration is built 
on something other than “business relationships” and material self-interest. By 
setting up a subcontracting structure intended to help funnel money to partner 
organizations, CSM pulled these groups into a competitive search for dollars not 
necessarily balanced with cooperation. Joel Rogers, the University of Wisconsin-
based founder of the CSM, alluded to this changing relationship between 
partners when reflecting on the demise of CSM. “What do you learn from this? 
It's all kind of obvious. And it's all hard. The defections get more and more 
attractive as the ideal conclusion gets more and more remote, and more 
improbable.” In earlier years, when different people were involved and there was 
a clearer structure, Rogers felt groups had been able to maintain cooperative 
relationships, but the accumulation of small setbacks and erosion of collective 
goodwill loosened the bonds between partners, reducing their ability to resist the 
ever-present centripetal forces pulling organizations back toward fragmentation.  
b. Establishing cooperative norms through collective action 
Cooperation between organizational partners can be very difficult to 
encourage and maintain. “Market logic” is very strong within the nonprofit sector 
and is reinforced by widespread focus on promoting competition among 
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foundations and governments (Incite, 2007). Two quotes from local leaders 
demonstrate the persistence and harmful effects of “zero sum” logic: 
Madeline Talbott (Chicago community organizer): “No matter what we say, we 
were trained in the early days that you want to borrow more than you lend in any 
coalition. The idea was: How can I use this coalition for my benefit? And if you 
couldn't, then you had to get out quick, because they were gonna use you—and 
that's still true for many coalitions.”  
 
Sheila Cochran (Milwaukee labor leader): “The nature of a coalition is that 
everybody's gotta get something out of it. The only reason you're there is for your 
own self-interest. So if labor has its own self interest, and it isn't interested in the 
issues that the community's bringing to the table, then the community gets pissed 
off and walks away from the table and now you've got this big wall up and a bunch 
more hurdles to go through.”  
The sense that others are approaching each relationship trying to “win” is 
antithetical to the sort of long-term cooperation necessary to develop cultures of 
solidarity. The space for this sort of transformation is fostered by more of a mix 
between cooperation and competition. As Talbott suggests, it is quite reasonable 
to assume that others will try to “borrow more than they lend.” On the other hand, 
this knowledge can be balanced with the knowledge that people and 
organizations are shaped by, and change through, interactions.  
A healthy sense of realism is thus useful in approaching coalition partners, 
most of who are neither completely selfless nor completely ruthless in their 
approach to collaboration. As the quote from Cochran indicates, it is widely 
accepted that organizations are part of coalitions that they get something out of. 
This troubles some activists, who wish people were guided by loftier principles 
and don’t want to work with those they disagree with. Indeed, a collection of self-
interests do not automatically become a collaborative agenda and a coalition of 
pure utility maximizers likely wouldn’t last long. However, it is more useful to 
understand and work with complex organizations as they are than it is to start out 
disappointed about what they aren’t doing. Mistrust at the start of a coalition is 
bound to be confirmed if everyone is expected to meet the same set of abstract 
standards and political litmus tests. 
Even if none of us are completely selfless, we can become more 
cooperative in our interactions. Campaign coalitions and other intermediaries 
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provide a bridge between organizations and movements, creating space for 
cross-fertilization, relationship-building and transformation of identities and 
interests. Accepting each group’s self-interest as they understand it, giving them 
the benefit of the doubt, working cooperatively as much as possible, and being 
patient about the rate of change helps increase the chances for productive 
interactions. Steve Donahue, a Pittsburgh transit organizer and former Catholic 
Worker, suggests a “long haul” approach, giving potential allies the benefit of the 
doubt and approaching them with a sense of optimistic realism:  
“I think the main thing—as someone who's not a member—is that I approach 
organized labor with a favorable bias. I make a presumption that organized labor is 
correct until proven otherwise. And this is what I think community groups should do. 
It's similar to what I think is a problem when white people are like, "Where are all 
the black folks at?" I accept labor as it is, an institution which has as its first goal 
improving the work conditions of its members, and a second goal of winning things 
all of us enjoy, like the weekend. So I know they make mistakes, and I don't 
always agree with them...but I have a strong bias in favor of labor, and I think 
when community groups approach them they should at the very least withhold 
judgment.”  
High (and potentially unfair) expectations to support other organizations 
and campaigns are especially often placed on institutions that are perceived to 
be powerful and unitary, like “the labor movement” or “the black church,” as two 
Pittsburgh activists reflected at the Thomas Merton Center: 
Tim Vining: In the peace movement, I get frustrated when they suddenly expect a 
union to be an anti-war group. They're not—they're a union! 
 
Jeremy Shenk: And they say, “Why aren't you coming to our stuff?” But they don't 
come to union stuff...and people court black churches the same way...That's 
where we're trying to be consistent, where they'll know that the Merton Center is 
there supporting them, and that we're not a paper membership—we can turn folks 
out.” 
High profile leaders, particularly those who feel they’ve been taken 
advantage of, their power borrowed without reciprocation, or who don’t see an 
organizational interest in collaborating, are often wary of collaborating like this 
Pittsburgh labor leader: 
A guy stopped me yesterday at this thing—good union guy—and he says, “Y'know, 
we gotta get labor and some of these community groups closer together.” I say, 
“Oh, we do, huh? Give me a call, we'll go to lunch.” I'm thinkin' to myself...you 




Dobbie: Money's one of ‘em… 
 
And the other one is they know where the power is. I don't believe in that word 
power, I think it turns the public off...but we know we got some juice. And that's 
why they wanna be with us—and that's OK, who wouldja tie up with? Someone 
who's broke and got no respect? Hell, labor's never had a lot to gain from any 
group we've tied up with. Go back in history. What've we had to gain? The church, 
we gain some, no doubt...but in general, it's not much...We can always learn, but 
you gotta be careful who you go with, you gotta be careful of agendas.” 
When I told her the outlines of the above story, Madeline Talbott nodded 
and laughed before sharing how they’ve tried to break down that perception and 
build a new culture of coalition work in Chicago: 
“When we started this collaboration work with the unions in the early 90s, it really 
was like that. They really didn't know what to do—people would extort them, 
browbeat them...they just thought that you went to those tables if you had to go 
and then sit through it and get the hell out of there as soon as your members had 
what they needed. It was really horrible. We started trying to look at honest self-
interest, and be above-board about that. And we understand that when we work 
together, when your members get what they want, you may no longer want to be 
there with us, even though we still haven't gotten what we need. It came with 
different unions over time. But we just kept plugging away, working together, never 
demanding that they be at the table beyond their own interests. 
Talbott went on to describe a coalition fighting school privatization where 
they put this principle into practice. The leaders of the coalition had worked 
together in the past and reached an understanding at the beginning of their 
campaign that if anyone got their “bottom line” met, they were allowed to cut the 
deal and get out, as long as they were up front with the other partners. The union 
involved did exactly that, winning a deal to protect their members before issues 
like community control were settled. 
While this story could easily have been presented as an example of 
disloyalty on the part of the most powerful member of the coalition, Talbott 
emphasized how the union president later talked up the experience with other 
local leaders, leading to expanded opportunities for ACORN to collaborate with 
unions. Activists accustomed to calling for sacrifice in pursuit of higher goals 
might even be vaguely disappointed that the union did not turn down the deal out 
of principle. Whether this would have worked or not misses the larger point that 
extremely few labor-community coalitions ever get to such a decision point, in 
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part because the more powerful organizations fear they will be asked to be 
completely selfless. While all the partners benefited from their collaboration, the 
community groups were able to access a different form of power through the 
union and strengthen a long-term strategic relationship.  
While strict cost-benefit calculations would be overkill in most cases, 
activists should recognize that many coalitions on the Left refuse to acknowledge 
the role self-interest plays. Intentionally bringing it into discussions legitimizes its 
existence and allows coalitions to balance the tensions more effectively and 
openly. Through the various collective struggles and relationships formed, our 
sense of our own interests can be broadened, as has been demonstrated in 
Chicago. The union in the above story has continued to deepen its relationship 
with community groups, developing several proactive joint campaigns, including 
some that are not “traditional labor issues.” As a transitional step, such strictly 
defined norms can be invaluable in avoiding misunderstandings and hurt feelings. 
In pursuit of transforming the consciousness of those involved, broadening 
the agenda, and developing new cooperative norms, many people emphasized 
the importance of actually working side-by-side on campaigns as opposed relying 
solely on discussions, lectures, or formal trainings. Tom Hoffman, longtime SEIU 
staffer now leading Pittsburgh UNITED, said, “We've gotta find stuff to work on 
together rather than just airing our differences. The only time I've ever seen some 
of these barriers come down is when you're sitting around the table with people 
and you get to know each other.” Tim Vining and Jeremy Shenk illustrated this 
point in a story about an SEIU organizer who came up through the ranks as a 
janitor and surprised people by spontaneously bringing up gay rights and the Iraq 
war while accepting an award at the Merton Center’s annual banquet: 
Jeremy: “I think it's totally an excuse when people say you have to tone things 
down because the membership’s not there. If anything, the opposite is often true—
working class folks support stuff, and it's really the middle class professionals who 
might get alienated.” 
 
Tim: “And this guy, if he had been a typical staffer, he never would have brought 
up gay marriage out of fear of offending the membership. The reason it came up 
was this guy and his wife had been having beers with someone who had been 
supporting their fight who shared with him the struggles of being gay in this society. 
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So then it was just him defending a friend, but a staff member would have been 
very cautious. Once it just happens and there's gay folks there or whatever, people 
are like OK...but if we had talked about it abstractly beforehand, never would have 
happened.” 
Hope for progress and bridging these divides is often found in such stories, 
however rare, of individuals and groups undergoing dramatic transformations in 
the crucible of collective action. In explaining why she doesn’t get easily 
discouraged, Milwaukee 9 to 5’s Annette described an experience as a young 
union organizer working on an Ohio nursing home campaign that started on a 
worrying note when several white workers approached her to say they were 
hesitant about being in a union with their black colleagues. Because she had 
been trained in a context where open discussions of such issues were 
encouraged, she helped the organizing committee directly talk about racial 
issues over the course of the campaign, which paid off when the management 
kicked off an intense anti-union campaign, firing workers, making false criminal 
accusations, and trying to find wedge issues: 
They put up this whole montage of anti-union stuff, and there was this picture of 
Jesse Jackson from our 1199 magazine, and underneath it said, "Do you want 
your dues money going to this nigger?" The [organizing] committee and I met early 
the next morning and I said, “What do you wanna do?” And this one worker, who 
had expressed real concerns to me about being around black people, said, “Well, 
we have lots of copies of the magazine that has [local president] Henry 
Nicholson's picture in it, right? Let me have them.” And she sat there and cut them 
all out and wrote "My President" on them, and pinned it on, and then she took 
them to work, and at the shift change she pinned them on everybody, and they 
went in wearing pictures of Henry.  
 
It was an amazing thing, to see how far people had come, and how hard it was for 
people to get where they ultimately got. I'm sure at that moment it wasn't that hard 
for them to put that picture on, but it was very meaningful, I thought...and I think in 
other organizations, I wouldn't have known what to do, and I wouldn't have trusted 
them to come up with a good response. If I hadn't been part of an organization 
where we did talk about things and I was asked my opinion in situations where I 
was probably wrong, but someone said to me, "talk about what you're thinking—
and then we'll try to figure out where to go with it. 
Of course, not all (or even most) conflicts are transformed into positive 
experiences, but stories like Annette’s help maintain the faith in “regular” people’s 
potential that is essential for organizers to be effective over the long haul. Most 
activists who have been involved in intense campaigns can recognize this 
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woman who went from expressing racist prejudices to taking anti-racist action. 
These stories of dramatic transformations provide powerful reminders why it is 
important to keep working with people and not write anyone off as a potential ally. 
The story also highlights the importance of open discussions about tough topics 
like race. Annette described intense discussions among union staff that had 
helped her develop her own understandings of herself, her opinions, and ability 
to intervene in such situations. Because she was confident and had been part of 
successful efforts to address such issues head on, she was able to help the 
committee constructively talk about the racial divide in the workplace and what it 
meant for their efforts. 
As with many other important elements of movements, this sense of 
common purpose is not arrived at solely through discussion. Experiences of 
collective action play an important role in clarifying the bonds that connect people. 
The night before the Chicago City Council voted on the Big Box Living Wage 
ordinance, hundreds of supporters gathered at City Hall on a hot sticky evening 
for a prayer vigil. After congregating at a nearby church where many planned to 
spend the night and dropping off pillows and blankets, the group distributed signs 
and banners and gathered in a loose knot on the corner of Randolph and LaSalle, 
spilling into the street as the crowd swelled under the watchful eyes of a dozen 
police officers. As the sun went down, an assortment of religious leaders and 
members of their congregations came to the center of the circle and led the 
group in prayers and songs. Organizers circulated, passing out candles, creating 
a twinkling light much different than the neon reflecting from the surrounding 
skyscrapers. As darkness fell, a charismatic young South Side minister wearing a 
Chicago Bears football jersey led the group to spread out and “lay hands” on the 
building and then begin marching around the block, singing freedom songs over 
a mobile PA system hoisted onto the shoulder of a teenage boy grinning widely 
about being in front of the TV cameras.  
The sound and candlelight reflected off the surrounding buildings as the 
crowd, now swelled to several hundred, encircled City Hall, drawing the attention 
of passing tourists and the top slot on every local news program that evening. 
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The prayer vigil was invoked by many of those involved as a galvanizing and 
clarifying moment of the campaign. Liz, a union staff member and recent 
transplant to Chicago, remembered that, "Just being down there singing and 
marching, and the candlelight vigil, it was truly one of those ‘this is why we're 
doing this’ moments. Everyone coming together and understanding what it was 
all about.” After returning to the church where they spent the night, a couple 
hundred of the participants chatted in clumps eating pizza on the floor of a multi-
purpose room while kids ran around chasing each other or slept in corners 
amidst rally supplies. Not only did many interesting conversations take place, a 
common identity was fused that night. Following this event, I saw several 
members of different organizations recognize each other at events with some 
variation of, “Hey, you spent the night at the church, right?” Such collective 
memories often provide touchstones for defining a group and its history of 
struggle together—expanding the “we” beyond lines of race or neighborhood that 
might have divided people previously (Foerster, 2004). 
Strategy 2: Changing Individual Norms to Foster Bridge-Building 
 “We must be the change we wish to see in the world” (Mohandas K. Gandhi) 
 
Perhaps the most-cited activist quote of all time, Gandhi’s dictum clearly 
delineates a model of prefigurative leadership. Alongside new group norms, new 
modes of leadership are necessary to facilitate the emergence of multiracial 
movements. These cases suggest that activists have some degree of agency in 
shaping outcomes, and that a form of dialogical “bridge-building” leadership is 
best suited to such settings. Although leadership is central to discussions among 
activists, it is often treated uncomfortably in the social movements literature, 
which tends to emphasize the importance of factors outside the control of 
activists in accounting for the success of movements (Barker, Johnson & 
Lavalette, 2001). This project reflects a more optimistic sense of the possibilities 
for movement leaders to shape outcomes, particularly within the realm of 
organizational culture, likely due in part to its basis in conversations with activists. 
The most effective and respected leaders do “more than their share” to help 
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change the organizational culture by leading by example, continually reaching 
out to strengthen relationships across boundaries, and subordinating their egos 
to the larger good. 
 “Bridge-building” leaders, who are able to move between groups and help 
people communicate across difference, have been identified by many writers as 
key to successful coalitions and movements (e.g. Grossman, 2001; Robnett, 
1996). Building multiracial movements requires translation, trust-building, and a 
dialogical mode of leadership that blends listening and persuading, learning and 
teaching (Shandro, 2001). As described by Gabe Morgan of SEIU, Barney 
Oursler of the Mon Valley Unemployed Committee (MVUC) has been the 
quintessential bridge-builder in Pittsburgh for years: 
Barney's unique in being a really, really good organizer. There aren't many folks in 
the country who can do it, and it's really rare that there's somebody like Barney 
who's been doing it in the same place forever...he's like an effective Wobbly 
[nickname of the Industrial Workers of the World]. He can meet with the Black 
Radical Congress, and then sit down with the Building Trades, then talk to Teresa 
Heinz Kerry, and they'll all let him in. That's really key to coalition work, but it's a 
skill set that very few people have. 
This description highlights the need for both a certain orientation and skill 
set to serve as an effective bridge-builder. Captured in the phrase “effective 
Wobbly” is the implication that while lots of radical activists talk about bringing 
diverse groups together, few of them are able to do so. Empirical studies of local 
movement networks have shown that a relatively small set of activists who 
occupy such linking roles are critical to the success of local movements (Carroll 
& Ratner, 1996). Such leaders play a number of key roles in encouraging the 
emergence of strong movements in their regions, particularly through helping 
other participants develop skills for working across difference. 
a. Creating space for transformation 
Strong leaders can play a protective “greenhouse” role within movements, 
holding back potential conflicts to allow the seeds of cooperation to germinate 
and gain some strength. For example, the Chicago Big Box Living Wage 
campaign could easily have been derailed early on by opposition from the 
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building trades unions, who often look less than kindly on any efforts that might 
limit construction. However, they had faith that the leadership of the Chicago 
Federation of Labor (CFL) was leading the local labor movement in a positive 
direction and understands their interests, so the trades let the CFL play a primary 
role in pushing the ordinance and refused to be baited into the conflict by Mayor 
Daley. That the CFL, as the embodiment of “big labor” in Chicago, so publicly 
and consistently championed a living wage for (mostly non-union) workers also 
convinced some racial justice advocates that working with unions might be 
possible and undermined the opposition’s claims that unions just cared about 
protecting their already privileged conditions.  
As was further explored in Chapter 2, bringing together the right people in 
the right order also helps create more favorable conditions for changing 
relationships. Bridge-building leaders from different groups are more likely to be 
able to build good personal connections with each other, which can then set the 
tone for others as they join, so beginning coalition campaigns based around a 
smaller core group increases sustainability. Within coalitions, bridge leaders 
often “absorb” some of the negative energy, helping others relate more 
productively. Many leaders described listening to members complain about each 
other for hours on the phone, and helping defuse the anger before the next 
meeting. For example, although Sheila Cochran did not play an extensive formal 
role in the Campaign for a Sustainable Milwaukee, she was in the loop because, 
“The black folks that were involved would pick up the phone and rant to me about 
whoever was in charge or wasn't in charge. I would try to ask, ‘Is it racial? Or do 
you guys just not understand each other?’” Because Cochran also had a line of 
communication to the white leadership, she was sometimes able to broker deals 
that would have been difficult for the participants to resolve face-to-face. 
Kate, the chair of the Grassroots Collaborative, described how she tries to 
take the lead in setting the tone and defending norms in the Collaborative if 
someone gets cut down in a meeting by intervening “either publicly, or definitely 
privately. I've been in meetings when someone came up with something not very 
supportive, and I've gone to them afterwards and said, ‘Just think about it—if that 
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was your first meeting, how you'd feel if that's the first time you spoke up?’” 
Madeline also challenges Collaborative members to be supportive of each other, 
privately and publicly, “And people find that strange, because the rule is that you 
just fight for your own interests. But you can actually change things, where 
there's a sense that we help each other out…but you have to work at it.” 
To gain the credibility necessary to intervene effectively in such situations, 
bridging leaders have to put themselves out front, representing “the change they 
wish to see” even while others are still operating within an old paradigm. Over 
and over, respondents described “swallowing hard even when you’re right,” and 
“putting your ego in the back seat” as key to getting through the challenging 
periods in efforts to build power. This kind of leading by example is counter-
posed with the more common attitude of, “Well, if that’s the way you’re gonna 
be—two can play that game.” Many leaders talked about how hard it was for 
them to break out of this mindset and act in ways they’d like everyone to, which 
sometimes gave them empathy for others who had not yet done so.  
Operating on multiple levels like this requires extra energy, which is often 
in short supply during the tensest moments of a campaign, when emotions run 
highest and transformative moments are most likely. Reserving enough energy to 
rise above the immediate situation, be self-reflexive, and intervene effectively is a 
continual challenge of leadership in these contexts. It would be useful to better 
understand how some such leaders are able to continue doing “more than their 
share” over time, while others end up feeling taken advantage of or demoralized 
by the experience. 
b. Spreading norms through education and leadership development 
Where do such leaders come from? Certain people are especially well 
positioned to become bridge-builders on the basis of their life experiences 
crossing boundaries as “outsiders within” (Delgado, 1998). More broadly, it is 
clear that people with a history of relationships across racial lines are more likely 
to be able to build multiracial relationships (de Souza Briggs, 2007). In this vein, 
it was striking how few of those I interviewed could describe positive and 
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meaningful experiences in racially integrated settings. While talking about how 
many members of his church and other African-American pastors saw no point in 
working with people outside the Black community, Reverend Joseph Jackson, of 
MICAH and GJLN in Milwaukee, explained that he thought he turned out 
differently because of how he grew up: 
Personally, I believe in an integrated society. My experiences led me into that way 
of thinking, because I've always been part of multicultural groups. Growing up in 
Hillside, even though my family was Baptist by denomination, St. Francis Catholic 
Church had a summer program that attracted lots of the youth. And then as a 
teenager, my family moved around quite often, and we were up on the hill here, 
and I went to a Lutheran church. They had Boy Scouts, they had everything that I 
wanted to do, and I went through their catechism. It was right there, but it was 
majority white, and I went there for a period of time. And later when I went to 
Riverside [High School], it was naturally integrated—there was no busing when I 
was in school. It was Black, White, Hispanic and everything else. So from all that, 
integration certainly suits me personally. But so few folks have that experience. 
Other bridge-building leaders described experiences later in life, often 
through work, that pulled them outside their own communities. Those who had 
worked as organizers often talked about how much they changed as a result of 
systematically building relationships with so many different people and helping 
them relate to each other. Tim Drea, one of the key labor leaders involved in the 
Big Box Living Wage campaign, grew up in a small mining town in southern 
Illinois, got involved in politics through the mineworkers union, and ended up 
working for Emil Jones, a prominent African-American politician in the state. 
Later, as political director of UFCW Local 881, he had a relatively unique resume 
and day-to-day life, pulled him into all corners of the region by campaigns, where 
he not only drives through, but knocks on doors and actually talks to people. He 
contrasted this knowledge of different neighborhoods with members of his own 
family who moved out of the south side to the suburbs in the early 1970s: 
You musta not been able to rent a moving van in this city between 1968 and 1973, 
cuz it seems like every white family I talk to says, ‘Oh, we moved out...’ When I 
was working for Emil Jones and he was running for Congress against Jesse 
Jackson, they sent me up here to walk precincts in Roseland [their old 
neighborhood]. And there was a cousin who was like ‘You got out alive?’ And I 
was like, ‘Yeah, there's a thriving black middle class there.’ He was like, ‘I don't 
know what part you were in.’ He grew up there, and he just couldn't see it. 
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Many of the most effective bridge-builders described proactively reaching 
out and building trust over time in an effort to broaden and diversify their 
networks. Jen Kottler, of Protestants for the Common Good in Chicago, is often 
the only white face on Operation PUSH’s syndicated Sunday School television 
show. As she describes it, she “just keeps showing up, so now they figure 
‘maybe Jen’s gonna be around awhile.’” Although a wide range of experiences 
clearly prepares people to be better bridge-builders, organizational silos often 
preclude such people from rising through leadership structures, as John 
Goldstein laments: 
For most union folks, their path is up through their own union. It's not through the 
labor council or the state fed or bringing community groups together. Where you 
move ahead, and where you get validation is within your international, and that's 
part of the problem—the internationals aren’t engaged in local struggles, they don’t 
have ties to local communities, and they aren’t focused on developing strong local 
leaders. 
As those who have written on attempts to revitalize central labor councils 
point out, CLC’s and “community outreach” work have often been seen as a “pre-
retirement sinecure” by many in the labor movement (Ness & Eimer, 2001). 
Since such work is not usually respected or a direct route to power, the most 
ambitious and capable people don’t move in that direction, and community 
perceptions about the labor movement are often confirmed by a preponderance 
of old conservative white men. Suspicion of people whose work history crosses 
boundaries is present in community organizing and many other movements as 
well, making it generally difficult for many bridge-builders to rise into leadership.  
Bucking this tendency, intermediary organizations like the Grassroots 
Collaborative and Thomas Merton Center often make a deliberate effort to hire 
bridge-builders with credibility in several communities as staff. There is some 
anecdotal evidence that involvement in this sort of collaboration makes 
organizations more likely to hire such bridge-builders as well. For example, 
several organizers have moved between unions and community groups involved 
with the Grassroots Collaborative. Toni Foulkes, whose election to City Council 
was perhaps the biggest win of the recent campaign, was seen as a particularly 
strong candidate because she was a leader both within ACORN and the UFCW. 
 
 114
As examples of such collaboration grow, hiring processes and internal 
politics will hopefully become more open, resulting in the emergence of more 
natural bridge-builders. In the meantime, and to help develop a new generation 
of such leaders, national networks like Building Partnerships (BP) are promoting 
Civic Leadership Institutes to bring together cohorts of labor and community 
leaders in various cities. The concept is based on leadership development efforts 
sponsored by institutions like Chambers of Commerce that bring together rising 
elites to make connections and develop a common framework. Recognizing that 
the intermediary infrastructure of the left has atrophied, several of the founders of 
CSM are now working with GJLN and BP to create a Civic Leadership Institute in 
Milwaukee that would help activists develop a common language and experience 
working with people in other sectors. 
Of course, this sort of process often happens in informal settings as well, 
as demonstrated by one of Kate’s favorite strategies—sending people on trips 
together in cars and vans, where they naturally share their experiences and 
educate each other, as in one trip to the Illinois State Fair with two “little old black 
ladies from the South Side who ran a food pantry” and “two wealthy white ladies 
from DuPage County who volunteered at one”: 
When we were down in the tent, we were talking about food stamps, and there 
were these farmers who asked, "Could you step outside the tent? I have a 
question." These farmers were eligible for food stamps! So on the way back, 
everyone was real quiet, and I was like, “What's up?” And one of the little old black 
ladies said, "I had no idea that farmers could be hungry—how can a farmer be 
hungry?" And one of the women from DuPage County said, "Y'know, I heard that 
too—I kept thinking I misheard him." So they got in this whole conversation about 
the little world that they were in and what they saw at their pantry was so different, 
and how could it be that poverty existed in this way. 
The ensuing discussion of the economics of food production and their 
different experiences as anti-hunger activists in their communities broadened the 
understanding and collective identities of these women, several of whom went on 
to become leaders in the organization. By bringing together white suburbanites, 
black inner city residents, and rural white farmers, Kate created the potential for 
dialogue to transform each of their understandings of the issue of “hunger,” which 
brought them all together. While many such anti-hunger groups remain narrowly 
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focused on food banks and direct service, such educational processes have 
helped this group focus on root causes of poverty and enabled coalition-building. 
Moments of leadership transition lay bare the intersection of organizational 
structures, emergent cultural norms, and personal relationships. If things were 
going well, how much was dependent on the leader’s charisma, skills, or 
personal relationships, and how much was translated into structures and norms 
that maintain themselves beyond the intervention of any individual? If the 
situation was more stagnant, how large of an opening has been created?  
The two Milwaukee intermediaries had quite different experiences as key 
leaders transitioned out. Most observers agree that the CSM never recovered 
after Bruce Colburn left to work for the AFL-CIO. As Joel Rogers put it, 
“everybody loves Bruce—he's pretty lovable. [After he left], the labor folks started 
doing things that weren't very friendly to the community people.” Although the 
CSM accomplished many things following Colburn’s departure, the process of 
fragmentation continued with nobody having the stature or ability to knit things 
back together.  
On the other hand, the GJLN coalition weathered the departure of two key 
leaders—Kathleen Mulligan-Hansel and John Goldstein—early on, but has 
maintained a strong sense of connection and purpose. Of course, GJLN was far 
smaller and focused in its mission, compared with CSM, and also is part of 
national networks of coalitions doing similar work, which provide referent points 
and support. The material stakes are also much lower. While GJLN’s budget is 
quite modest, CSM had millions of dollars flowing through it, increasing the 
incentives to “capture” the organization and heightening conflict between key 
players. 
Connections between people and organizations take work to maintain. 
Sheila Cochran used the metaphor of a spider web to describe the proactive 
process of coalition-building, and emphasizes that you’re always “runnin’ around 
webbin’ it back together.” For this reason, the Grassroots Collaborative has tried 
to stay focused on constantly building relationships. Following the death of John 
(Juancho) Donahue, the original convener of the Collaborative, the group worried 
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about carrying on the cooperative culture. They were helped by the fact that the 
overall leadership involved has remained remarkably stable over the past decade, 
and they have been able to “keep the spirit of Juancho alive.” Kate, chair of the 
Collaborative, feels that a sense of conciliation was established by the founders 
in the early days and continues to shape members’ actions: 
In the beginning, where there were five or six of them who would meet to eat 
breakfast, they talked and shared...and they trusted each other. I think that's 
provided a strong foundation for us. I think everybody worried when Juancho died, 
that the spirit would go with him. We talked a lot about that...And there've been 
people at different times that I've had an argument with and I'll get a call from them 
saying, "y'know, in the spirit of Juancho, let's have coffee...or let's have a beer 
after work..."  
 
So the group, I think there's always the foundation that people, even if they weren't 
here, they've heard the stories and they're aware of it. They know there's a story 
attached to how we got to where we are, and part of that story is that there was 
basic trust and honesty and commitment to each other, along with a basic set of 
principles. When all else fails, people rely on that. 
In addition, they’ve tried to make time for more formal relationship-building 
and reflection, especially focused on bringing new people into the fold. Following 
the prolonged campaign for the big box living wage, they planned a retreat for the 
summer of 2007, as Kate recounts: 
It's a group of people that has a pretty decent sense of humor—some more 
obvious than others. But some people who've come on have actually been kind of 
offended by what they think are flip comments or whatever. So we're going to Ed's 
place in Michigan City in June, where we'll spend the day. People'll bring their 
families, we'll barbeque, drink some beers, and spend time together. I think that's 
really important...But I think you hit on something, which is keeping the stories 
alive, which I think is important...and creating new stories, and new relationships, 
new great experiences that people can talk about. 
As Kate’s comments clearly demonstrate, there is nothing accidental or 
unplanned about these trips to the fair or beach, but they are less structured than 
more traditional trainings or meetings. The best bridge-building leaders do more 
than cross boundaries themselves, they take advantage of opportunities within 
campaigns to create dialogue between others in situations that are likely to lead 
to cross-fertilization and mutual learning and strategically intervene in formal and 
informal ways to shape an organizational culture of solidarity. When movements 
are growing and active, more opportunities for informal interventions present 
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themselves (e.g. people staying overnight in a church together during the Big 
Box Living Wage campaign), but more formal structures can be essential to 
maintaining connections when a movement is in the doldrums (Rupp & Taylor, 
1987). For example, even though Pittsburgh has recently been in a bit of a 
movement trough, events like the Merton Center’s annual awards gathering have 
kept pulling people together and providing an easy entry point for new activists 
and a network of loose relationships to be drawn on when campaigns emerge. 
Additionally, formal settings like a Civic Leadership Institute can be invaluable for 
bringing people together for the first time and explicitly encouraging dialogue 
within a clearly defined context. 
Strategy 3: Breaking Cycles of Criticism and Defensiveness in Campaigns 
Campaigns offer the chance to break out of patterns of fragmentation and 
forge cultures of solidarity through collective action. As several respondents 
mentioned, people are more motivated to try new things and cross boundaries in 
the context of “real” efforts to make change. While groundwork must be laid 
before tackling ambitious goals, the reality is that many leaders are not brought 
to the table until a concrete campaign takes shape. Coupled with the knowledge 
that cultural transformations are most likely in the context of collective action, this 
fact makes issue campaigns a key venue where cultures of solidarity are 
developed and seeds of long-term change are sown.  
In all three cities, organizers have used campaigns to try to break negative 
cycles of conflict between potential allies, particularly unions and communities of 
color. This section highlights three episodes: contrasting efforts to bring together 
the trades with black communities in Milwaukee and Pittsburgh, and the relatively 
successful multiracial coalition in the Chicago Big Box Living Wage campaign. 
When they have been most successful, organizers have used campaigns as 




a. Efforts to bring together black communities and the Building Trades 
While those involved in the labor movement often describe the issue of 
diversity in the trades as “complicated” and “messy,” advocates of a more 
representative workforce tend to think progress could be made relatively quickly 
if the unions would alter a few key practices and confront their overtly racist 
members. The pattern of the basic dispute thus largely repeats itself. Racial 
justice advocates criticize the trade unions, whose leaders get defensive about 
their efforts, and neither side believes the other is operating in good faith. 
Breaking this cycle is a challenge, but is possible if the groups are able to accept 
where each other is at and work on a concrete project, as shown by the different 
trajectories of cooperation and conflict around bringing Black workers into the 
trades in Milwaukee and Pittsburgh. Though neither city represents an 
unqualified success story, Milwaukee has seen several breakthrough moments 
that point to opportunities for change, while Pittsburgh has been unable to 
address the semi-submerged conflict. 
From their beginnings, leaders of the Campaign for a Sustainable 
Milwaukee (CSM) and Pittsburgh’s Alliance for Progressive Action (APA) saw 
healing the relationship between the construction trade unions and the Black 
community as key to progressive movement-building in their regions, but 
campaigns to create affirmative action requirements on publicly funded projects 
in the 1990s turned out quite differently in each city. The key turning point in 
Milwaukee was the 1996 construction of a new convention center. The CSM had 
already been in existence for several years, winning a number of living wage 
ordinances and building support for strikes. Key leaders had been laying 
groundwork to bridge the gap for years and took advantage of the opportunity 
offered by the huge project and the election of a new president of the Building 
Trades Council. Two separate struggles were being waged, one putting pressure 
on officials to ensure the convention center was built union, another focusing on 
hiring for minorities, creating a situation where it looked like neither side would 
win anything. Tony, the new president of the trades, was feeling caught in 
between, as his members demanded he secure a project labor agreement and 
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community groups and politicians demanded they bring more people of color into 
the trades: 
“There were a lot of community groups around town who were really bellerin' and 
wanted to see more diversity in the trades, and wanted to see jobs and 
apprenticeships opened up to people of color. And there weren't a lot of things 
going on...our Big Step [minority apprenticeship] operation had floundered and 
was useless, doing nothing. There wasn't a lot of minority recruitment going on. 
The community groups around town were frustrated that they couldn't get their 
candidates in. And I was the brand new president and was just getting hit from 
everywhere. 
  
A very visionary guy who was a carpenter business agent at the time, he sat down 
with me one day and says, "Y'know, you need to do this the right way. And the 
right way is to band up with ‘em. They have voting power, they have political power, 
and they're not going away. And there's no way this organization can continue like 
it is. Just think about it." And I think that initially that was the reason why on the 
part of all of these unions, because I think they finally came to the conclusion that 
no matter how redneck they may be, they're not gonna beat ‘em. 
 
The president of the convention center board at the time was anti-union and had 
this wild idea that he was gonna build it with all non-union minority contractors. 
Well that can't even happen—it’s impossible. So they had hired Clark construction, 
out of Bethesda. Clark is the old High Menominee, and is pretty notorious for a lot 
of anti-union stuff. (They brought in this goon to try and negotiate with me, and the 
interesting thing was that this guy and I were in a labor-management gunfight in 
Kalispell, Montana years ago, but I didn’t tell him that until it was over.) 
 
So we had to do something. Kind of a paradigm shift around here, because up 
until a certain point in time, the building trades didn't embrace any of these 
community groups—they were in fact seen as trouble, problems for us. But they 
were showing that they had immense power. They were, for the first time that I'd 
seen in 38 years, showing some kind of collective, and result-oriented, power.”  
Several key union and community leaders on the CSM board helped 
organize a massive demonstration where union members and community 
residents from all over the city surrounded the entire construction site. The event 
attracted substantial press coverage and prompted immediate action by local 
politicians, as Tony remembers: “All of a sudden the phone was ringing: ‘How 
can we help you?’ We sat down with Clark/Hunzinger and bargained a contract 
that included 25% minority contractor participation and 25% minority labor. And 
we met those goals.” 
This story demonstrates the importance of choosing the right issue and 
actively engaging partners in ways that allow them to get involved. There was 
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nothing automatic about the convention center project that brought together the 
historically antagonistic Milwaukee building trades unions and communities of 
color. The breakthrough flowed from the groundwork that had been laid by the 
CSM, where key bridging leaders within the trades and community groups had 
been working together for years, the growing weight of the African-American and 
Latino vote in city politics, and the internal political situation perceived by Tony.  
A core of bridge-building leaders knew they wanted to bring together the 
trades and communities of color around a cross-cutting issue and were ready to 
seize the opportunity when the convention center presented itself. By doing prep 
work before the initial conversations, they increased the chances of successful 
interactions between the two sides. The physical experience of marching down 
the street in a multiracial crowd seemed to leave a powerful imprint on many of 
those who participated, leaving behind some optimism about further cooperation 
and validating those who had brokered the effort. It also provided a policy 
precedent, making it easier for Milwaukee activists to push for similar 
agreements from local government in cases like the Park East development. 
On the other hand, efforts to pull together a similar deal between the 
trades and the black community in Pittsburgh in the late 1990s failed badly. A city 
ordinance called “Pittsburgh Works!” was proposed to mandate that all city-
funded construction projects were built union and by at least 35% city residents, 
with the goals of ensuring good jobs and diversifying the local trades. Although it 
spoke to deeply felt grievances in the African-American community, the 
ordinance was not connected to a specific grassroots struggle or proposed 
project and played out mostly in the formal political sphere. The trades managed 
to hijack the measure after it was passed and prevented its implementation, 
further alienating many black leaders but not sparking much community reaction. 
The APA was similarly positioned to engineer a deal as the CSM but was 
unable to do so, a failure that came back to haunt the living wage campaign, 
which was unable to meaningfully bring together the black community with local 
unions, according to many involved. Pittsburgh seems to have lacked the 
organizational infrastructure and the handful of proactive and well-placed leaders 
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able to reach out across the divide in Milwaukee. While nearly all those 
interviewed emphasized the importance of starting coalitions with a few strong 
partner organizations committed to mobilizing their membership around social 
justice issues, such organizations are sometimes not available. There were not 
many active membership organizations in Pittsburgh’s black community, with 
activity more focused around individuals and politicians, and only a couple unions 
looking beyond “bread and butter” issues, with no key allies in the trades. The 
APA tried to play an intermediary role, but without clear potential partners to 
mediate between, they were left in uncertain waters. 
Another difference between the two experiences is that Milwaukee’s 
breakthrough was directly tied to the Convention Center campaign in which all 
the key stakeholders were forced to see some common interests in the face of 
the possibility of getting nothing at all. The legislative approach in Pittsburgh may 
have hampered efforts to bring labor and the black community closer together, 
compared to Milwaukee, where both sides could see an imminent loss on the 
horizon as demolition began on the convention center. This demonstrates the 
greater difficulty of developing new norms outside the context of collective action, 
and left a legacy that still hampers coalition-building in Pittsburgh today.  
A more promising effort has recently emerged out of a sustainable 
development intermediary called Pittsburgh United (based on the model of Good 
Jobs & Livable Neighborhoods) around a new stadium project in the Hill District. 
The “One Hill” coalition is using their CBA campaign to proactively confront these 
barriers in building a new basis for trust between labor and the Black community 
(as well as uniting community groups themselves). As opposed to the Pittsburgh 
Works effort, this strategy offers both a formal structure to work within as well as 
opportunities for collective action and leadership development. However, 
Pittsburgh UNITED still faces an uphill battle. Early in 2008, the Building Trades 
Council came out against their CBA efforts as impediments to development, 




As is suggested by Sheila Cochran’s spiderweb metaphor, these 
relationships are always fragile. In several recent setbacks in Milwaukee, the 
relationships built in the late 1990s have not carried over to new contexts as 
smoothly as hoped. The trades have not been very involved in the GJLN coalition, 
although several members of the coalition have good personal relationships with 
the union leadership. Tony has kept his distance because of what he perceives 
as unreasonable hostility toward the trades: 
“We have a number of people around town who think that we never do enough 
and it's always too late, and just attack us and the industry on a regular basis. [A 
prominent critic] has no concept of how the industry works. She would just have us 
throw the doors open, and tomorrow there'd be 5000 people, and of course there's 
no market for it—they'd all just be standin’ around with their fingers in their ass. 
She's a very intelligent woman, but she's just got this block. So we still have our 
detractors out there, and some of them became part of the GJLN coalition. I 
wanna work with people, but if they insist on bashing the living hell out of the 
building trades, there's lots of other community groups I can work with. It was very 
difficult for us to be a part of this thing when every once in a while someone would 
come to the mic out of the coalition and say ‘The unions aren't doing the fucking 
job.’” 
The lack of active involvement on the part of most of the building trades 
limits the potential impact of GJLN as well as chances to further transform the 
relationship between the trades and local communities of color. Without 
cooperative projects to work on within a formal structure, such relationships  
have proven vulnerable, particularly as key leaders are replaced. For example, a 
recent public dispute about immigration at the 2006 Labor Day parade tied into 
national debates about immigration and the overall direction of the building 
trades unions, and led to several unions refusing to march in the parade. The 
episode set back trust-building and showed the lack of ties between the trades 
and the local Latino community.  
Sheila Cochran, probably Milwaukee’s best-placed bridge-builder, has 
spent years trying to improve the relationship between local unions and 
communities of color, by “mending fences, putting band-aids on stuff, getting 
people to talk to each other and saying ‘Oh god, don't send out that press release, 
you'll set us back another five years.’" As part of this outreach, the Labor Council 
had been working with a local Workers’ Center on the Latino south side and 
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asked them to participate in the annual Labor Day march, something nobody 
thought would be a big deal at the time. However, a few local trades unions took 
a stand against it, which attracted national press and further inflamed the 
situation, leading to what Cochran describes as an “estranged relationship”: 
I've just held my ground and said, “Well this is a population that needs organizing 
in this town.” I said, “Here I sit, having dealt with building trades issues in the black 
community for the last few years, trying to convince them that you guys are OK, 
and that you really are going to allow them to come into your unions, and you're 
just a great bunch of guys. And then this happens, and I get black people calling 
me saying, ‘See! They are just a bunch of bigots.’”  
 
This is about workers that need to be organized, one of the largest masses of 
people in this town that we need to have some kind of relationship with. You guys 
can be pissed off or whatever, but somebody's gotta maintain a bridge between 
the Latino community and organized labor in this town, and if that's gotta be me, 
so be it. And when you guys get ready to use that bridge, just take the spikes off 
before you walk across my back!  
 
While it remains to be seen whether Cochran’s bridge-building efforts will 
pan out, her experiences highlight the difficulties of challenging such entrenched 
divisions from a traditional leadership position subject to the unpredictable ebb 
and flow of organizational politics. Milwaukee shows both the hope for change 
and its fragility. The convention center project was a key event that turned out 
well in large part because a formal cooperative structure existed in the CSM, a 
major issue provided opportunities for new norms to emerge through collective 
action, and a number of well-placed leaders were able to build bridges between 
the trades and communities of color. Internal political unrest (combined with the 
presence of trusted bridge-builders like Bruce Colburn) actually made it more 
possible for the trades to explore new partnerships with community groups.  
After this mid-90s breakthrough, a generally accepted pattern of 
negotiating project labor agreements that include affirmative action on big public 
projects in the city has continued. The trades have by all accounts revitalized 
their Big Step program bringing minorities into apprenticeships, leading to steady, 
if slow, growth in numbers. However, this has certainly not demographically 
transformed the local building trades, or even led to solid relationships between 
the unions and community groups that can then be built on to tackle more 
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complex problems. Lots of mistrust remains, and an incident like the Labor Day 
parade conflict always has the potential to blow up years of careful progress. 
Pittsburgh UNITED is trying to build some initial bridges by focusing on winning 
community benefits agreements tied to specific development projects. This 
approach seems more likely to succeed than Pittsburgh Works, but will remain 
highly contingent on key leaders and relationships, as well as the chance to get 
some early wins to build on. 
b. Fending off elite interventions during Chicago’s Big Box Living Wage 
Campaign 
Chicago’s building trades have had at least as conflictual a relationship 
with the local African-American community as in Milwaukee or Pittsburgh, and 
there haven’t been a lot of breakthroughs on the basic issue of hiring in the 
construction industry. However, other unions in the city, such as SEIU and 
UNITE-HERE, have proactively built coalitions and advanced a racial justice 
agenda. SEIU in particular is a large and powerful player in Chicago politics, so 
the impact of these efforts has been more than symbolic. Along with a number of 
community organizations who have reached out to partner with labor, these 
unions have achieved enough success that their campaigns have moved from 
uneasy truces to become something closer to a multiracial working class 
movement. 
Because the split between the trades and Black communities has failed to 
maintain an effective and self-reproducing barrier to multiracial organizing, 
Chicago elites have attempted to drive a wedge between segments of the 
emerging working class movement, looking to head off any challenges to their 
control of local policymaking. During the big box living wage campaign, several 
members of the coalition received warnings about an impending “race war” from 
Daley aides, as one labor leader recalled: 
Daley’s top aide on the council—I've known him a long time...He told me in 
passing one day, "You're starting a race war." I said, “What? It's only a race war if 
you make it one." It made me mad, but I didn't really know what he truly meant by 
that until the mayor started playing the race card. And he took the problems that 
some labor has with African-Americans and he blew it up. There never was a 
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trades issue with big box—they stayed out of it. They're gonna build ‘em whenever 
they get built. Daley took that division between African-Americans and labor and 
multiplied it a thousand times, and tried to make us out to be racist. 
Daley, Wal-Mart, and their allies used two main strategies. First, they 
pounded a consistent drumbeat in ads, editorials, and press releases that the 
ordinance was about white unions trying to keep stores from opening in black 
neighborhoods. Second, they tried to persuade prominent black political and 
religious leaders to publicly oppose the ordinance, often by offering money and 
political favors. It is a testament to the strength of the living wage coalition that 
the combined efforts of Wal-Mart, Target, and the Chamber of Commerce 
spending millions combined with a strong mayor twisting arms wasn’t successful 
in turning the tide against the ordinance. Ken Snyder, the Collaborative’s lead 
organizer, now political director for UNITE-HERE Local 1, described the months-
long battle for the support of key African-American leaders pitting the campaign’s 
grassroots pressure against the money and clout of Wal-Mart and the mayor:  
Rev. James Meeks, who's a huge figure, was working very hard behind the scenes 
against us, and the fact that he couldn't persuade a large number of black 
aldermen to go away from us was a huge thing, and had a lot to do with the fact 
that some of our key African-American aldermen stepped up to deflect that. [Wal-
Mart] could get to Meeks, they could get to anyone they wanted. They brought 
Andrew Young in, before he got in trouble. When Andrew Young comes to town 
and says ‘I want to meet with you,’ you find time in your schedule. When Tim Drea 
from UFCW calls, maybe not—he never got in to see Meeks. 
 
ACORN and Protestants for the Common Good worked on a huge effort to 
connect with black pastors, and ACORN had a couple pastors who were basically 
out there full time working on it. [The opposition’s] strategy was basically that if 
they got enough of the African-American aldermen to vote against, then the White 
and Latino aldermen wouldn't override the African-American community. We 
defeated it because of the strength of our grassroots campaign. We had a lot of 
the “good faith” actors on our side, and we had thousands of phone calls going in, 
both from door-to-door and phone-banking. Aldermen were saying, “I’m getting 
calls 10-to-1 in favor of the ordinance.” [Aldermen] Lyle and Preckwinkle were 
really important behind the scenes in the African-American caucus, because it 
probably only would have taken a couple more leaving to tip the balance and just 
start a slide. 
A core network of bridging leaders was central to these efforts—
particularly black pastors and politicians who were connected to the unions and 
city-wide community organizations. Some such leaders, like the aldermen and 
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ACORN pastors, were in place already, but others emerged through the 
campaign itself. For instance, Toni Foulkes was already an activist within 
ACORN and her UFCW local, but the big box living wage brought those two 
organizations closely together and perfectly positioned Foulkes to emerge as a 
key spokesperson of the campaign, expand her network of mentors, and make a 
successful run for a City Council seat, an amazing rise for a political newcomer in 
Chicago. 
The final days before the City Council voted in the summer of 2006 saw 
the issue raised to a fever pitch. Both major daily newspapers published a steady 
stream of editorials against the ordinance, Wal-Mart and Target flooded the 
media with big advertising buys and threats to abandon the city, and Mayor 
Daley barnstormed the city’s south and west sides claiming the ordinance would 
hurt Black communities. At a mass meeting of Black clergy, ministers were 
offered contributions to their churches or community development corporations in 
exchange for publicly opposing the living wage ordinance. That the issue became 
so blatantly racialized was shocking to many, and inspired some leaders to stand 
even firmer, as Rev. Jennifer Kottler of Protestants for the Common Good 
recounts: 
“It really was critically important that we had Jeremiah Wright, and Mike Pfleger, 
and Marshall Hatch, and B. Herbert Martin, and [other prominent Black pastors] 
coming out and saying, "You gotta understand, this is not the entire Black 
church—there's more of us. Leon Finney, Arthur Brazier, and James Dimas don't 
speak for the entire Black church in the city of Chicago.”  
 
I think for some well-meaning folks, the bottom line was “any job is better than no 
job.” And then I think that there were others who were just bought. Bought and 
paid for by Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart was throwing money around. Pastors who were 
supportive of us got calls, asking, "Don't you need money for your youth program? 
For your CDC?" I think there are some of those [opposition] pastors who are very 
well-meaning and then I think there are some that are just goin’ to hell in gasoline 
shorts.” 
That Wal-Mart and Daley could run an anti-living wage campaign under 
the banner of racial justice demonstrates how detached racial and economic 
justice issues are in mainstream US political discourse (Guinier & Torres, 2002). 
To many of those closely involved, it seems incredible that others don’t recognize 
how interlocked issues of poverty and race are, but as Ward Connerly and other 
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conservatives have demonstrated, Americans (of all races) have been trained to 
remember the civil rights movement as a battle against individual discrimination, 
and the memory of Martin Luther King can be manipulated to oppose affirmative 
action or living wages. During the campaign, living wage supporters learned that 
they needed to more and more clearly demonstrate, both rationally and 
emotionally, how the ordinance would help low-wage Black workers. Though it 
was precarious at times, they at least fought this battle to a draw, with polls 
showing huge majorities of African-Americans in support of the ordinance and 
enough of the Black establishment standing with them to prevent the mayor and 
the media from being able to frame it as solely a “white union” initiative. 
On the morning of the vote, council chambers were packed with hundreds 
of noisy protesters. On one side, a sea of purple, red, yellow, orange, and blue t-
shirts representing all the unions and community groups supporting the living 
wage—relatively evenly split between African-Americans, Latinos, and Whites, 
with a wide range of ages represented—many of whom had come straight from 
an all-night vigil in a church across the street. Around 8 a.m., buses arrived 
carrying a couple hundred Black teenagers in white t-shirts bearing the name of 
The Woodlawn Organization, a south side community organization started by 
Saul Alinsky that has become a large real estate, social service, and 
development interest tied to Mayor Daley.  
After a period of each side trying to drown out the other’s chants from 
behind security cordons on opposite sides of the echoing lobby, members of 
ACORN and other community groups fanned out and began informally talking to 
the young people, quickly learning that most of them had no idea what was being 
voted on that day and were only there because they had been promised money 
by the director of their youth program. Once the youth found out what the 
ordinance was actually about, most drifted away to sit on the stairs, took the bus 
home, or joined the supporters’ side. By late morning, the “opposition” had 
largely dissolved, and the crowd that greeted the council members after they 
finally voted late in the afternoon was almost all living wage supporters. 
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Several of those involved think more than direct financial motivations 
might have led some Black leaders to oppose the living wage. A labor leader 
active in the living wage campaign suggests that: 
There are ministers on the south side of Chicago who believe that if unions 
become strong in the African-American community, the key social institution will 
become the unions instead of being centered around their church. Although we are 
in no way competing with the churches, I am in competition with this thing that they 
fear losing the most—their political power and their ability to influence politicians in 
these south and west side wards. That comes under threat as we get more 
involved…Who will the politicians be more afraid of—the unions or the ministers? 
Recent events in Chicago clearly demonstrate the fragmenting and 
demobilizing effects of “city trenches.” Electoral politics as practiced in these 
cities fragments communities along racial and geographic boundaries. Ward 
politicians have a well-honed system of maintaining control by mediating 
between a multitude of interest groups. Mounting a substantial challenge to the 
machine, the living wage coalition managed to hold onto almost all their 
committed “yes” votes and pass the ordinance by a substantial majority; however, 
they were unable to override the Mayor’s veto, a task that will require a renewed 
effort and even broader support.  
Even though they did not secure a veto-proof majority, Genie Kastrup, 
SEIU’s political director, echoed others in talking about how the coalition was 
able to shift the political center of gravity and create a sense of possibility of 
larger change in the future: “In the past, the aldermen have been able to often 
run to either labor or the community groups and play them off each other, and a 
united front meant they felt like, ‘I’ve never been pressured like that.’ It was a 
new day at City Hall.” The emergent possibility of a more permanent “new day” 
likely explains the full-scale mobilization of the political establishment and its 
corporate backers against an ordinance that would have had relatively modest 
financial impact on the affected businesses. 
Conclusion: Cultural Change Strategies for Multiracial Organizing 
The potential impact of a multiracial working class movement will continue 
to excite the imaginations of organizers searching for ways to bring people 
together without ignoring the differences between them. Mechanisms for realizing 
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such an outcome through deepening and transforming alliances around race and 
class into political power will be explored more fully in Chapter 4. Any political 
context presents a number of potential bases of community and solidarity, some 
of which are often in conflict with each other. Race and class consciousness 
have often been pursued as if contradictory, and in many US cities, cross-class 
racial solidarities often seem to be a much more salient political identity for 
residents of all races than class-based communities.  
Basic cultural changes are necessary to move such coalition-building 
efforts forward. The attempts to build multiracial coalitions in these three cities 
demonstrate the importance of bridge-building leaders, developing cooperative 
norms during moments of collective struggle, and creating structural frameworks 
for groups to work together across differences. Figure 3.1 summarizes the 
prefigurative strategies used in the two areas to encourage the transformation of 
the individuals and groups involved. While most would rarely be completely in the 
prefigurative column, moving in that direction by incorporating new norms 
increases the opportunities for transformation. 
Figure 3.2: Traditional and Prefigurative Organizational Norms 
 Traditional/Additive Prefigurative/Transformative 
Organizations Either bureaucratic or structureless; transactional 
Actively constructing inclusive beloved 
communities 
Leadership Top-down, charismatic, competitive 
Bridge-building leaders becoming the 
change they wish to see 
 
The relationship between African-Americans and unions is of course not 
the only conflict demanding the attention of organizers. Several recent writers 
have documented the divide between labor and environmental groups (Rose, 
2001; Obach, 2004), many have written on gender and sexual identity issues in 
the labor movement (Baron, 1991; Colgan & Ledwith, 2002; Tinsman, 2002), and 
in many places, getting the white men running unions to talk to each other would 
be a step forward. However, the issue of race remains particularly prominent in 
US working class organizing, and it is difficult to imagine much progress without 
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a movement that unites economic and racial justice concerns. As shown by these 
cases, coalition campaigns provide an opportunity to do this work. These local 
coalitions operate at a scale in which prefigurative politics and changing 
organizational cultures are more realistic, as leaders can build bridges and trust 
between groups and help new norms emerge through struggle. 
There do not appear to be any automatic prescriptions for creating an 
organizational culture hospitable to multiracial organizing. Trying to keep as 
many elements in place at once creates the possibility of the emergence of new 
relationships and norms. The big box living wage campaign took this emergent 
set of norms to a new level in Chicago, as Madeline Talbott relates: 
It's still countercultural within organizing ideology, but what I teach in organizing 
workshops is that coalitions work best if there's real trust between at least some of 
the members, and if possible trust among all of them. You just have to own that 
there's a history to this, and each coalition's not new. I think developing trust and 
the ability to work together is a lot just doing it rather than laying out your positions 
and trying to reach agreement. A lot of it is just by hook or by crook...having to 
work together and seeing what you get out of it. It helps to be up front, and it also 
helps to be willing to swallow hard and eat a certain amount of shit. Getting it is not 
an intellectual achievement. It seeps in through the skin pores in the course of 
struggle, just like it does with our members. And of course it's useful to reflect on 
that, and generalize from that, and be able to articulate what you've learned, but 
there's a certain amount of just experience that changes people in coalitions.  
 
And there's still miles to go before we sleep, but it's so much better now. I've 
worked with Dennis Gannon [president of the CFL] for 11 years on living wage 
issues. He never returned a single phone call of mine all that time, and he never 
called me. And now we call each other's cell phones, and the number of unions 
where that's true is so much different now. It was in the heat of battle when we all 
needed each other, and we all cared so much, so we reached out, and what we 
kept finding was people willing to back down off of their positions in order to make 
something go. And we all got better at this. I was far more coalitional than I usually 
am. I'm usually a bulldog when it comes to defending my organization's interests, 
but I backed off claiming credit again and again...nearly killed me to do it, but I did... 
 
The big box campaign was critical to the solidifying of relationships because there 
was so much heat of battle that it forged this coalition of trust, and we found 
ourselves sharing things that just a few weeks before we would have hidden from 
each other. We just found ourselves opening up and talking about things. There's 
still huge divisions, mostly between the unions, that have still not been worked 
out...but in the course of that, people have had more and more ability at the 
table—even if not outside of it—to lay out their concerns and have them dealt with. 
And others were just phenomenal in their willingness to swallow and keep moving 
on things that they felt they were right on. It was hugely important that we won 
big—even if it's only temporary—because every time people try to go back to their 
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old way, they recognize that in the old way, there's no way any of us could have 
won. 
Talbott’s account makes clear the emergent nature of this culture of 
solidarity—new ways of relating to each other were forged through collective 
action and deepening dialogue between partners. It also captures the conditional 
nature of these gains. The spider webs of local working class movements require 
the constant vigilance of many bridge-building webslingers, diagnosing weak 
spots and moving proactively to strengthen relationships. These webs are always 
fragile, both because they are often under attack and because they are of 
necessity built within the hegemonic system of neoliberal capitalism, 
simultaneously resting on its structure and conflicting with it. 
The concept of prefigurative politics provides a theoretical and practical 
toolkit for understanding the tasks taken on by these leaders in their attempts to 
create new organizational cultures that allow people to break old habits and 
develop new norms. Leaders of such efforts utilize a mixture of formal and 
informal opportunities to bring people together in ways that encourage 
transformation and then try to solidify new norms in structures and collective 
narratives. The biggest challenge facing such bridge-building leaders is also their 
greatest opportunity—in order to be successful in reaching their larger goals, 
they must engage dialogically with their constituencies and unite people across 
deep divides. This entails far more complex processes than relying solely on 
additive strategies, but also contains the potential of creating an ever-expanding 
pool of leaders and relational power. Thus, while searching out a balance 
between additive and transformative strategies might slow progress toward short-




Chapter 4  
 
Combining Strategies to Reshape Local Politics 
 
Building on the previous chapters, which focused primarily on changes 
internal to movements, this chapter looks outward to examine the development of 
new political strategies in the three cities. How organizers build and use power 
impacts the results of struggles as well as the internal cohesion of a movement. I 
examine these cases within the class-conflict perspective of regime theory, with 
complementary contributions from the literature on urban social movements and 
power relationships. 
There are many opinions about how to most effectively structure 
campaigns and movements, and activists must make strategic choices about 
how best to pursue their goals. These often implicit theories form the basis for 
very different organizing strategies, tactics and goals. Debates have long raged 
on the Left about whether, and how, to engage with electoral politics; the efficacy 
of non-violence; and incremental versus revolutionary change. Many such 
debates are longstanding precisely because they offer no clear answers, but 
rather dilemmas to be grappled with. While these opinions have often hardened 
into dogma and split movements apart, research on social movements shows 
that broader repertoires and strategic flexibility leads to greater success (Amenta, 
2006). Practically, it thus seems more useful to identify the limits of different 
strategic options and ask how they might be combined in specific situations. 
This chapter explores how these working class coalitions have contested 
local neoliberal “growth machines” in their attempts to redefine the role of 
government in the economy. While state and federal policies as well as 
international factors provide an important context for these struggles, unique 
aspects of each local situation are explored in the following section. All the cases 
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examined in this project operate at the municipal and regional scale, making local 
governments and corporate elites the main focus of their campaigns. These 
emerging movements have been most successful when they have combined a 
variety of strategies and found ways to work simultaneously toward short and 
long-term goals. The chapter presents three strategies of political intervention 
utilized by these coalitions and concludes with reflections on how local activists 
can take the next step to move into a governing role in their regions. 
Introduction: Local Political Contexts of Post-Industrial Rust Belt Cities 
Organizing efforts are shaped by, and respond to, their institutional 
political setting, which is relatively similar in each of these regions. All three cities 
are the dominant municipality of the surrounding county and operate on a 
mayor/council system (although Chicago clearly has the strongest Mayor, both 
by law and personality). In a state and national context, the electorates of these 
cities and counties are strongly Democratic, so much so that municipal 
government is in effect a one-party system. Milwaukee formally holds non-
partisan local elections, but in Chicago and Pittsburgh, the Democratic primary is 
the de facto general election, producing a similar dynamic of candidate-driven 
politics largely disconnected from the national parties. All three are strong 
“neighborhood cities” with city councils elected by districts and developed strong 
ward-level Democratic machines in the 20th century. The machines are shadows 
of their former selves, surviving only in fragments and memory, as patronage has 
shrunk with City workforces under pressure of shrinking tax bases and federal 
investigations.  
Economic policy in these three cities, like most in the U.S., has long been 
dominated by a “growth coalition” of local capitalists, real estate interests, and 
politicians (Logan & Molotch, 1987). While the old political machines incorporated 
labor and ward-level leaders, they were dominated by pro-downtown growth 
coalitions. Such constituencies are sometimes formally organized in bodies such 
as Pittsburgh’s Allegheny Conference on Community Development, which was 
formed in 1943 and continues to play a central role in linking the region’s 
economic and political elites. In other cases, the networks are more informal, 
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relying on overlapping board memberships, social connections, and a few key 
think tanks to forge consensus (Carroll & Shaw, 2001). In Chicago, Barbara 
Ferman (1996) has shown that political actors, led by the original Mayor Daley, 
have maintained a more autonomous role than in most cities, although the 
results have arguably not been much different. Milwaukee’s regime formed 
relatively late, not solidifying its hold on power until the 1960s, but all three cities 
have been effectively run by growth coalitions for decades (Rast, 2006). 
Deindustrialization and the resulting social dislocations shook up these 
governing regimes to some extent, but by the 1980s they had regrouped around 
a neoliberal agenda and proceeded to chip away at whatever concessions had 
been made to working class interests during previous decades. For example, 
unions in Chicago that had long relied on “handshake contracts” rather than more 
formal legally-binding agreements, found themselves forced to accept less and 
less from the younger Daley in the 1990s (Rast, 2005). Through this transition, 
the basic thrust of the growth machine agenda has remained constant—touting 
the benefits of publicly subsidizing large downtown projects to the exclusion of a 
development policy more broadly spread across neighborhoods. 
a. City trenches and the fragmentation of urban politics 
Challenges to this growth machine have been periodically mounted by 
three main groups: African-Americans, labor, and middle class whites (usually 
either promoting reform or neighborhood protection). At different points, these 
groups have been potent electoral forces in city politics, but their organizations 
and leaders have tended to recede or be pulled into the growth machine. By 
turning a comparative-historical lens on the purportedly exceptional American 
working class, Ira Katznelson (1981) showed how early political developments in 
the U.S. produced a working class fragmented along lines of race, neighborhood, 
and unions. The development of political institutions from this beginning has 
consistently deepened and solidified the “city trenches” separating the worlds of 
the workplace and the community. This fragmentation of struggles limits the 
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power of a the working class and allows elites to maintain control despite their 
vastly fewer numbers. 
Each of these contending groups has had their electoral moments. The 
peak years of the U.S. labor movement surrounding WWII were a time of union 
strength in City Halls, reflected in officials like Frank Zeidler (Mayor of Milwaukee 
from 1948-60), who was the last Socialist to lead a major U.S. city. The Black 
Freedom Movement developed a base in each of these cities in the 1960s and 
70s, but never managed to transform city government. Harold Washington, who 
served as Mayor from 1983 until his death in 1987, is still the only African-
American elected to lead any of these cities (Marvin Pratt was recently appointed 
to serve out a term in Milwaukee, but then defeated in the election). 
Washington’s campaign inspired unprecedented turnout in the Black and Latino 
communities and took advantage of a machine split between two white 
candidates in 1983, but was crippled by a hostile City Council and unable to 
create many of the changes his supporters had hoped for (Rivlin, 1992).  
As in most cities around the country, middle class neighborhood-based 
movements have not been able to maintain the interest of residents much 
beyond defensive campaigns to keep poor and Black residents out of their 
neighborhoods, protect their property values, and lower their taxes (Davis, 1990). 
As one of the first of a wave of politicians to capitalize on growing insecurity and 
dissatisfaction in the country, Peter Flaherty served as Mayor of Pittsburgh from 
1970-77 as an anti-machine candidate focused on preserving neighborhoods and 
cutting taxes. 
Despite these variations, local growth machines have largely maintained 
control over the shape of local policy. Even an ambitiously progressive 
administration like Washington’s found itself constrained by the threat of capital 
flight, a credit squeeze by bankers, and the downgrading of municipal bond 
ratings. This problem of scale is faced even more acutely by local community 
groups and unions, who find themselves trying in vain to force multinational 
corporations to pay attention to local problems. The fragmentation of the 
American working class thus limits the ability of local movements to come 
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together across differences and to contest capital (Sites, 2007). The political 
potential of multiracial working class coalition-building lies in the possibility that a 
governing majority could be forged to finally overthrow the growth machines. 
As is explored in Chapter 3, race is an extremely significant cleavage in 
each city, where Whites, Blacks and Latinos relate to electoral political structures 
quite differently. Figure 4.1 presents basic demographic breakdowns of the three 
cities and their surrounding counties. 













Chicago 37 35 28 5 21 51 
Cook County 51 26 23 6 15 38 
Milwaukee 43 40 15 3 26 52 
Milwaukee Cty 61 27 11 3 19 45 
Pittsburgh 67 27 2 3 22 47 
Allegheny Cty 83 13 1 2 13 32 
 
Chicago has been described as a quintessential example of pluralist 
political incorporation. The South Side black community was organized into the 
Democratic machine under the leadership of Black politicians and ministers like 
William Dawson beginning in the Depression era. While their wards still received 
less resources than white neighborhoods, some patronage did flow through the 
machine, and an uneasy truce has been largely maintained through the present 
day. Chicago’s Latino population followed a similar pattern, and the Hispanic 
Democratic Organization is referred to as the only remaining “real machine” in 
Chicago. Despite this status, the Big Box Living Wage campaign exposed the 
different ways African-Americans and Latinos have been incorporated into 
Chicago politics. Although Latinos have grown dramatically in numbers to almost 
equal the area’s Black population (28% to 35% in 2006, with whites making up 
37%), race, class, and politics intersect different in the Latino community, leading 
to a different relationship with other groups, as Ken Snyder describes: 
                                            
7 Source: American Communities Survey, retrieved from http://factfinder.census.gov on 3/4/2008. 
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The racial politics of this were such that if we didn't have a majority of African-
American votes, the ordinance would not have gotten called. [The lead aldermen] 
wouldn't have let it come up for a vote if it looked like it was getting inflicted on the 
black community, but that wouldn't have held true for the Latino community. If [the 
other side] had won most of the Latino aldermen, they would not have held up the 
ordinance, because the racial politics are different with Latinos. 
Observers describe Chicago’s elected Latino leaders as more 
ideologically diverse than their black counterparts, ranging from some of labor’s 
strongest allies to staunch Daley supporters. While this is arguably true of the 
Council’s black caucus as well, the perception (or myth) of a unified black 
political perspective and voice persists in a way that is not assumed of Latinos. 
Milwaukee’s black and Latino populations arrived later than in Chicago, 
past the point when ward-level and ethnic organization played a central role in 
Milwaukee politics. Their relatively late arrival also meant they did not have much 
chance to develop an economic foothold before the factories started shutting 
down, resulting in a relatively small black middle class compared to other Rust 
Belt cities. Like Chicago, whites make up a small plurality of the population at 
43%, compared to 40% African-Americans and 15% Hispanic. Although, like 
Chicago, it is quite flat and spread out, Milwaukee’s three converging rivers 
separate neighborhoods as starkly segregated as any city in the region. If you 
imagine the city as half a pie cut into four pieces beginning from the northeast, 
middle and upper-class Whites are concentrated in a narrow strip between the 
Milwaukee River and lakefront; Blacks on the “north side” spread out to the west; 
separated from Latinos by the wide industrial ditch of the Menominee Valley; and 
ending up back along the lake in historically White “ethnic” working class 
neighborhoods (now becoming more Latino). 
The more famous home of three rivers, Pittsburgh was also one of the 
earliest northern cities to develop a significant African-American community and 
has been an important center of black culture. However, for the most part, they 
have been kept on the sidelines of local politics. Whites continue to maintain a 
comfortable numerical majority in the city (67% to 27%), and the black 
community has long been fragmented by class and geography. Pittsburgh’s 
topography, which often separates neighborhoods by rivers, ravines, or cliffs, has 
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prevented the development of sprawling ghettoes like Milwaukee’s north side or 
Chicago’s south and west sides. As soon as they developed the means, many 
families moved out of the Hill District, the historic center of Pittsburgh’s Black 
community. For all these reasons, the black community has never cohered as a 
unified political force and the possibility of a Black mayor of Pittsburgh seems as 
distant as ever. 
b. Three dimensions of power in urban politics 
In the face of such fragmentation, there is no shortage of pessimistic 
theories that seek to explain urban politics. Those placing modern cities within 
neoliberal capitalism have mostly followed Castells (1983) in suggesting that 
increasing capital mobility makes it extremely difficult for local movements or 
governments to force meaningful changes. From a more political perspective, 
institutionalists like Katznelson show how much the past determines our current 
and future trajectories. Regime theory has largely focused on producing more 
nuanced narratives of how elites maintain control of the growth machine by 
adjusting strategies and co-opting resistance, a theme echoed by a wave of 
recent studies on governmentality (Rast, 2006). 
Although depressing, this body of urban theory possesses the virtue of 
accurately describing reality for the most part. In recent decades, the 
governments of these three cities have been dominated by local growth 
machines and become less and less labor-friendly. Economic development plans 
seem to involve little more than luring young professionals and empty-nesters to 
downtown lofts, with little concern for the people who will do the work to support 
their lifestyles and/or already live in the city, seeming to confirm all the 
pessimistic predictions of the literature. However, by taking the past so literally as 
prologue and focusing on regime continuity, this tradition sometimes overstates 
the permanence of power relations and fails to offer much leverage on questions 
of social change. 
Addressing such questions requires the critical analysis of present 
regimes with attention to the actual mechanisms through which they exercise 
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power. By focusing on specific forms of power used by elites to maintain the 
status quo, John Gaventa’s work provides a useful framework for understanding 
how such growth coalitions maintain their hold on decision-making and how 
challengers can “both confront power and overcome the accumulated effects of 
powerlessness” (Gaventa, 1980, p. 258). Following Lukes (1974), Gaventa 
proposes a three-dimensional understanding of power relations. The first 
dimension involves observable competition over resources and decisions, the 
second incorporates a more institutional focus on establishing the agenda and 
“rules of the game,” and the third examines how people’s conceptions and 
desires are themselves shaped by power. Like Offe and Wiesenthal (1980), 
Gaventa finds that the challenges facing working class movements are much 
greater than simply forming stronger interest groups to contest the first dimension 
of power. Observable (first dimension) conflicts, like City Council votes on 
specific ordinances, are thus a culmination of contention and shaped by the 
second and third dimensions of power.  
Neoliberal growth machines build and use power materially through 
institutions and setting the rules of competition; and culturally by shaping the 
general population’s common sense of the role of government and local business 
and the efficacy of markets (Sites, 2003). As a demonstration of how this 
manifests itself, the GJLN discovered how deeply rooted real estate developers 
were within the local political structure during their efforts to win a community 
benefits agreement: 
The developers we were up against spent years building up power, and an issue 
for them was like a single development project. They don't care about that 
particular project, they care about having the power to be able to go where the 
money is and do projects when and where they want to. And they've built that up 
over years through making campaign contributions across the board—we pulled 
records and saw that the big developers gave money to all of them. 
It was seen by some elected officials as perfectly normal that developers 
had a “special relationship” with city planning staff, meeting privately to plan 
projects. In a Rust Belt city like Milwaukee, which has suffered through decades 
of eroding population, good jobs, and self-image, many have come to believe the 
mantra that any activity is good, even if the benefits of new downtown lofts to the 
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average Milwaukeean are seldom clearly explicated. Through institutions like the 
Chamber of Commerce and conservative foundations, local business interests 
promote a vision of themselves as an indispensable resource shackled by the 
“special interests” of labor, environment, and community groups.  
Even in its “liberal” guises, this pro-development perspective admits the 
interests of these groups only in a secondary role, perhaps advising a developer 
or business owner but never setting the agenda themselves. The common threat 
facing the hint of any such impertinence involves capital flight—business owners 
will supposedly refuse to operate in any locale that does not permit them 
complete freedom. Because local elites wield power within all three dimensions, 
collaborative efforts to reshape local economies to be more equitable and 
sustainable must also address all three as they engage the political process. 
Challenging the Neoliberal Growth Machine 
Analyses of political processes tend to produce more optimistic or 
pessimistic results depending on the focus of the author. Mainstream pluralist 
political scientists (looking only at observable, first dimension power struggles) 
often find that well-organized challengers are successful in achieving at least 
some of their goals and are often partially incorporated into the institutional 
structure of governance. More pessimistic assessments of similar cases come 
from critical theorists, who usually conclude that modern systems of domination 
are almost infinitely able to absorb challenges (Rast, 2006). Both extremes tend 
to overemphasize one side—either the agency of individual and collective actors 
or the structural constraints limiting them.  
Amenta (2006) suggests a blended “institutional politics” approach that 
explores the historical contingencies and interplays between institutional factors 
and political actors to explain why systems of power relations are usually (but not 
always) maintained. A three-dimensional view of power helps flesh out the 
implications of Amenta’s suggestion by pointing us toward conflicts that might be 
less obvious and more enduring than those exposed during the flash points of 
campaigns. Of course, overt conflicts remain important to examine for the ways 
they bring such relations of power above the surface and mark key events within 
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longer struggles. Figure 4.2 summarizes the major campaigns examined in this 
chapter. Although most have not resulted in clear victories or losses, by looking 
at them as part of a sequence we begin to see how interrelated they are.  
Figure 4.2: Key Coalition Campaigns Impacting Local Policy 
City Campaign Key Dates Result 
Chicago City/County Living Wage 
1995- Formed coalition 
1996- Lost City Council vote 
1997- Won vote 
2002- Won inflationary index 
Living wage ordinance 
covering municipal 
workers and contractors 





2004- Wal-Mart announces stores 
2005- split votes on 2 stores; 
developed living wage strategy 
2006- won City Council vote 
2006- Daley veto 
2007- Aldermanic elections 
 
Failed to override Daley 
veto, but electoral 
organizing resulted in a 
friendlier Council 
Milwaukee City/County Living Wage 
1995- Launched campaign 
1995- Won City Council vote 
1996- Won School Board vote 
1996- Won Convention Center CBA 
1997- Won County Council vote 
 
Living wage ordinances 
covering municipal 
workers and contractors 




2003- Demolition of Park East 
freeway announced; coalition formed 
2004- Lost CBA vote at City Council 
2005- Won vote at County Council 
 
CBA covering County-
owned parcel of land 
(unclear how enforceable 
the ordinance will be) 
Pittsburgh City/County Living Wage 
1997- Formed coalition 
2001- Won City Council vote 
2001- Lost County Council vote 
2002- City repealed ordinance 
 
No living wage ordinance 
 Justice for 
Janitors 
2002- Contract campaign; Support 
coalition formed 
2003- Downtown contract signed 
2004- Centre City pulled out and 
fired janitors 
2004- City Council passes Displaced 
Worker ordinance 
Won a contract covering 
all but one downtown 




Activists in each city sought to achieve goals beyond any individual 
campaign, making an assessment of success based solely on the adoption of a 
certain policy inadequate. In the analysis below, I pull apart the concept of 
success into layers corresponding loosely with the three dimensions of power to 
explore their ability to combine multiple political strategies, place each campaign 
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within a larger context of struggle, build capacity to intervene on various levels, 
and set the terms of the debate in local politics. 
Strategy 1: Coordinating Strategies, Goals, and Timeframes 
Consistent with the social movements literature, success within first 
dimension observable power struggles is positively correlated with broad 
strategic repertoires. Two critical dimensions of breadth demonstrated in these 
cases are the ability to combine various forms of power and balance short and 
long-term goals. 
The line between “outsider” and “insider” strategies often marks a 
significant separation on the local political scene. Though the dichotomy can be 
criticized as overly simplistic, it reflects basic assumptions of the differences 
between “insider” groups who exert power through personal connections with 
policy-makers and “outsiders” who rely on disruptive, contentious displays of 
power (Maloney, Jordan, & McLaughlin, 1994). In the settings studied in this 
project, unions would be expected to rely more on insider strategies like lobbying 
elected officials on the basis of campaign contributions and clout within the 
Democratic party. Community groups more often use their outsider ability to 
create disruption to force officials to pay attention to their issues. 
Many factors reinforce the distinction between insider and outsider 
approaches to pressuring political decision-makers. Particularly since the 1960s, 
a libertarian strain in U.S. movements has condemned insider strategies as 
almost inherently corrupting and anti-democratic, while considering outsider 
strategies to more authentically represent the voice of the people. Some 
community organizations in this tradition fetishize their lack of involvement in 
electoral politics as a mark of purity. At the same time, however, it is widely 
believed that these outside strategies are usually not very effective in 
accomplishing their goals. These two strands of thought come together in Piven 
and Cloward’s (1977) pessimistic thesis that poor people’s movements are only 
able to create change through disruptive action during moments when governing 
regimes are realigning, but even then have very little ability to shape the policy 
reforms granted by elites. 
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Within this tradition, power is seen as almost inherently corrupting. 
Outsider strategies maintain distance from all but the first dimension of power 
and its public conflict. This may reduce the chances of overt co-optation, but is a 
self-limiting strategy that gives up whole fields of struggle to elites maintaining 
the status quo. Moving into “second dimension” agenda-setting requires 
expanding the timeframe and scope of struggle. As one Milwaukee organizer 
described the ultimate goal of their work, these coalitions are trying to shift the 
balance of power, even in the absence of a clear next “hot issue,” so that “things 
are different ten years from now, and we can take on the things we care about—
schools, jobs, our communities.” 
Organizers and other pragmatic political actors have often grappled with 
such dilemmas of scope. Often, even those who agree on long-term goals and 
visions disagree about the proper steps to take in the present. While some 
activists have always argued that the pursuit of compromise partial victories 
would dull the edge of hunger for change and diminish the likelihood of broader 
transformation, others claim that movements are built on victories, and that 
winning smaller campaigns builds confidence, develops skills, and whets the 
appetite for larger changes. A version of this debate has taken place within U.S. 
community organizing, which has tended to get sidetracked into an endless cycle 
of “stop sign” organizing—winning small local victories on immediate concerns of 
members but not attacking the structural inequalities that reinforce the problems 
facing their communities (Fisher, 1994). Unions, for their part, often tend to 
narrow their goals and ambitions to issues that can be bargained in a contract. 
Because these differences in strategic orientation often correspond with 
race, class, and organizational boundaries, they become even more difficult for 
movements to negotiate across. It is relatively rare to find unions engaging in 
direct action or community groups building effective political machines, but when 
attempted, blending strategies often produces successful results. The most 
effective efforts in each city used a full range of tactics, combining theatrical 
confrontations with (metaphorical) arm-twisting in smoke-filled rooms. 
Participants across my cases generally viewed this “political sophistication” in a 
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positive light, although difficult to achieve. The potential power of a united 
working class collaborating across racial and strategic boundaries is captured 
colorfully by a Milwaukee labor leader: 
Oh, if you could just sit down together with the African-American community and 
the Latino community and make a joint statement on one or two issues. It doesn't 
have to be anything elaborate. Just saying we're gonna work together on this—
whether it be broad-based or very narrow. You’d have these guys downtown 
crappin’ in their dresses! 
Looking back at movement-building activities in Chicago and Pittsburgh up 
through the mid-1990s, the results of each city’s living wage campaigns would be 
surprising. The Alliance for Progressive Action in Pittsburgh brought together 
labor, faith-based, and community organizations around a broad shared agenda 
and launched a living wage campaign with the explicit goal of furthering 
collaborative activity and strengthening the APA. Chicago’s Jobs and Living 
Wage Coalition was focused on establishing a living wage ordinance, with no 
explicit goals of building a larger movement. In their first real tests, taking the 
ordinances to their respective City Councils, Pittsburgh’s campaign was 
victorious, while Chicago’s lost.  
We might have expected organizing efforts in Chicago to fizzle while 
Pittsburgh went on to further success. However, within a year, Pittsburgh’s 
ordinance was rolled back and the APA was in disarray, while Chicago’s coalition 
not only bounced back to win the ordinance, but has gone on to increase its living 
wage, come within a vote of passing one of the most ambitious living wage 
policies in the country, and unseat an unprecedented number of aldermanic 
incumbents. An explanation for these divergent trajectories is depicted in Figure 
4.3, which schematically represents the strategic orientations of most unions and 
community organizations and how they might expand their strategic repertoires.  
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Figure 4.3: Traditional Union and Community Strategic Orientations 
 
Most working class organizing (workplace or community-based) is short-
term and would benefit from broadening its timeframe. Unions and community 
organizations differ more on their tendencies to rely on either “insider” or 
“outsider” strategies and again, could each benefit from expansion. This does not 
imply giving up their existing strengths, but learning to “walk and chew gum at the 
same time.” Not coincidentally, a region like Chicago where more organizations 
have expanded into overlapping strategic territory is more hospitable to coalition-
building. As building block organizations expand into the dotted lines in Figure 
4.3, intermediaries are more able to bring them together. Coalitions like the APA 
and CSM may have been so broad to make up for the narrow focus of local 
unions and community groups. Their collapse, and the resulting demobilization, 
demonstrates why such intermediaries do not provide a substitute for strong 
membership organizations. It seems likely that Chicago could survive the 
dissolution of the Grassroots Collaborative because many local organizations 
have expanded their timeframes, goals, and strategic repertoires and will thus 











a. Combining “insider” and “outsider” power 
Chicago activists increased their ability to combine strategies over the 
past decade of contentious living wage campaigns. The early campaigns are 
remembered as tough challenges, especially for the unions, who weren’t 
accustomed to directly challenging the mayor, but the coalition held together and 
learned from the experience. This contrasts with Pittsburgh’s living wage 
campaign, which struggled to maintain unity across this strategic split. 
The 2002 indexing campaign marked a major step forward in terms of 
political sophistication and trust among the key players in Chicago. SEIU was 
interested in raising the living wage because of its potential impact on their 
contract campaign. Although they were talking privately, ACORN and SEIU did 
not present themselves publicly as aligned on the issue, creating the illusion that 
Mayor Daley could head off a potential alliance if he agreed to a deal quickly. 
Playing to type as an outsider, ACORN held public demonstrations to raise the 
profile of the issue while SEIU quietly proposed negotiations, at which Daley 
quickly agreed to automatic indexing of the City’s living wage. Madeline Talbott, 
of ACORN and currently Action Now, called this “a more sophisticated play…To 
sort of play off each other while being united at the same table was really fun and 
showed great progress.” 
The 2006 Big Box Living Wage campaign continued to build on this 
sophistication, producing an initial series of wins at Council (although failing to 
override Mayor Daley’s veto). In this most recent campaign, the coalition was 
able to relatively seamlessly combine highly visible pressure tactics, personal 
lobbying of power-brokers, targeted constituent mobilization, and presenting a 
credible threat to running candidates against incumbents in their efforts to secure 
votes. Blending tactics was helpful at several key turning points in the campaign, 
including forcing the ordinance out of committee to the full Council, maintaining 
support in the face of a full-scale assault by Wal-Mart and Mayor Daley, and 
negotiating the final language of the ordinance. 
One example of this synergy was the variety of tactics the campaign used 
in their interactions with Ed Burke, powerful chair of the Council’s Committee on 
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Finance. In the course of having dinner with Burke, labor leaders learned that he 
was hedging on his pledge to move the ordinance out of committee in May of 
2006. Upon hearing this news, the coalition sent an army of community 
organizers out into key districts, including Burke’s, where, as Talbott recounts: 
“We immediately discovered that we could romp—he hadn't been minding the 
store. We could force him to call it, because he wanted to be out of the kitchen. 
And then we went into all the swing aldermen's wards and put up signs, got 
signatures, got calls into the offices, and just created this thing going on in their 
own backyards in an election year. We only visited voters, so if you were sharp 
and saw our walk sheets, you knew what we were doing.” 
The outsider grassroots organizing of the community partners was more 
effective because it could be strategically targeted based on “insider” information. 
For example, while Talbott had initially thought it would be useless to try to 
organize in the district of a powerful incumbent like Burke, a union political 
analyst who had been analyzing demographic shifts across the city convinced 
her it was worth the effort. On the other hand, the unions and advocacy groups 
found a far more receptive audience from aldermen who were receiving 
hundreds of constituent calls supporting the living wage. By focusing on 
registered voters, the coalition’s potential power was immediately recognizable to 
politicians in an election year.  
Several community groups like ACORN were already doing some political 
organizing, while unions like SEIU and UNITE-HERE have been willing to 
mobilize their memberships and utilize a broad range of pressure tactics. Various 
partners could thus bring influence to bear on key votes, a combination of 
pressure points that helped keep aldermen on board, since they weren’t able to 
play the unions and community groups off one another. Although remaining 
tensions were sometimes inflamed by the media’s focus on the unions and 
dismissal of community partners, members of the campaign reinforced the value 
of their different sources of power at the coalition table.  
When they went to City Council meetings, Tim Drea, then political director 
of UFCW Local 881 and now secretary-treasurer of the state AFL-CIO, put on a 
suit like a “regular labor lobbyist guy” while the community groups wore “their 
uniform—jeans and t-shirts.” Drea highlighted Talbott’s role in helping the group 
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talk through the need for multiple forms of power and “recognize that the guys in 
suits aren't always your enemies, and the guys in the streets aren't enemies 
either. I guess we knew that, but it was nice to talk it out.” Such discussions were 
important to maintaining cohesion. Although the media focused on the “unions vs. 
Daley” storyline, assuming that they must represent the “real” power, members of 
the coalition agreed with Kate, of Illinois Hunger Coalition, who emphasized that:  
“It wasn't just the unions. The unions had these white aldermen that we didn't have 
any connection with, but there were a bunch of the Black and Latino aldermen that 
they didn't have. A few of those Latinos that voted with us, I've been in rooms 
when they start yelling, ‘Tear up your union cards—they don't represent you!’” 
Aldermen could risk angering the unions or neighborhood groups in their 
ward, but were quite worried about simultaneously alienating both of these 
sources of electoral power. The living wage coalition held onto most of their votes 
under intense pressure because of its grassroots capacity to mobilize 
constituents and willingness to hold incumbents’ feet to the fire and support 
challenging candidates. Because they had done real face-to-face organizing in 
the neighborhoods, constituent support for the ordinance held up even under the 
constant media barrage. One alderman reported “never feeling pressure like 
that,” and others complained of feeling caught with nowhere to go. The final days 
before the vote were full of traditional community organizing tactics like marches 
and vigils, grassroots political pressure through constituent phone calls, and 
insider lobbying.  
While the Western Pennsylvania Living Wage Coalition did a tremendous 
amount of outreach and education of the broader public, it was not able to 
effectively focus a combination of grassroots and insider power on key politicians. 
After getting an ordinance through at the City, the campaign lost a surprise vote 
at the County level, prompting the City Council to repeal its ordinance. The 
consensus of those involved is that both votes would have been won with more 
active support from organized labor. As Rosemary Trump of SEIU, the key union 
leader involved, recalled:  
“The unions all supported the campaign but didn’t actively make it a priority. It was 
probably about a six on a scale of ten in terms of importance, and there were folks 
who thought people making less should just join a union and bargain a contract. 
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Labor council support was key to the fact that there was any effort at all, but if it 
had been a higher priority for them, it probably would have passed. [Several 
council members] probably would have voted yes if there had been more union 
pressure on them from people like the Federation of Teachers.” 
In contrast to Chicago, Pittsburgh’s campaign lacked organizational 
members who could combine insider and outsider strategies. The community 
organizations involved were largely uninvolved in electoral politics, and the 
unions didn’t have the capacity to mobilize a broad swath of their membership 
around the issue. Tom Hoffman, who was working for SEIU at the time and now 
coordinates Pittsburgh UNITED, told me: 
“There’s a big difference between SEIU here and in Chicago in terms of being able 
to apply political pressure. Rose Trump did a lot of great work, and she was a 
great supporter of a lot of great causes, but there weren't a bunch of SEIU 
members that night. And at the labor council, they always said, “Well, this doesn't 
really affect any of our people. It's nice, but it's not really a priority.” 
By the time of the Council vote, the campaign had effectively split between 
“outsiders” and “insiders” and the coalition meetings were not able to provide an 
effective space to discuss the possibility of a negotiated compromise on the 
ordinance. The “outsider” camp had no faith that the “insiders” could be trusted to 
negotiate an acceptable compromise, and so in effect gambled on an “all or 
nothing” approach, which ended up leaving them with no ordinance. More 
importantly, the process drove a wedge between members of the core leadership 
group that led to the demise of the Alliance for Progressive Action and set back 
movement-building in Pittsburgh for years. The failure to bring together both 
tactical wings thus resulted in failure both at the immediate policy level and in 
terms of future capacity. 
b. Balancing Short and Long-term Goals in Campaigns 
Most of the organizations that represent sizable working class 
memberships in the U.S. lean toward short-term strategies, leaving relatively few, 
and small, groups advocating for more fundamental changes. On the other hand, 
growth machines make plans within a more extended timeframe, leaving working 
class movements at a disadvantage if they do not move in this direction. As with 
many of the other dilemmas inherent in such work, I suggest that organizers are 
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more successful when they recognize the real tensions between each position, 
and make choices contingent on the specifics of each situation rather than 
adopting a firm position.  
If one accepts the desirability of working pragmatically toward short and 
long-term changes as well as the possibility that strategic compromises can 
derail longer-term efforts, several strategic questions emerge. How does one 
ensure that issue campaigns are part of a broader ongoing struggle? Decide 
when to cut a deal, and when to take a principled loss? When to play politics-as-
usual within accepted frameworks, and when to insist on changing the process 
and terms of the debate? It is often difficult to balance short and long-term goals, 
but several campaigns in these cities demonstrate the importance of keeping the 
long-term capacity of the movement paramount and how campaigns can 
contribute to this end while also producing short-term successes. 
As described in the previous section, the different paths taken in 
Pittsburgh and Chicago following their initial living wage campaign are somewhat 
surprising. Most centrally, this divergent trajectory reflects the ability of Chicago 
organizers to place each living wage campaign within a broader struggle, helping 
create a context in which neither wins nor losses demobilize their efforts. In fact, 
several short-term losses have sparked deeper coalition-building and more 
successful campaigns.  
Rachel Meyer’s (2008) analysis of the original Chicago living wage 
campaign demonstrates that rank-and-file supporters came to see their efforts as 
one episode in a “perpetual struggle,” an orientation that helped them redouble 
their efforts after the initial loss in 1997, continue expanding from the successful 
effort to index the wage level to inflation in 2002, and respond to Daley’s 2006 
veto with an unprecedented electoral mobilization. The results of this electoral 
work were somewhat surprising even to the political insiders involved, who had 
not realized how weak the local machines had become, even in the districts of 
long-time incumbents. One union political staffer reflected that: 
“Even after all the negative press, we were still really strong, especially on the 
south and west sides [primarily African-American neighborhoods]. A lot of those 
wards were up around 90%. And that was against the $2 million that we estimate 
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they spent. We put together a real field program, so it wasn’t just the big powerful 
groups pushing on them. In the last month, we did thousands of patch-through 
[phone calls] from their constituents, and they hate that! We were averaging a 
hundred a day and they were freaking out.” 
This learning process not only affected strategy within the living wage 
campaign, it gave the unions and community groups involved a sense of the 
broader possibilities of political change through challenging incumbents head-on 
in elections. This string of campaigns has corresponded with broader shifts in 
local politics, as Daley has consistently moved away from labor and community 
groups since his 1995 re-election (Rast, 2005).  
Through the 1990s, most unions remained at least nominally loyal to the 
machine but began to entertain increasing doubts as their “insider” power 
seemed to mean less and less. In particular, Chicago’s city workers, long the 
faithful foot soldiers of the machine, felt that Mayor Daley declared war on them 
in recent contract negotiations, demanding cutbacks in health care and other 
areas. Because they had little independent political capacity, having traditionally 
fed their members and money into the machine, the unions found themselves 
vulnerable. The last decade has thus seen a process of emotional and 
institutional disengagement from the local Democratic Party, along with proactive 
steps, as individual unions and the Chicago Federation of Labor (CFL) have built 
up an independent electoral infrastructure, which paid off in recent council 
elections. 
Anticipating some such effort, SEIU held a well-publicized “Aldermanic 
campaign training” early in 2006 to find potential candidates and signal their 
willingness to challenge incumbents. Nobody thought the groups involved would 
end up launching such a broad and coordinated effort until the living wage 
campaign exposed the opportunity. The coalition had laid the groundwork and 
was agile enough to take advantage of the opening. At a meeting immediately 
following Daley’s veto of the Big Box Living Wage, members of the coalition went 
around the room offering reflections on the campaign and what to do next, most 
agreeing with Mike, SEIU 880’s lead organizer, that the veto offered them a 
chance to create more change than if they had won the ordinance outright. “We 
 
 152
had a sophisticated use of the various types of power in the room,” reflected Mike. 
“We held together through a rocky campaign, building trust and laying the 
groundwork for a lot more we could get done in February.” What could have been 
a crushing defeat was immediately reframed as an opportunity, a process that 
worked smoothly because it was consistent with the “perpetual struggle” 
orientation of coalition partners. 
The way decisions are made within campaigns is a critical determinant of 
whether they will contribute to movement capacity and facilitate deeper 
collaboration between partner organizations. Examining several campaigns 
makes clear that a primary goal of organizers should be avoiding “catastrophic 
losses” in campaigns, where a short-term defeat metastasizes into a broader 
crisis of the emerging movement.  
Reflecting on turning points of the big box campaign, Ken Snyder of the 
Grassroots Collaborative diagnosed the complications that arise when bringing 
together groups that rely on different logics of political action, and how important 
it was that leaders paid attention to the process, as well as outcomes, of 
negotiations. Organizations evolve unique models of decision-making and action, 
often reflective of their internal structure and traditions. Insider groups like unions 
usually vest considerable latitude to individual leaders while outsider community 
groups tend to delegate less authority. Snyder’s account highlights prefigurative 
strategies at both the individual and organizational levels: 
The reason that community's afraid to get sold out is that they do things differently 
than labor. People get elected to the head of a labor union and the model of 
accountability is elections. So if Dennis Gannon doesn't do right by his members, 
then he doesn't get elected again—that's how there's accountability. Where a 
community group does accountability by sending in a leadership team and then 
they come out and talk to the whole group, so you could come up with the same 
product but the community feels sold out…and that's the moment where all the 
trust has the potential to break down. 
 
I give Tim Drea [UFCW] a lot of credit, because there were moments in the 
campaign where the Brennan Center was saying, “We need to do this to the 
ordinance,” and [Alderman] Burke was saying, “I want to do this to it,” and the 
labor union model is asking, “Is this good or bad? OK, let's do it.” And the 
community model is, “Let's come back and talk about it.” Labor deserves a lot of 
credit for seeing why that was important to do here and the community groups 
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deserve some credit for listening to the UFCW and the Brennan Center...but 
y'know, you don't know your partnership is that strong until you're there.  
Under pressure during moments of crisis, people and organizations tend 
to fall back on accepted schemas and spaces for discussion of differing 
assumptions becomes limited (Kelly & Karau, 1999). These conditions can lead 
to breakdowns within coalitions as the desire of each partner to follow their most 
comfortable strategy becomes stronger and stronger. Snyder felt the Grassroots 
Collaborative provided a good basis for such cooperation under pressure 
because it includes both unions and community groups, particularly since SEIU 
880 operates “more like a community group than any union” he’s ever seen and 
several community-based partners fall on the formal side of the continuum. In 
addition to the presence of such bridging organizations, the campaign made sure 
to have ongoing conversations about the different internal logics of each partner. 
Without strong reservoirs of trust and established decision-making 
processes, many coalitions crumble under the pressure of balancing multiple 
goals. In contrast to Chicago, Pittsburgh’s core group of leaders fractured along 
overlapping fault lines of power, gender, ideology, and goals during the crucial 
end stages of the living wage campaign. While the main division corresponded 
with an insider/outsider split, it also reflected a deeper disconnect over long-term 
goals. Rather than disagreeing about the relative importance of short and long-
term goals, both groups justified their strategic choices in terms of their long-term 
effects. However, since the APA had not succeeded in forging a consensus on 
shared long-term goals, the campaign further fractured the potential allies.  
On the “insider” end, Jack Shea, head of the Labor Council, was primarily 
interested in passing a reasonably strong ordinance and maintaining labor’s 
relationships with key political allies. He was used to hammering out 
compromises before public votes and thought the coalition should have been 
willing to narrow the ordinance by eliminating human service workers after losing 
at the County Council in an effort to keep the City version in some form: 
“Sometimes, you gotta be a closer. You gotta know when to make the deal. I was 
taught when I came up in this business that sometimes a union rep gets offered a 
half a loaf or no loaf at all, and a lotta times they take no loaf…Always up and 
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down the sidewalks, rah rah rah—but that ain't makin' a deal...that ain't helpin’ 
families better themselves. You feel good for the hour you're walking up and down, 
but it ain't about that.” 
Other key leaders of the campaign however, came of age in the anti-war 
and civil rights movements, were more comfortable forcing public conflict, and 
cared about building power and changing the way politics works in Pittsburgh as 
much as passing the ordinance. From this perspective, a big part of the problem 
was the fact that one needed to be somewhat connected to the power structure 
(and usually a white man) to exert influence. Several key activists saw the living 
wage campaign as a chance to “change the face of Pittsburgh activism,” by 
bringing together a more diverse constituency. While accepting that insider 
strategies like having the head of the labor council meet privately with council 
members were likely to be effective, they resisted relying on them because they 
worked against the long-term goal of diversifying and spreading power.  
These differing perspectives built up tension over the campaign. During 
the final stages, the key players were not even talking all together. We can only 
hypothesize about whether they could have worked out an acceptable 
compromise ordinance among themselves if they tried, because a real 
conversation about that possibility never took place. Chicago coalitions have 
been able to negotiate out a series of compromises (and collectively decide on 
areas they would not compromise), in large part because the more powerful 
union and political actors have insisted that all the key partners be involved in 
such discussions. By establishing standards up front for who would be at the 
table for key discussions, they are able to be more inclusive without getting 
bogged down trying to involve all possible groups. Their long-term view helps 
shape decisions in crisis points and avoid compromises that might limit future 
possibilities. 
Milwaukee’s Good Jobs and Livable Neighborhoods coalition also faced 
the a potential split during negotiations for the Park East community benefits 
agreement. Representatives of the community groups were offered a “side deal” 
that would have included minority hiring and affordable housing, but no 
guarantees of union labor. The developers were very anxious to avoid paying 
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union wages on the project and thought they might be able to drive a wedge 
between communities of color and the unions, particularly because the coalition 
did not have extensive union involvement. However, a broader perspective of 
trying to build power with unions beyond the particular campaign led the 
community groups to reject the deal. Even though GJLN only achieved a partial 
win on this first campaign, they avoided the sort of catastrophic defeat that hit 
Pittsburgh’s living wage campaign and are continuing to build capacity and 
strengthen their ties to unions. 
Strategy 2: Proactively Shaping Policy Conversations 
In their efforts to promote the interests of the working class and poor 
majority, these local movements have also begun to contest the third dimension 
of power by developing alternative collective visions of their cities based on a 
new set of principles. This ideological work requires a shift in perspective and an 
alternative institutional infrastructure to develop ideas and put them into practice. 
As Craig, the lead organizer of MICAH, explained, “it was the potential to shift 
power and the overall discussion in a real way that attracted us to GJLN.” In 
moving toward this goal, he diagnoses a common challenge among organizers 
as being overly issue-driven, always searching for the “next hot issue in order to 
get us going instead of being attracted to the idea of building power.”  
In contrast, members of the local growth machine pursue a broader 
agenda through construction of a “common sense” consensus on issues that 
concern them. Craig’s goal is for members of GJLN to adopt a perspective more 
like these developers, who are committed to shaping the context even more than 
promoting specific projects. He and other GJLN participants talked in more detail 
about their efforts to shift the conversation around economic development than 
their counterparts in other cities, perhaps because of the group’s focus on 
development issues as well as the legacy provided by the Campaign for 
Sustainable Milwaukee and Progressive Milwaukee.  
Wisconsin has a varied political history shaped by swings between a 
strong socialist tradition and serving as a right-wing laboratory. Milwaukee served 
as a testing ground for welfare reform and school vouchers over the past several 
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decades (interestingly, the Bradley Foundation in Milwaukee and the Scaife 
Foundation in Pittsburgh have been two of the most prominent funders of right-
wing causes in recent times). When the Campaign for Sustainable Milwaukee 
started having some success putting job creation at the top of the local political 
agenda in the 1990s, the Bradley Foundation began a series of attacks on their 
efforts. Echoing the tactics of their Wisconsin forbear, Joe McCarthy, Bradley 
operatives tried to plant stories in the press and spread rumors of radical 
domination of the CSM. In the opinion of Bill Dempsey, CSM’s lead organizer, 
this smear campaign stemmed from Bradley leaders who “felt the region’s focus 
shifting from school vouchers to family-supporting jobs as the defining issue of 
the moment.” 
GJLN has carried on CSM’s theme that local government should play an 
active role in creating an equitable economy by focusing on the ways that 
government shapes real estate development. Many members were attracted to 
the Park East campaign based on an intuitive sense that local government 
should be doing more to create good jobs and stable communities in Milwaukee. 
As the campaign progressed, they developed an intellectual rationale and public 
message, as expressed by Craig: 
“It's wrong for the city to be beholden to developers and to use our tax money to 
subsidize all kinds of development projects and have us not get any benefits off it. 
So we built our mantra on this idea of “public dollars, public benefit.” The city has 
this practice of giving developers what they want, in part because they have deep 
pockets and they can put it right back into the campaigns.  
 
Our angle was that if public investment was goin’ in, we needed to demand higher 
standards. And if we did that, we could start to undermine a practice that has been 
deeply ingrained, in terms of developers getting what they want from the city. We 
were coming up against these developers and they were saying, “Well this is my 
land that I own, why should I have to do what you say?” So we said, "There's 
public land, there's public investment. Anywhere there's either/or, we'll demand 
public benefits."  
This position brought them up against the central tenet of neoliberalism—
that free markets provide the optimal solution to any social issue. Such a 
challenge brought out the growth machine’s big guns—defeating the GJLN Park 
East proposal was reportedly the Milwaukee Chamber of Commerce’s top priority 
in 2004. The opposition predictably relied on long-standing arguments that any 
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regulations on development would lead to capital flight and actually hurt the local 
economy. As Kori Schneider of the Fair Housing Council reflected: 
“There's just a really strong feeling that the market should be able to take care of 
itself, and if we need affordable housing, then the market will create it. The city 
continues to say that, yet there's really no evidence of it working. In fact, they're 
subsidizing stuff all the time—there's very little that gets built that they don't 
subsidize. I still find it hard not to believe the whole bluff thing...it's compelling...it's 
scary. There were many times where I was like, ‘Well, what if they're right?’”  
“Public dollars, public benefits” not only provided an intellectually 
consistent context for their demands, but also what Craig tellingly calls a 
“mantra.” In order to break the stranglehold of the laissez faire perspective on 
local debate, such a simple and clear message was crucial. It directly confronted 
“don’t mess with the market” mantra of local developers and provided a stable 
touchstone for supporters who, as Schneider describes, are always subject to 
conflicting pressures and doubts themselves. As they got further involved in the 
campaign, members of the coalition began to hold this alternative vision more 
firmly and examine the often-flimsy claims of elites more critically. Rev. Joseph 
Jackson, a MICAH pastor who became co-chair of GJLN, described himself 
transitioning from being relatively politically disengaged to poring over the 
paper’s business section for clues over the course of the Park East campaign: 
“I was pulled in on my self interest. Here was an area of Milwaukee that I grew up 
in, and we had a chance to make something good happen in that corridor, so I 
started tellin’ my testimony, and I looked up and folks started saying, “Joe, can you 
come to this? Joe, you oughta do this.” I saw it as a chance to right some of the 
wrongs of the past.  
 
I was reading history on [former Mayor Frank] Zeidler, and he was very 
responsible for the Hillside projects being there, and that was the affordable 
housing of the day. But now… to hear politicians and developers use the argument 
that there was enough affordable housing already near downtown, and that was it! 
Man, I don't know, I don't have a degree from the university—or the technical 
college for that matter—but that was like, “Who do you think I am?” That was 
insulting...it is insulting!” 
Professional credentials and expert discourses often present a bar on 
participation in such debates for those toward the bottom of our economic 
pyramid. Coalition campaigns can present alternative educational venues for 
participants to develop both concrete understandings of the issues and 
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confidence in their authority to question such “experts.” As he further developed 
this theme, Rev. Jackson linked together the institutional and cultural basis the 
GJLN coalition is trying to build. The organizational basis of the coalition, and its 
ability to intervene in local policy discussions, is intricately connected to their 
efforts to create a climate of hope: 
“It became clear as we fought at the city level that this was potentially a great 
model for the whole city. And if it was going to spread, then we were gonna need 
to exist. And that was before we even lost—but we had agreed that we were 
gonna be at this for the long haul, because we wanted to see the whole city go in 
this direction. So there'll always be another opportunity, and somewhere, years 
down the line, these Milwaukee developers that have this attitude of "If we don't do 
it, nobody will," that'll be thrown out the window. Cuz now we're talking about a 
whole city, not just a city along the river and lake. And if you can develop the 
whole city, and rule the whole city, then you must be God! Let's change the culture 
of development in Milwaukee. Get Milwaukeeans to believe that they can be 
builders of their own city, and have jobs in their own city.” 
By articulating an alternative vision of Milwaukee based on good jobs and 
neighborhood development rather than shiny new buildings downtown, GJLN is 
challenging the basic definitions of success assumed by government officials and 
the local growth machine. While they care about winning individual projects like 
the Park East development, they know their larger goals are only feasible if they 
are able to shape a new set of “common sense” assumptions about the regional 
economy and role of government. 
The right’s rise to power over the past several decades was based in 
sustained attention to infrastructure-building, a fact that is attracting more 
attention in progressive circles of late. Rather than reflecting some mysterious 
shift in American values, the rise of the right was based in grassroots organizing, 
a network of think tanks and media outlets, and the development of a formidable 
electoral apparatus (Dochuk, 2006). Their efforts paid off more handsomely than 
they could reasonably have expected, creating a dominant paradigm most 
people might have been expected to find counterintuitive, as Business Week 
editorialized in 1974: 
“It will be a hard pill for many Americans to swallow—the idea of doing with less so 
that big business can have more. Nothing that this nation, or any other nation, has 
done in modern economic history compares with the selling job that must be done 
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to make people accept this reality.” (Business Week, October 12, 1974, cited in 
Dreier, 2007). 
To counter such influence, progressive activists are constructing their own 
movement infrastructure, including spaces for the development and 
dissemination of critical perspectives, policy analysis and development, and 
political capacity to develop and elect candidates to office. 
To begin developing and spreading an alternative vision of Milwaukee, 
GJLN has helped create a Civic Leadership Institute to bring together local 
activists to develop a common understanding of the regional economy and 
potential development strategies. This institute is modeled on similar efforts 
around the country promoted by Building Partnerships and seeks to provide an 
alternative to the Chamber of Commerce-sponsored leadership development 
programs in many cities.  
In a similar vein of knowledge production, Partnerships for Working 
Families is helping create a network of independent policy action centers that 
develop and analyze regional policy from a working class perspective (Dean & 
Reynolds, forthcoming). Past campaigns in these cities have relied mostly on 
university-based researchers to provide such capacity. For example, Milwaukee’s 
efforts were closely linked to the UW-Madison-based Center on Wisconsin 
Strategy in the 1990s and UW-Milwaukee’s Center on Urban Economic 
Development during the Park East campaign. Similarly, academics in Pittsburgh 
and Chicago have played supportive roles in campaigns (although they have also 
worked closely with out of town think tanks or technical assistance providers like 
the Economic Policy Institute). 
Universities occupy an interesting position in relation to these efforts. 
While small groups within them often produce research and training very useful 
to these local movements, the larger institutions are often central players in local 
growth machines, both as ambitious builders and producers of justificatory 
studies that paint a rosy picture of the potential of development projects (Nicholls, 
2003). Would labor-community coalitions be able to rely on such centers in 
campaigns targeting the university? As many universities reduce community-
focused work like extension programs and place ever-more emphasis on 
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traditional research and faculty as grant-getters, how many faculty are 
realistically able to play such roles? These contradictions lead some to wonder 
how effectively even the best-intentioned university-based centers can support 
local movement-building and suggest the need for independent movement 
research capacity8.  
A sub-component of developing alternatives involves working within 
sectors to generate perspectives rooted in particular group experiences. For 
example, Protestants for the Common Good was formed to ensure there was a 
“Religious Left” voicing an alternative vision and providing a vehicle for people of 
faith in Illinois to get involved in social justice issues. In Milwaukee, MICAH 
similarly articulates economic justice in faith-based language, contesting the 
right’s hold over religious discourse. 
Strategy 3: Independent Political Action 
Like the need to build infrastructure to do ideological work and blend 
strategic approaches, these movements also need to create new sources of 
political power to impact the electoral arena. Through the development of an 
independent political apparatus, working class movements reduce their reliance 
on the Democratic party and increase their ability to develop candidates and hold 
politicians accountable. 
The GJLN and Pittsburgh Justice for Janitors coalitions were unable to 
synthesize insider and outsider strategies smoothly enough to win full victories in 
their respective campaigns. Compared with Chicago, local community 
organizations in the other two cities have not engaged much in politics and most 
of the unions are not comfortable with the use of more disruptive power, making 
the gap between them more difficult to cross. This discomfort with blending 
strategies appears to be symptomatic of a lack of independent political capacity, 
which can translate into dependency on the existing power structure and reduce 
strategic options. 
                                            
8 The ideas in this paragraph were shaped by conversations with Ralph Bangs, Walter Nicholls, and Virginia Parks. 
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During a telling early moment of the Park East campaign, a classic 
community organizing “outsider” accountability session held at a church in front 
of more than 500 community members made several key union partners 
uncomfortable, as described by John Goldstein, who now works for Partnerships 
for Working Families: 
“The MICAH ministers really got tough. They pulled microphones away from 
elected officials, and they did a traditional community organizing thing, where they 
said, “Will you support the CBA, yes or no?” And when politicians started giving 
speeches, an older minister took the mic away. County supervisors were 
screaming, and we had coalition partners who were freaked. One said, “Look, all 
the work we've done has gone out the window—the county board's mad at us.” It 
ended up being the county board that was strongest in the end, but that was a very 
tense moment. That summation meeting at the end of the public meeting was very 
tough—people were in tears. They're not used to dealing with elected officials like 
that.” 
Several of these union leaders never returned to the coalition following the 
incident. Since it was early in the campaign and coalition partners did not have a 
long history of working together, more extensive preparation might have been 
necessary to get everyone on the same page before the event. At least in part 
because of the lack of energetic labor support, the GJLN coalition lost its vote on 
the Park East CBA at the City Council. While they did secure a CBA covering the 
County-owned parcel of land, it has proven tough to implement. In Tony’s opinion, 
this stems from GJLN’s tendency to rely on “outsider” approaches: 
“I carried a lot of water for them, but some of this stuff, you still have to do behind 
closed doors. You gotta sit down and cut whatever kinda deal you can cut before 
you go out and hit ‘em over the head with a picket sign. And that isn't the way the 
Good Jobs folks do their thing. And that doesn't bother me, it's just…you're not 
going to get anything past the Redevelopment Authority until you can get at the 
people who appoint people to the Authority. And it can be done—they're right on 
track as far as their vision of things and what they'd like to see, but they're just not 
going to get it with how they're doing things.” 
The community organizations involved in GJLN are not nearly as active in 
conventional politics as those in Chicago, largely because of concerns about 
endangering their 501(c)(3) status and a simple lack of examples of involvement. 
Milwaukee has been a testing ground for many experiments in privatization and 
several observers pointed to the depoliticizing effects of welfare reform and 
charter schools on the local scene. Many community organizations in Black and 
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Latino neighborhoods have received grants or government funding that explicitly 
or implicitly keeps them away from any “political” issues. In addition, just as 
several of their labor allies were viscerally uncomfortable with the publicly-
conflictual community organizing tactics of MICAH, many community (and labor) 
organizers have a gut-level aversion to insider strategies, as Annette from 
Milwaukee 9to5 (and formerly SEIU) reflected about herself: 
“It's probably because I'm not a politically savvy person, but the only kind of power 
I like is the kind that comes from members. I don't like the maneuvering. A lot of 
people do, they find it exciting—like chess—but I don't like it. It feels like we're 
excluding people...it starts being about you...and at that moment, you're not really 
representing people, you're the one maneuvering. I've caught myself falling into 
that in bargaining, when it's like, “I hate that boss, I'm smarter than him, and I'm 
gonna show him up.” 
Their general lack of involvement in electoral politics meant the GJLN 
coalition was less able to secure firm commitments from City Council members, 
who had less of a history, and less to fear, from these organizations than the 
Chicago coalition (although to be fair, this was the first such campaign GJLN had 
engaged in). The Milwaukee growth machine hadn’t engaged as directly with the 
County Council, where allies emerged somewhat surprisingly from suburban 
districts, as Pam Fendt, now director of GJLN, reflects: 
“It became clear that [County Council members] weren’t nearly as connected to 
the developers—and the developers weren’t nearly as comfortable playing over 
there as in the City—because they usually don’t have to. The City controls all the 
zoning, and it was just in this case they knocked down the freeway and the County 
owned a piece of the land…But the difference came out to me at a hearing where 
one of the supervisors mispronounced a big developer’s name when he called on 
him—he didn’t know who this guy was, but it was completely different down at the 
city.”  
This contrast highlights the inadequacies of looking only at the first 
dimension of power. From such a perspective, the City and County Council 
would be seen as equivalent arenas and the differing results somewhat puzzling. 
Only by understanding that the opposition was playing on a field it had helped set 
up at the city level does it begin to make sense why representatives of whiter, 
richer areas supported this effort to help central city people of color. 
In fact, campaigns in all three cities had trouble winning the (supposedly 
“safe”) votes of politicians representing poor, largely African-American districts 
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whose constituents would presumably have had the most to gain from the 
ordinances. These “betrayals” were often especially deeply felt by members of 
community organizations based in the same neighborhoods, who found it 
incredible that their representatives would vote against their cause. For this 
group of representatives, their insider power was supposed to have been 
decisive. Rev. Joseph Jackson of MICAH told me people often avoid discussion 
of the City Council vote:  
“It's embarrassing—we let this happen to us! We trusted the politicians this one 
time and look what happened to us. So now I think we're more clear that there's no 
permanent enemies, no permanent partners. Like my good old brother Michael 
McGee, who said he was with us 100% on the CBA, then at the 12th hour he 
abdicated. Seems like somebody talked to him at that last hour and made him an 
offer he couldn't refuse.” 
This sort of disillusionment can lead either to withdrawal from politics or to 
a determination to shape the process “upstream,” through developing candidates 
and turnout capacity within community organizations (more common in Chicago 
than the other two cities). The focus on these particular Black politicians may be 
based more on assumptions about the overlapping effects of race and class than 
especially pronounced flip-flopping. In Pittsburgh, most of the blame for the living 
wage loss has been laid on James Simms, who represented the blackest and 
poorest district in the County and cast a surprise deciding vote against the living 
wage ordinance after originally sponsoring it, yet several white “labor-friendly” 
reps who voted no or abstained have escaped such harsh criticism (or labor-
backed challengers).  
Still, the fact that these coalitions had such a tough time securing votes 
from politicians whose constituents supported the ordinances in overwhelming 
numbers does highlight the lack of grassroots organizing power plaguing many 
low-income communities of color. Organized voters or money are far more 
effective in convincing politicians than any appeal to social justice or shared 
identities. Tom Hoffman described the night of the living wage vote in Pittsburgh 
in similar terms as Rev. Jackson talked about Milwaukee: 
“Jim Simms looked out and saw the Lutherans, the crazy kids from the University, 
a couple people from SEIU, and a few of the other usual lefties, and he said, 
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"None of these people vote for me, why should I do what they want?" We didn't do 
any organizing in his neighborhood. Someone gave him a better deal, and we 
didn't have anyone talking to him that he'd listen to.” 
More than any personal story about a politician like Simms, the living 
wage loss in Pittsburgh reflected the lack of political infrastructure able to hold 
officeholders accountable to a pro-worker agenda.  
A partially successful effort in Pittsburgh more recently emerged through a 
campaign to secure a contract for the downtown janitors represented by SEIU. 
Overall, the campaign was similar to many other Justice for Janitors (J4J) 
comprehensive corporate campaigns, a model that has been refined within 
SEIU’s property services division since the mid-80s. In fact, a 1985 “fight back” 
strike by Pittsburgh janitors after decades of shrinking membership and stagnant 
wages is seen by some as the first example of this innovative approach, which 
gained national fame through successful mobilizations of mostly immigrant 
communities in Los Angeles in the early 1990s (Waldinger, et al, 1996). J4J 
campaigns use labor-community coalitions to place simultaneous pressure on all 
the major property owners involved to sign a master contract through whatever 
forms of pressure are available, including public demonstrations of union and 
community members, financial pressure, calling in political favors, and 
threatening embarrassment to people and organizations who may be able to 
facilitate a settlement. 
In 2003, negotiations for downtown janitors were stuck on healthcare 
issues, prompting SEIU to launch a campaign  outside and inside strategies. By 
linking up with community groups through the Merton Center, the union was able 
to publicly shame some big property owners, like the healthcare corporation 
Highmark, as the local’s Pittsburgh director, Gabe Morgan, describes: 
“At the time, a janitor cleaning their building had to pay $500 a month to get family 
healthcare. So a bunch of clergy came marching down the street with the janitors’ 
kids and a big banner…I think Highmark didn't even really understand what was 
happening. It's a number on your sheet next to your electric bill.” 
When Highmark agreed in principle to the union’s demands, it created a 
ripple effect, with other owners agreeing to come to the table rather than face a 
public campaign. Behind the scenes, an inside strategy was facilitating this 
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process, as labor leaders directly contacted local building owners to convince 
them to sign a contract. While this inside-outside combination produced a 
successful agreement with the major locally-based building owners, the janitors’ 
celebration was sidetracked by the decision of one absentee owner to pull out of 
the pattern agreement, provoking a struggle still going on today, as recounted by 
Morgan: 
“Centre City announced they were throwing out the contract on New Year’s Eve, 
and then the workers were out in January 2004. What I knew from experience 
other places was that we had to come back really hard, right away. The ‘85 lockout 
went a similar way: Three buildings said, “We're drawing the line,” everyone else 
jumped on board, and all of a sudden there's an 18-month lockout. Within a few 
weeks, I had six other buildings saying they were going to do the same thing—this 
one building with nine janitors was threatening the whole contract.  
 
So we started a really ugly fight to drive them back in, no matter what it cost. ‘Cuz 
if we can at least make this not cost-effective for the owner, it makes it less 
attractive for others to try. So we did a month and a half of escalating events- we 
dumped a thousand bags of garbage in front of the building...We went on hunger 
strike…Had sixty-some people go in on Friday and lie on the floor...City Council 
passed a resolution...[the county executive] intervened. All the other building 
owners were showing each other the video of the stuff we were doing. And all the 
people who had been thinking of bailing were saying, “We don't want any part of 
this.”  
Although this pressure campaign contained the damage and kept the 
other building owners in line, several of the community organizers involved 
ended up frustrated that the campaign didn’t continue to escalate pressure on 
Centre City building tenants to cancel their leases or bring pressure to bear on 
the property owners. Some felt this reluctance stemmed from SEIU’s involvement 
with the power structure making them hesitant to be too confrontational. While 
this “insider” approach paid off with local owners, it presents a dilemma by 
limiting leverage on out-of-town owners. In addition, the union was coordinating 
organizing campaigns in several other cities and didn’t want to commit too many 
resources to a battle with unsure chances of success. Coordinating struggles 
across geographic scales is a challenge for any working class movement and is 
currently a major focus of unions like SEIU and UNITE-HERE, who are 
experimenting with organizing and bargaining strategies for service workers that 
even cross national lines at times. 
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Even though they have thus far failed to break Centre City, the campaign 
did provide new political openings, resulting in a Displaced Workers Ordinance 
protecting union janitors by mandating that when contractors change, the new 
contractor has to hire the displaced workers for at least 6 months to let them find 
another job (since overturned in the courts). In Morgan’s opinion, “It would have 
been politically impossible before, but now it was a no-brainer.” This type of win 
highlights the ability of organizers to turn setbacks into opportunities. 
 Recent efforts in Milwaukee echo those of a decade earlier, when a 
similar set of activists came together to create the Campaign for a Sustainable 
Milwaukee and a third party, Progressive Milwaukee. It was hoped that the 
institutional relationship between the coalition and party would provide a 
framework for coordinating inside and outside power and provide a partial 
solution to the perennially vexed relationship between working class movements 
and the Democratic Party in the U.S. As Joel Rogers, the key architect of the 
CSM/PM framework, explained: 
“The traditional function of a party is to bring people together on a basis that's 
more permanent and allows you to access public support in ways that social 
movements are very rarely able to do, except under the most extraordinary 
conditions. If you've just got episodic coalition politics, that doesn't really develop 
much for you.” 
The Milwaukee efforts were part of the larger New Party goal of 
developing a “non-spoiler” third party strategy based on “fusion” elections, where 
candidates run on multiple party lines, which received a fatal setback at the U.S. 
Supreme Court. This ruling effectively killed the national New Party and along 
with incipient local divisions, led to the dissolution of Progressive Milwaukee: 
“In New York [where fusion is allowed], with the Working Families Party, you see 
that the model is perfectly good. They have very little money, but have been able 
to do stuff that the Left hasn't been able to do for 20 years.  So there's really no 
exaggerating the importance of having some degree of more cosmopolitan political 
coordination, but that takes attracting people who have an interest in real power. 
 
In theory, we could have done it without fusion. But you tend to attract the people 
you don't want—who either don't give a shit about higher-level politics or who don't 
give a shit about practical politics. Progressive Milwaukee sort of went off on its 
own, and people started doing more electoral work than the Campaign was about. 
You didn't have any real accountability for the Progressive Milwaukee candidates, 
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and they ended up endorsing people pretty promiscuously—people who 
immediately went south and reneged on commitments.” 
Without Progressive Milwaukee or a similar vehicle, it has been difficult to 
maintain any connection of issue campaigns and electoral organizing into 
coordinated power-building in Milwaukee. As in most other regions, the 
tremendous resources poured into national elections tend to be used to create 
temporary structures by the Democratic Party or AFL-CIO—what Sheila Cochran 
at the Labor Council describes as “spaceships landing with all the money”—
rather than strengthening existing networks that might be able to play an ongoing 
role, to the frustration of John Goldstein: 
“We were running 500 volunteers and 100 staff a day close to the [2004 
presidential] election. Multiple contacts with union members identified as swing 
voters and drop-off voters in the city. It shows that when you put resources in, you 
can really have an effect. If unions put 10% of what they put into national politics 
and built permanent local structures, you could really do something. Another 
classic example of a wasted opportunity—after Election Day, it's all gone—no ID's 
are preserved, nothing...I just hate it!” 
While electoral politics in Milwaukee and Pittsburgh are largely episodic 
and shaped by outside actors, Chicago organizers have made some initial steps 
toward building the political capacity of their groups through their issue 
campaigns and continued into electoral politics. Grassroots Collaborative 
members have been able to tap into national money to do voter registration, 
education, and turnout in their neighborhoods. Door-knocking during the Big Box 
Living Wage campaign produced lists of supporters that were then used to target 
voters in the aldermanic elections. Many of the coalition partner organizations 
segued fluidly into local aldermanic elections, playing a significant role in ousting 
several incumbents who voted against the ordinance. For example, in the Back 
of the Yards neighborhood, Latinos Organizing for Justice took their local 
alderman a survey showing that 93% of residents supported the living wage but 
only 35% supported her, as Kate describes: 
“And her response was, "You don't support me, so I don't need to listen to you." So 
their feeling was, "We're gonna get her out of office," and they did, and now they 
really feel like they only want people there who are going to represent us. People 
have realized their power more than ever before. It's like the clouds opening up in 
the sky. People are saying, maybe we can reverse this trend where the only 
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housing development is for higher income people; that we'll have real parks and 
not Millennium Parks. Our vision incorporates recreation for all kids, safe streets, 
school funding, stopping closing down schools and pumping all the money into 
charter schools—it's about all that.  
 
The way I grew up in Chicago, there was a park at the end of my block. Both my 
parents worked, but I learned how to play chess, and checkers, water ballet, 
tennis—and everything was free! It was like a full-time job for me, and my parents 
could go off to work and not worry about me getting into trouble. But if I lived in the 
same neighborhood now, I wouldn't have any of that—I'd probably be in the house 
getting babysat by the television. And that's what's happening for too many 
kids...It's all part of what a real beautiful city should look like.” 
The groundwork for this electoral and programmatic effort had been laid 
through earlier campaigns and efforts to get prepared for such an opportunity. 
The next steps in Chicago focus on building grassroots power in wards across 
the city by bringing together community organizations around common causes 
and mobilizing union members in their neighborhoods. Leading into the election 
year, SEIU ran a program of aldermanic trainings designed to find potential 
candidates and send a message that the union was open to supporting outsiders, 
which raised some eyebrows among their allies, but showed people they were 
serious. They also systematically organized their members in the city, largely to 
demonstrate to aldermen in predominantly African-American districts that they 
had strength in their wards, as SEIU political director Genie Kastrup described: 
“Approaching black aldermen on the living wage, they’ve never worked with labor 
on anything. They just relate to the trades and think labor is all white. I met with [a 
black alderman] to try and reopen the door because I knew nobody had gone and 
talked with her. When I came in, she was really hostile because she thought I was 
going to try to threaten her. We actually haven’t done a lot at the city level, so I 
hadn’t met her, and she was just talking about ‘White Unions’ and ‘her 
constituents,’ and I said “Don’t try to pretend that I’m the White union here. We 
have 3000 members in your ward, and they’re not white.”  
 
I showed her this one little street on the map, said, “You know this street? We 
have 50 members on that street, and you add in their households, you’re talking at 
least 150.” And her face kind of went blank and she sat back in her chair. She had 
been trying to split apart the union from her constituents, which is their strategy, 
and was really just shocked that there could be so many union members in her 
ward. We have 2500-3000 members in most of the Black wards, which they know 
is often the margin of victory, or even the number of votes they got last time.” 
Electoral efforts in Chicago have clearly been more successful than in 
Milwaukee and Pittsburgh, but it is difficult to assess the extent to which they 
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have succeeded in challenging the growth machine discourse and changing the 
conversation on economic development in the region. The Big Box Living Wage 
campaign was able to hold onto strong public support for regulating corporations 
in the face of a huge media campaign, but its chief opponent, Mayor Daley, was 
also reelected in a landslide. More work will be necessary to shift the debate 
toward justice issues. Members of the coalition have been working to pull 
together and educate a “Progressive Caucus” on Council to develop a real 
counterweight to the Mayor’s power and be able to push an independent agenda. 
Increased policy and education capacity also seem likely to be necessary 
components for the emergent working class movement to take a leadership role 
in conversations about what kind of city Chicago should be. 
Conclusion: Moving into a Governing Stance 
“I can imagine some people would say, ’Oh, your Chicago squabbles are petty.’ 
But this corporate-led Democratic governments vs. people-led progressive 
movements—that's the real heart of the struggle, and that's what we're working on 
here. So it might seem petty to someone in Arkansas, but we're trying to define 
what social justice means, as opposed to just fighting off the worst” (Carlos 
Fernandez, Chicago Jobs with Justice).  
One benefit of examining economic justice organizing over time in each 
city is how clear it becomes that any single measure of success is inadequate in 
assessing the results of each campaign. Not only are conflicts taking place 
simultaneously across dimensions of power, events can have different short and 
long-term effects. The second and third dimensions of power are usually most 
relevant within a longer window, so we can group them together and use short 
and long timeframes as a rough proxy for the three dimensions of power. This 
also reflects the two basic ways many organizers think about success: 
• Was the policy/instrumental goal achieved (short-term success)? 
• Was the movement strengthened (long-term success)? 
Local movements appear to be quite capable of absorbing (and even 
benefiting from) short-term losses, but have a difficult time bouncing back from 
serious setbacks in terms of organizational infrastructure and the long-term 
health of the movement. For example, as shown in Figure 4.4, the Chicago Big 
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Box and Pittsburgh living wage campaigns are the only efforts that resulted in 
flat-out policy losses, but these setbacks had very different long-term effects on 
local movement-building. Pittsburgh’s living wage loss splintered local activists, 
while Chicago’s sparked an ambitious coordinated electoral effort. 
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In moving toward long-term success, Amy Dean and David Reynolds 
(forthcoming) have suggested that a key step for labor-community coalitions is 
moving beyond an oppositional posture to take a “governing” role in local 
politics—putting forward a positive program and building consensus around a 
comprehensive platform as part of eventually constructing a new “regime.” As 
demonstrated in this chapter, working class movements face challenges as they 
attempt this transformation. The common fears of many “outsider” activists are 
rooted in reality—getting involved in local policy processes can in fact demobilize 
and fracture coalitions. However, leaving that work to only loosely affiliated 
politicians is a recipe for disappointment and inconsistent results. Demonstrating 
that getting co-opted is not the only danger facing such movements, the most 
dramatic example of demobilization in these three cities resulted from the 
Pittsburgh living wage campaign, which was perhaps the least enmeshed in local 
politics. Based on this limited sample, there does not appear to be any necessary 
relationship between “insider” involvement and weakening movements. 
The fundamental lesson of the literatures on urban regimes, neoliberalism, 
and class struggle is that these coalitions operate on unfavorable terrain 
structured in ways that make it difficult for them to succeed. In such situations, 
working class organizers need to be keenly aware of how elites use power and 
willing to contest them in each of these arenas. By moving into more complex 
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relationships with political officials and blending the use of insider and outsider 
power, the emerging Chicago movement has been able to continue to increase 
their influence over a series of living wage campaigns. However, this 
“sophisticated” combination of strategies has relied on the strength of 
relationships built up over the last decade—it would probably not make sense for 
a brand new coalition to attempt something similar from scratch. On the other 
hand, other cities could profitably replicate the way each Chicago campaign has 
expanded the core group of leaders, deepened bonds between them, and 
catalyzed broader change in the region. 
To move in this direction, organizers in all three cities have formed 
capacity-building intermediary institutions of three types (though none of the 
cities in this study have had all three functioning at once):  
• Coordinating organizations that concentrate local expertise in policy work 
and coalition-building.  
• Leadership development and training to facilitate the emergence of a 
cadre of bridge-building leaders from grassroots organizations and unions.  
• Independent grassroots political apparatuses.  
These nascent movements remain basically oppositional, and haven’t yet 
faced the challenge of governing and putting forward a proactive agenda. It 
seems likely, however, that the balancing act being developed between insider 
and outsider strategies, and between immediate and long-term goals, will serve 
them well in making this transition. Initial steps toward a more accountable 
relationship between politicians and movements can be seen in Progressive 
Milwaukee and the Grassroots Collaborative’s efforts to find and run candidates 
from within their own membership. In their efforts to define what an equitable and 
caring city would look like and begin building the infrastructure to bring it into 
reality, these movements are creating the ability to contest local growth machines 
across all three dimensions of power.
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Chapter 5   
 
Moving Forward and Drawing Conclusions 
 
The coalitions described in this project are part of a much broader set of 
efforts to build working-class movements. More specifically, they represent an 
evolution of strategies on the part of local organizers in the neoliberal era. This 
sort of coalition-building is particularly interesting because it opens a window on 
questions of how movements emerge from the doldrums that have long 
fascinated academics and activists alike. Coalition campaigns are examples of 
what Aldon Morris (1984) called “movement halfway houses,” locations where 
new organizational structures, networks, norms, and relationships are developed.  
While looking back over the evolution of local movement strategies in 
each of these cities, examining the meso-level of organizational infrastructure 
helps clarify the processes of movement emergence. A strong infrastructure of 
membership organizations, networks, and technical assistance providers of 
expertise make the emergence of strong local movements more likely. However, 
infrastructure is clearly not enough. Organizers need to develop new internal 
cultures in order to bring people together across entrenched differences, and 
movements must also navigate a political system stacked against them when 
they attempt to deliver concrete and immediate changes. 
These cases thus suggest that working class organizers are faced with the 
daunting task of building a strong local organizational infrastructure, developing a 
transformative culture of solidarity, and melding together several different tactical 
forms of political power to build strong movements and create change. 
Furthermore, while it seems clear that strong local movements are built over time 
through cycles of issue campaigns and base-building, overly formulaic 
approaches have weaknesses. The most seemingly parsimonious and efficient 
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efforts—mapping out formally elegant structures like the Alliance for Progressive 
Action and Campaign for Sustainable Milwaukee—turned out to be unsustainable 
and failed catastrophically. Chicago’s organizing efforts, which looked 
fragmented and less promising than the other two cities during the 1990s, have 
since coalesced into the most vibrant and effective local movement in the region. 
Guiding Strategic Evolution and Innovation Forward 
I argue that this divergence reflects Chicago’s relatively quicker adoption 
of what I call a comprehensive movement-building approach. In contrast with 
earlier efforts that tended to go from episodic ad hoc coalition-building to broad 
central bodies, this approach involves bringing together broad coalitions to work 
on specific issue campaigns, but relies on more focused intermediary 
organizations to play a coordinating and consolidating role between campaigns. 
These strategies evolved through campaigns to balance the inherent tensions 
between efficiency and sustainability facing organizers.  
There are long-standing debates surrounding nearly every element of 
working class movement-building, with “optimistic” and “pessimistic” positions 
well established on each. Despite libraries full of scholarship, few of these 
dilemmas have been resolved conclusively, as counter-examples to nearly every 
pattern can be found. Even researchers examining the same cases often draw 
very different conclusions, as shown by ongoing debates within U.S. labor history 
or the implications of the movements of the 1960s. 
a. Grounded Generalization: Transferring Strategies to New Locations 
If there is a common thread to the literature on working class movements, 
it seems to be that their development is historically contingent and bound up in 
specific contexts. Hard and fast rules of human behavior, organizational patterns, 
and the outcomes of strategic choices do not exist, but patterns emerge across 
similar situations. While most social theorists work from such an assumption, it is 
more difficult to translate into practice-oriented work. In appealing to a non-
academic audience, most studies that strive for social relevance conclude with a 
section of “best practices” that boil down complex analyses into a set of rules to 
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be adopted by practitioners. The recent literature on coalition-building and 
revitalizing the labor movement has been especially prone to this sort of 
abstraction and simplification (Tattersall and Reynolds, 2007). In trying to give 
activists what we think they want, writers often provide over-simplified strategic 
recommendations that may not be translatable to their situation. 
An alternative path involves attempting to specify the conditions under 
which a finding may be generalizable (Paige, 1999). This approach is particularly 
attractive in social movement studies because it mirrors ongoing dialogues within 
movements over strategic approaches and their dissemination and recognizes 
the inevitable differences between contexts. Some of the more interesting 
implications of this project flow from the fact that there is a current wave of 
interest in trying to build proactive labor-community coalitions to address 
economic justice issues. In particular, two national networks—Partnerships for 
Working Families (PWF) and Building Partnerships (BP)—have emerged from 
recent successes in California and are spreading their model around the country 
(Dean & Reynolds, forthcoming).  
The analytical task before these groups involves a sort of grounded 
generalization—understanding the development of local movements in their 
specific context, figuring out which elements were essential to their success, and 
suggesting how they might be translated into another local context. This parallels 
the increasing consensus within organizational studies that, rather than looking 
for causes, it is more useful to identify the conditions that increase the likelihood 
of a group evolving toward greater competency (Hackman, 2005). 
Los Angeles, which has transformed from a bastion of the “open shop” 
into a stronghold of working class people of color, suggests the potential of a 
fully-realized version of this approach. However, the Campaign for a Sustainable 
Milwaukee tried to implement a very similar model as LA organizers in the 1990s. 
They built a broad coalition, developed policy analysis capacity and an 
independent political apparatus, and focused on cross-cutting regional issues 
that could unify people and point them towards a different way of thinking about 
economic development. The CSM was successful both on paper and in practice; 
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however, it declined rapidly in the late-1990s, leaving few traces behind, which 
offers a cautionary lesson to PWF and BP as they try to spread the “California 
model.”  
The blueprint for the CSM existed before the first meeting was called, and 
local organizations and leaders were basically plugged into the framework. This 
well-designed framework allowed the CSM to grow quickly and wield power 
effectively, but because it housed most local capacity and expertise under one 
roof, efforts in Milwaukee were significantly set back by the Campaign’s demise. 
The ambition and complexity of the CSM made leading it tremendously complex 
as well. During its peak years, Bruce Colburn, Bill Dempsey, and Joel Rogers 
brought together three unique sets of skills, experiences, and dispositions. The 
CSM was formed around them, making it difficult to imagine molding together a 
similar leadership team. 
Chicago is an interesting case because it has built a strong leadership 
core and undertaken many of the same tasks as organizers in the model regions 
of California, but without building nearly the institutional capacity to coordinate it. 
The near future will give some clues as to whether this represents an alternative 
path, or if they will run up against the limits of their lack of capacity and need to 
do more institution-building. Imagining such alternatives can help check the 
tendency to impose order through hindsight. Los Angeles evolved their model 
over time and based on the local situation. While the current model can be 
described as possessing a high degree of internal logic, and has produced 
successful results, it does not necessarily follow that if the same infrastructure 
existed in other cities, they would also have strong working class movements. 
This has implications for places like Pittsburgh and Milwaukee, where 
activists have affiliated with PWF and BP are building institutions along the lines 
of the California model. What specifically needs to be done to build working class 
power in these regions? What might be different in the Rust Belt generally and 
each region specifically? Milwaukee’s labor leadership has largely come from the 
central labor council (CLC), not an activist local. Pittsburgh’s community 
organizing has been weak, the CLC has not been particularly supportive of 
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coalition-building, and the main activist union locals have taken a top-down 
approach, supporting progressive causes through money and statements rather 
than involving members. How might efforts evolve differently in these situations? 
My conclusions attempt to generalize to the principles that emerged from 
multiple cases and hold true across contexts while also embedding them in a 
contextual trajectory. This study of course only begins to surmount this difficulty 
through its limited comparisons across time and region. It does however, provide 
a glimpse of the kind of “knowledge work” necessary for movements to grow and 
evolve, as participants learn through their experiences. It also provides a 
reminder to avoid focusing narrowly on the “rational” elements of organizing and 
dialogue. As accounts of the Black Freedom Movement in particular have shown, 
emotions and cultural norms are central to creating space for strategic learning 
(Barker & Cox, 2002). Marshall Ganz (2005) has argued that the strategic 
capacity of a leadership team—their ability to recontexualize and synthesize data 
in fashioning new approaches—is the key variable in understanding why 
challenging groups sometimes win. I agree that the ability to learn and adjust 
over time is central to the success of organizing in these three cities. In addition, I 
find that planning for this sort of “knowledge work” is quite inconsistent, 
suggesting that it could be the focus of movement capacity-building interventions. 
b. Organizing as “Movement Farming?” 
Urban farming provides a potentially useful metaphor for the craft of local 
movement-building. Community gardening has spread widely across U.S. urban 
areas in recent decades (over a roughly similar timeframe as the recent wave of 
labor-community coalition-building). These gardens represent collaborative 
efforts to reclaim some slivers of our deindustrialized cities for the production of 
immediately useful goods. They are built on the history of what came before, 
often requiring the cleanup of contaminated soil, much like coalitions must 
overcome legacies of racism and mistrust. Some community gardens reflect an 
agglomeration of individual interests in the form of separate plots marked out and 
only sharing some basic resources like irrigation systems, reflecting what I have 
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called additive logics of coalition-building. However, other community gardens 
(and coalitions) develop more transformative logics, moving beyond their initial 
boundaries and exploring ways the group can produce more through extended 
cooperation. 
Farming also involves the combination of art and science that is basic to 
organizing. A good gardener tests the soil, understands the growing season, and 
plans out an optimal spatial relationship between different crops before planting, 
but also accepts that each plot of ground is unique and only experience can 
show what the exact best strategy for that garden will be. That sort of iterative 
learning process enables gardeners to change some of the “context” of their land. 
Rotating crops, fertilizing, and mulching enable a good gardener to grow things 
that would have been impossible when they began, much as coalition work builds 
on itself and expands possibilities by creating cultures of solidarity and expanding 
political opportunities. 
Finally, farmers have developed a healthy sort of fatalism over the 
centuries that might prove useful to organizers. Locusts, hailstorms, and other 
unpredictable events that can always ruin a season don’t provide much 
alternative except to shrug and get back to work. Conditions that produce a 
bumper crop are likewise unpredictable, so farmers do pretty much the same 
thing each season, while systematically making small improvements to their 
systems and infrastructure, avoiding catastrophic losses at all costs, while trying 
to continually do a little better. Organizers also face unpredictable winds, and can 
lay the infrastructural groundwork during fallow periods to increase the chances 
of strong movements emerging during moments of political opportunity. 
Summing Up: Spheres of Strategic Intervention 
Three overall areas of focus emerge from this study as key cross-cutting 
areas of movement strategy: building organizational infrastructure, developing 
new cultures of solidarity within working class movements, and using issue 
campaigns strategically to further these goals. Most effective organizers operate 
with two timeframes in mind: short-term efforts to capitalize on political openings, 
and a longer-term focus on strengthening the base of the movement to be able to 
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take on larger challenges. As demonstrated in the more successful examples, 
such as the Chicago living wage campaigns, well-run campaigns can succeed on 
both levels through careful strategic choices. 
Sphere 1: Building Organizational Infrastructure 
Organizational structures are the building blocks of movements, and as 
the element most clearly under the control of activists, attract a lot of attention. 
Through the analysis of these cases and similar work by others, an 
organizational taxonomy of local working class movements including three main 
types of infrastructural bodies emerged: the building blocks of membership-
based organizations; networks that link these organizations together; and 
intermediary “expert” organizations that serve as repositories of expertise in 
specific areas like coalition-building or leadership development. 
a. Key organizational building blocks: Unions, grassroots community 
organizations, and congregations 
The backbone of these efforts is almost always formed by existing 
organizations who take the lead in broader coalition efforts. Working class 
residents of these cities fall within three main organizational sectors: unions, 
churches, and community groups. All three can provide effective bases for 
political action, but in practice span a wide spectrum in terms of their 
effectiveness, involvement of rank-and-file members, and orientation toward 
coalition-building. These coalitions have been most successful when at least one 
organization within each sector actively engages its members in broad economic 
justice campaigns. Even better, sometimes these key partners are already 
politically well-situated and able to influence political decision-makers and other 
leaders in their sector. 
Often, such perfect partners do not exist in a region, making internal 
reform efforts and/or new organizing crucial to creating building blocks. This 
connects to broader efforts within each sector (e.g. revitalizing the labor 
movement by moving from a “business model” that treats members as 
consumers to an “organizing model” that relies on democratic participation to 
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generate power). It can be difficult for leaders from other sectors to understand 
the dynamics of other organizations when looking for good partners, making 
bridge-builders with cross-cutting experiences important. 
The 1996 leadership changes at the AFL-CIO provided more space, 
resources, and encouragement for labor-community collaboration. However, the 
current upheaval in the labor movement, with several large unions leaving the 
AFL-CIO, has made such work more challenging. Several of the unions most 
likely to be active in such coalitions because they represent many low-wage 
workers of color, like SEIU, have adopted an industry-based model of organizing 
that makes local coalition-building less interesting to them. In some regions, the  
lessened involvement in the labor council of those unions who left the AFL-CIO 
has also diminished the ability of local labor movements to collaborate with 
community organizations.  
Particularly puzzling is the absence of certain organizations from these 
cases. Public employee unions would appear to be prime candidates for 
coalition-building, with much to gain from joining with community groups to 
defend high quality public services. However, for the most part unions of 
teachers, city employees, social workers, etc. have been absent in these three 
cities. At times, they even tend toward conflictual relationships with community 
stakeholders, diminishing this potential bridge (Scanlon & Harding, 2005). 
b. Networks: Labor, grassroots organizations, the “religious left,” and a diverse 
cross-sector leadership core 
Although there are seldom many “key activist organizations” available, 
many regions are even weaker at the intermediary level linking these groups 
together. Every region in the U.S. has at least a nominal labor council organized 
through the AFL-CIO; however, the effectiveness of these bodies varies 
dramatically. In the best cases, the labor council actually fuses together various 
locals into something resembling a movement, with common goals and shared 
resources. More often, they are loose agglomerations of independent locals far 
more connected to their parent unions than each other. Similarly, while interfaith 
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justice coalitions exist across the country, their success in generating 
participation in more than a handful of congregations is usually shallow.  
Still, the faith community seems often to be more networked than 
community organizations, whose turf battles and parochialism make partnering 
difficult. As a group of community organizations dedicated to building power and 
moving larger issues, the Grassroots Collaborative is the only good example of 
such a network arising from these cases. MICAH is the most successful faith-
based network in terms of pulling area churches toward a focus on social justice 
organizing, and Milwaukee has also had probably the most “activist-minded” 
labor council. However, while the labor council has consistently been involved in 
a broad range of issues, not many new “activist locals” directly organizing 
members have emerged through their efforts. 
It is even more rare to find strong cross-sector networks in these cities. 
Community activists, union leaders, and progressive people of faith seldom share 
the same spaces or get to develop relationships. Coalition campaigns are thus 
very valuable in providing space for such interactions and bringing people 
together across differences. 
c. Knowledge development and capacity-builders: Policy, politics, leadership 
development, and coalition-building 
Cross-sector intermediaries also provide vital movement support functions, 
like analyzing and generating policy, developing leaders, and coordinating 
independent political action. One or more of these functions are often performed 
under the same roof or in closely affiliated organizations although, as mentioned 
above, consolidation has mixed effects on success. These cases, along with 
recent successes in California, also make clear the role of organizations that 
provide coalition-building expertise (Nicholls, 2003). Members of the Grassroots 
Collaborative have developed a basic coalition framework that now provides the 
starting point for bringing together broader coalitions in efforts like the Big Box 
Living Wage campaign. 
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Questions often emerge about whether to build on existing structures that 
are situated to perform these functions. Local universities often have centers that 
provide some policy capacity and labor councils usually have some form of 
political apparatus. The resource advantages of building from existing structures 
are clear, but organizers must always ask whether the organization can fully 
transform into a new iteration that is truly cross-sector. 
The national networks (BP and PWF) are particularly focused on building 
this intermediary level of infrastructure. PWF is focusing on developing “think-
and-do tanks” to function as movement hubs in terms of policy and organizing 
expertise modeled on the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE). BP 
prioritizes the formation of Civic Leadership Institutes based on the leadership 
development model in San Jose. 
d. Putting the pieces together 
Table 5.1 summarizes the key elements of organizational infrastructure 
that facilitate local movement-building in the form of a chart that might be useful 
for self-assessment by activists and provide the basis for a set of measures could 
enable research across a broad set of cities. I developed these measures by 
triangulating the results from this study with other accounts of labor-community 
collaboration and the social movements literature more broadly. I have adjusted 
them based on feedback from a few activists and scholars, but the scales remain 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































I think that something like this chart could be a useful tool for both 
researchers and organizers. As a next step, I imagine testing it at gatherings of 
local leaders interested in coalition-building. After asking everyone to fill it out 
individually, I would bring them together in small groups, and then the full body, 
to assess their region on each dimension. This iterative process would allow the 
group and I to see where people interpreted things differently or disagreed with 
each other, which would be valuable for revising the instrument and building a 
common understanding.  
From an organizing perspective, such a group assessment could inform 
strategic planning and future action, as well as broadening people’s perspectives. 
In terms of research, a more refined survey instrument could then be 
administered to groups across a broader set of regions and then analyzed 
statistically with attention to patterns, particularly whether certain dimensions 
appear consistently more difficult to attain or if groups of people tend to 
demonstrate systematic differences in responses. Along with more qualitative 
and theoretical work, this could help inform emergent questions such as whether 
to weight certain dimensions more heavily than others. 
Figures 5.2-5.5 present an extremely preliminary and rough estimate of 
local movement capacity in each city over the past two decades. I provide what 
are in effect “my answers” to the survey to demonstrate what this might look like 
in practice and because it demonstrates some interesting trends that suggest 
these measures do correspond with movement success. While I assessed each 
dimension as fully as possible given the data I have, my understanding is 
nowhere near fine-grained enough to be completely confident about the 
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As shown by Figure 5.2, Chicago has steadily increased capacity in most 
areas, but remains somewhat sparse in local technical capacity. This may be 
changing, as groups are currently exploring the possibility of starting a Civil 
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Figure 5.3 shows that Milwaukee’s movement infrastructure has ebbed 
and flowed in strength. It is currently relatively solid across the board, perhaps 
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After a promising increase in capacity in the 1990s, Pittsburgh is the 
weakest of the three cities, particularly at the intermediary level, which leaves 
them less able to coordinate action. 
e. Building infrastructure over time and in layers 
A strong infrastructure makes it more likely that vibrant movements will 
emerge from conflicts. The elements that make up such an infrastructure are 
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mutually constitutive. The presence of each helps make the others more likely, 
and certainly facilitates the kind of coalition work that then likely spurs investment 
in further infrastructure-building. These infrastructural elements are all in some 
ways results, as well as causes, of strong local movements, so timing becomes 
important in understanding how each influenced the other. The chart in Figure 
5.5. brings these numbers together visually, clearly showing the declines around 
the turn of the century in Pittsburgh and Milwaukee, Chicago’s steady growth, 
and Milwaukee’s recent bounce back. 













While these elements of movement infrastructure fit together, it does not 
seem necessary that they develop in any particular form or order. In a case like 
Chicago, a variety of change efforts within organizations, developing networks, 
and building capacity have proceeded in sometimes loose relation to each other. 
Contrasting the three cities, it becomes clear that it is not necessary, or even 
desirable, to house these elements together. Though it may look more efficient 
on paper to create large, parsimonious systems like the CSM, such a strategy 
places “all the eggs in one basket,” making serious breakdowns more possible, 
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as well as increasing the chances that not all of the tasks will be performed well. 
Rather than striving for a parsimonious model, more overlapping networks 
evolving over time to fit the local conditions are stronger and more resilient. The 
temptation appears tough to resist—foundations have responded to the success 
of the Grassroots Collaborative by pushing them to become broader and to grow 
quickly, even though their tighter focus has arguably been central to their 
success.  
I also started this project assuming that a broad permanent coalition like 
the CSM or APA was the gold standard that everyone should aspire to—it took 
repeated demonstrations otherwise to make me question it. When prioritizing 
resilience, a set of multiple overlapping networks makes a lot of sense. Not 
housing all the local capacity under one roof makes a movement less vulnerable 
to a breakdown in that organization, while redundancy of expertise and capacity 
likewise provides insurance and forms denser networks. The spider web analogy 
suggested by Sheila Cochran, head of the Milwaukee Central Labor Council, 
rings true in relation to the success of strong and flexible networks and the role of 
bridge-building leaders in proactively diagnosing weak spots and stringing 
together relationships within inherently fragile structures. One element not 
captured by Figure 5.5 is the multiplicative effect of trust and relationship-building 
within stable situations. While Milwaukee has managed to rebuild much of its 
infrastructure since the collapse of the CSM, they have nothing like the reservoirs 
of trust and goodwill built up over time in Chicago, which emphasizes the 
importance of avoiding “catastrophic defeats.” 
Sphere 2: Developing Cultures of Solidarity 
These organizational elements are intimately connected to the cultural 
work of movements discussed in detail in Chapter 3. Coalitions and intermediary 
organizations provide the spaces where local activists come together from 
different spheres, develop trust and better understandings of each other, and 
begin to form common goals. Multiracial cultures of solidarity are clearly essential 
to the development of working class movements in the U.S., which have often 
stumbled while trying to bring people together across differences. Strained 
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relationships between unions and communities of color have held back 
movement-building in each of these three cities, prompting organizers to 
proactively confront these divisions with a combination of prefigurative strategies. 
Bridge-building leaders have tried to make themselves and their 
organizations reflect the norms and structural relationships they would like to see, 
even while recognizing that most others are operating according to different 
logics. Individually, these leaders try to “become the change they want to see” by 
modeling practices of forthrightness and trusting others, “swallowing hard” during 
conflicts, and creating space for new relationships to develop by absorbing 
negative energy.  They also work to create “beloved communities” within 
organizational structures that develop cooperative norms and realistic 
expectations between partners, and then extend these new norms beyond the 
initial core group of leaders. 
The most successful efforts have created formal structures that pay 
attention to the differences between participants in ways that are counter-intuitive 
to some organizers. The Grassroots Collaborative model of requiring 
organizations to commit resources and turnout members at events in order to be 
involved in strategic decisions has clarified the system and brought things out in 
the open for discussion. Efforts to maintain strict equality between partners, such 
as the Pittsburgh Living Wage Campaign, proved very difficult to maintain in the 
heat of a campaign, and often seem to slide into informal systems whereby a few 
key organizations make key decisions. This sort of “false equality” poses more 
risks of internal conflict than the structural differentiation of the Chicago model. 
The Grassroots Collaborative also agglomerates the power of its member 
organizations in a way that allows them to relate on a more equal basis with 
unions when necessary. 
These cases also demonstrate that developing new cultures is a fragile 
process of building new relationships over a series of interactions, requiring 
participants to break old habits reinforced by the dominant hegemony and elite 
intervention. While people can be transformed by collective action—as in 
Chicago, where activists reported a dramatic increase in levels of trust and 
 
 191 
openness during the final weeks of the Big Box Living Wage campaign—bad 
interactions can also quickly set back an effort, as people find their pessimistic 
expectations confirmed. Thus, a main task of organizers is convincing 
participants to follow Pittsburgh activist Steve Donahue’s advice to approach 
other organizations with a favorable (or at least neutral) bias. 
Such expansions of collective identity strengthen a local movement’s 
resistance to elite efforts to drive wedges between groups. As demonstrated by 
the Chicago case, the relative absence of class-based discourses and history of 
white working class racism in this country make working class movements 
vulnerable to efforts to promote racial splits. The living wage campaign was able 
to weather such attacks largely because it was centered on a diverse core group 
of leaders representative of the key constituencies of the city who had developed 
a basis of trust working together over a series of campaigns. In such 
circumstances, the attempts of the Daley administration and Wal-Mart to “play 
the race card” actually catalyzed the development of a multiracial working class 
culture of solidarity by spurring internal discussion and the development of a 
collective identity frame linking together class and race in terms of economic 
justice.  
This transformation of interests and identities marks the kind of moment in 
which local coalitions move beyond additive logics of collective action to become 
“more than the sum of their parts.” Relationship-building methods from the 
community organizing world could be particularly helpful in coalition settings 
where many participants do not have a good understanding of each other’s 
organizations and interests. Groups like MICAH very intentionally set up a series 
of “one-on-ones” where leaders sit down and ask each other questions, each 
doing more listening than talking during their turn. As many respondents said, 
unions and community organizations have much different internal politics. 
Strategic disagreements can be more about different ways of doing things than 
substance, and a basic understanding of where someone is coming from can 
help people find common ground. The process Milwaukee labor leader Sheila 
Cochran described as “webslinging” – proactively searching out and repairing 
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weak spots through relationship-building – is a related technique crucial to 
maintaining unity during campaigns. 
Sphere 3: Using Campaigns to Build Power Strategically 
Issue campaigns are the galvanizing events of these movement-building 
efforts, providing opportunities to win concrete changes and plough the ground 
from which movements emerge by building organizational infrastructure and 
promoting cultural change. These cases show how major leaps forward occur 
during the heat of campaigns as new possibilities present themselves, new 
relationships and norms are developed, and new strategies are experimented 
with. The relatively open and transitory nature of coalition campaigns may make 
them more likely sites of experimentation than more permanent organizations. 
While challenges emerge from the perception among activists that many 
coalitions are temporary, with unclear lines of ownership, this openness may also 
encourage leaders to try new things. 
These local movements pursue both short and long-term goals in their 
efforts to wrest control over local policy-making away from the neoliberal growth 
machines that dominate each region. Their campaigns are designed to affect 
individual policy decisions in the short term, while also building the long-term 
capacity of the movement. These coalitions have been most effective impacting 
policy decisions when they are able to combine “insider” (e.g. lobbying) and 
“outsider” (e.g. disruptive collective action) forms of power, particularly in 
conjunction with an independent electoral apparatus. Thus, when unions and 
community groups develop the ability to mobilize their constituents to vote, take 
direct action, and lobby, local politicians find it difficult to resist their demands, 
even in the face of large financial interests. 
The experiences of these coalitions show that local movements appear to 
be quite capable of absorbing (and even benefiting from) short-term losses, but 
that organizers should be very wary of suffering a catastrophic loss in terms of 
the long-term health of the movement. In practice, this suggests making strategic 
choices within campaigns with long-term goals in mind, and refusing to make 
compromises that will fracture key relationships even if they might produce more 
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success in the short term. In this vein, the community organizations involved in 
the Good Jobs and Livable Neighborhoods coalition refused to entertain 
proposed community benefits agreements that would have more fully addressed 
their demands for affordable housing and local hiring because it likely would have 
limited their long term ability to work more closely with the building trades unions. 
The longer-term success of a campaign is measured by whether it 
strengthened the local movement’s capacity to take on further struggles. Perhaps 
most importantly, campaigns allow local movements the opportunity to expand 
their capacity to bring people together across differences. In each campaign, 
organizers hope to: 
• Build the core group of bridge-building leaders by incorporating new 
activists, deepening bonds of trust, and developing shared norms and 
vision; 
• Develop cultures of solidarity within the broader membership of the 
organizations involved that expands their collective identities and connects 
to a broader vision of social justice; 
• Strengthen intermediary institutions that will continue bringing people 
together across differences and support future campaigns. 
To accomplish their larger goals, these local movements also need to 
build power to change the terms of the debate, which entails building 
intermediary institutions to develop and promulgate alternative visions, policy 
prescriptions, and leaders from within the movement. 
Developing Strategies and Bridging the Activist-Academic Divide 
The United States has a particularly sharp divide between the academy 
and social movements compared to many other countries. When it comes to 
labor and community movements, recent decades have seen a decrease in the 
labor studies centers and extension programs that tend to be a prime location for 
activists and academics to meet, further separating the two. This has arguably 
led to a less pragmatically politically involved US academy and relatively weak 
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“knowledge capacity” in social movements, something that might change if both 
sides move closer together and find more areas of overlap. 
Ideally, work within each of the above spheres of practice reinforces each 
other in a virtuous cycle. Well-selected issue campaigns provide the opportunity 
to recruit new partners, experiment with new intermediaries and strategies, and 
deepen cultures of solidarity. “Down times” between campaigns allow the chance 
to institutionalize the most successful of these experiments and proactively set 
the stage for emerging issues. This approach to local movement-building 
represents some clear advances, but is certainly not the end-all and be-all of 
movement strategy. As opponents adapt and the political-economic context 
evolves, it is more than a truism that movements must either keep growing or die. 
To facilitate this process of innovation, a cadre of local activist-
intellectuals—people doing the real work of organizing but also thinking about the 
bigger picture—could emerge and be linked together in each region, particularly 
within the intermediary layer of bridging organizations (Barker and Cox, 2002). 
By virtue of their central positions within local networks, this group would be well-
placed to function as “webslingers” surveying local movement infrastructure, 
diagnosing weak points, and proactively creating new intermediary organizations 
or connections. By analyzing past campaigns and efforts in other regions, this 
brain trust could play a lead role in consolidating local knowledge and strategic 
innovations, catalyzing change within existing organizations, and facilitating 
communication across divides. 
The national movement-building networks like PWF and BP could play an 
important role in linking these activist-intellectuals together across regions and 
developing their capacity to make grounded generalizations across contexts. 
Expanding slightly beyond their role of promulgating and adapting a model to 
other regions, these networks could explicitly set out to develop a core group of 
activist intellectuals in regions around the country, each seeking to develop local 
strategies to facilitate the emergence of strong working class movements. 
Through the comparative process of trying to translate their experiences into 
recommendations, those involved would hopefully develop a deeper 
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understanding of their local efforts as well as begin to isolate the common 
threads that emerge across cases. Instead of playing an “expert” role and mainly 
disseminating knowledge, the more “traditional” academic intellectuals involved 
would then focus on helping participants in the network develop their research 
skills and process. 
As many observers from a wide range of fields have said, the only likely 
prospect for the transformative and complex systems change desired by groups 
like these working class organizers lies in the development of “learning 
organizations” that are able to evolve and continue to increase their strategic 
capacity over time. Working class organizers face an unfriendly environment and 
the challenge of balancing multiple logics of action—both bringing people 
together and helping them change simultaneously. This demands new 
organizational structures and cultures, leadership styles, and strategic repertoires. 
Over time, perhaps these activist intellectuals would come to see their 
organizing work like farming—an ongoing process embedded in a complex 
system, with no hard-and-fast rules, but many relatively consistent patterns, a 
rich trove of folk wisdom, and the ever-present certainty that one’s work is never 
done. With such a perspective, they might very well navigate a variety of locally-
specific paths toward strong working-class movements, build alternative 
structures while also forcing existing bodies to change, and even begin to explore 
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